Madison Meadows, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Lands’ End, Inc.

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT TACOMA 7 MADISON MEADOWS, individually CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05841-BHS 8 and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ORDER 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. 12 Defendant. 13

This matter is before the Court on defendant Lands’ End’s motion to dismiss 14 plaintiff Madison Meadows’ amended complaint. Dkt. 30. 15 Meadows filed this putative class action in Pierce County Superior Court, alleging 16 that the retailer Lands’ End falsely advertises products as discounted on its website and in 17 promotional emails when the advertised prices are regularly available. Dkt. 22 at 3. She 18 alleges that she would not have made her purchases had she known the products were not 19 actually offered at a discount. She brings claims under the Washington Consumer 20 21 22 1 Protection Act (CPA) and the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA)1, 2 and for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, quasi-contract/unjust enrichment, 3 and intentional and negligent misrepresentation. She seeks class certification, statutory

4 and treble damages, and equitable and injunctive relief. 5 Lands’ End removed the action to this Court and moved to dismiss under Federal 6 Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Meadows failed to plead her fraud-based claims 7 with specificity, allege an actual injury, or plausibly state a claim for relief. It also 8 contends that Meadows’ CEMA claim is preempted by federal law. In addition, Lands’

9 End moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Meadows lacks standing 10 to pursue her CEMA claim because she failed to allege a concrete personal injury from 11 the email subject lines. Dkt. 30 at 18. 12 Because standing implicates the Court’s jurisdiction to decide the case, the Court 13 begins with this threshold issue. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show

14 that (1) she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or 15 imminent, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 16 that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 17 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). For an injury to be “concrete,” it “must actually exist”; it must be 18 “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 340 (citation modified). For an injury to be particularized,

19 “it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way” such that the plaintiff 20 “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.” Id. 21 1 CEMA prohibits “the use of any false or misleading information in the subject line of a 22 commercial email.” Brown v. Old Navy, LLC, 4 Wn.3d 580, 583, 567 P.3d 38 (2025). 1 A statutory violation alone does not constitute a concrete injury. TransUnion LLC 2 v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426, 427 (2021) (A plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] 3 the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and

4 purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right” because “an injury in law 5 is not an injury in fact.”). Instead, “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely 6 harmed by a defendant's statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that 7 violation in federal court.” Id. at 427 (emphasis in original). The Court explains that a 8 plaintiff must demonstrate that they have suffered a “physical, monetary, or cognizable

9 intangible harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American 10 courts.” Id. 11 Meadows argues that the “receipt” of false or misleading emails, is sufficient to 12 establish Article III standing “‘even absent additional allegations of harm.’” Dkt. 33 at 16 13 (quoting Harbers v. Eddie Bauer, LLC, 415 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1009 (W.D. Wash. 2019).

14 However, Transunion squarely rejected that proposition, holding that a statutory 15 violation—in this case, a CEMA violation—does not, by itself, confer Article III 16 standing. See also Montes v. Catalyst Brands LLC, et. al., No. 2:25-CV-0281-TOR, 2025 17 WL 3485827, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2025) (explaining that “the simple act of failing 18 to meet the standard requisite duty alone is not a harm” (citing Dillingham Tug & Barge

19 Corp. v. Collier Carbon & Chem. Corp., 707 F.2d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983))). 20 Meadows next contends that Lands’ End’s false and misleading emails caused 21 concrete harm by clogging her inbox, and those of the putative class, with unwanted 22 spam, wasting their limited data space and invading their privacy. Dkt. 33 at 16; see Dkt. 1 22 at 28. She explains that because she cannot discern whether Lands Ends emails 2 contain “truthful information” or whether they are “spam with false and misleading 3 information,” she “cannot rely on the emails she receives.” Dkt. 22 at 30. However,

4 Meadows cites to only two emails from Lands’ End over the course of two weeks. She 5 does not allege that she read the emails, clicked on them, or purchased products based on 6 the alleged misrepresentations. 7 Nor does she allege that the emails were unsolicited or unwanted. To the contrary, 8 Meadows acknowledged that “she would like to continue to receive and rely on truthful

9 information from Lands’ End regarding its Products.” Dkt. 22 at 30. On similar facts, the 10 district court in Montes concluded that the receipt of such emails does not constitute an 11 invasion of privacy where the plaintiff “welcomed Defendants’ marketing emails” and 12 indeed, “wishes to continue to receive [them].” 2025 WL 3485827, at *3. The Court 13 likewise concludes that Meadows has not suffered an invasion of privacy here.

14 Courts in this district addressing similar actions have reached mixed results on the 15 issue of standing. Compare Stephen Liss et al., v. Skechers USA Inc., No. 3:25-CV- 16 05861-DGE, 2026 WL 1392327, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2026) (concluding that “a 17 violation of CEMA confers standing”) with Montes, 2025 WL 3485827, at *3 (dismissing 18 CEMA complaint due to lack of standing); Nuri v. True Religion Apparel, No. 2:25-CV-

19 00690-LK, 2026 WL 864886, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2026) (remanding for lack of 20 standing); cf. Crooks v. Coty DTC Holdings, LLC, 2026 WL 1265422 (D. Md. May 8, 21 2026) (remanding for lack of standing for claim under Maryland CEMA which is 22 “virtually identical” to Washington’s CEMA). 1 Other courts have ordered supplemental briefing on the issues of standing, whether 2 the amount in controversy satisfies CAFA jurisdictional requirements, and whether a stay 3 is warranted in light of the appeal in Montes. See Selay Shahpur & Lindsey Smith, et. al.,

4 v. Ulta Salon, Cosmetics and Fragrance, Inc., No. 2:25-CV-00284-RLP, 2026 WL 5 1348114, at *2 (E.D. Wash. May 14, 2026) (requesting supplemental briefing on standing 6 and the amount in controversy for CAFA); Hutton v. Papa John's USA, No. C25-1922- 7 KKE, 2026 WL 1183241, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2026) (same); Kempf v. Fullbeauty 8 Brands Operations, LLC, 25-cv-1141-TSZ, ECF No. 48 (W.D. Wash. February 13, 2026)

9 (same); Talley v. Everlane, Inc., No. C26-0007-KKE, 2026 WL 1429329, at *2 (W.D. 10 Wash. May 21, 2026) (ordering the parties to show cause why the case should not be 11 stayed pending the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Montes); Dalana Brown v. La-z-boy 12 Incorporated, No. 2:25-CV-02203-JHC, 2026 WL 1494951, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 28, 13 2026) (same).

14 Given the lack of consensus among courts addressing this issue, the Ninth 15 Circuit’s forthcoming Montes decision is likely to provide important guidance. 16 Accordingly, the parties are ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE, why this case should not be 17 stayed pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Montes. They should do so by June 15. 18 Meadows’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 30, is RE-NOTED for June 15, 2026.

19 Dated this 2nd day of June, 2026. A 20 21 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 22 United States District Judge