Madison v. Spancrete Machine Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Madison v. Spancrete Machine Corp.

278 A.D.2d 867, 718 N.Y.S.2d 910, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13652

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 27, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 278 A.D.2d 867 (Madison v. Spancrete Machine Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Madison v. Spancrete Machine Corp., 278 A.D.2d 867, 718 N.Y.S.2d 910, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13652 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. [868]*868Memorandum: Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting his motion to compel his attorney to sign a consent to change attorney form upon the condition that his incoming attorneys reimburse his former attorney for actual cash disbursements. The payment of those disbursements was an advance of litigation expenses for which plaintiff is ultimately responsible (see, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-103 [b] [1] [22 NYCRR 1200.22 (b) (1)]; NY St Bar Assn Opn No. 653 [1993]). Plaintiffs former attorney is not required to defer recoupment until plaintiffs ultimate recovery (see, Caruso v Sinistorie, 18 AD2d 1074, 1075). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J. — Counsel Fees.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Green, Hayes, Wisner and Lawton, JJ.

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Order unanimously affirmed without costs. [868]*868Memorandum: Contrary to the contention of plaintiff, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting his motion to compel his attorney to sign a consent to change attorney form upon the condition that his incoming attorneys reimburse his former attorney for actual cash disbursements. The payment of those disbursements was an advance of litigation expenses for which plaintiff is ultimately responsible (see, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-103 [b] [1] [22 NYCRR 1200.22 (b) (1)]; NY St Bar Assn Opn No. 653 [1993]). Plaintiffs former attorney is not required to defer recoupment until plaintiffs ultimate recovery (see, Caruso v Sinistorie, 18 AD2d 1074, 1075). (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J. — Counsel Fees.) Present — Pigott, Jr., P. J., Green, Hayes, Wisner and Lawton, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

278 A.D.2d 867, 718 N.Y.S.2d 910, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13652, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madison-v-spancrete-machine-corp-nyappdiv-2000.

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