1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MADISON FISK, RAQUEL CASTRO, Case No.: 3:22-CV-173 TWR (MSB) GRETA VISS, CLARE BOTTERILL, 12 MAYA BROSCH, HELEN BAUER, ORDER (1) GRANTING JOINT 13 CARINA CLARK, NATALIE MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL FIGUEROA, ERICA GROTEGEER, OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, 14 KAITLIN HERI, OLIVIA PETRINE, (2) CERTIFYING CLASSES FOR 15 AISHA WATT, KAMRYN THE PURPOSE OF SETTLEMENT, WHITWORTH, SARA ABSTEN, AND (3) GRANTING MOTION FOR 16 ELEANOR DAVIES, ALEXA DIETZ, ATTORNEYS’ FEES 17 and LARISA SULCS, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, (ECF Nos. 171, 174, 177, 178) 18 Plaintiffs, 19 v. 20 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 21 CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY 22 and SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendants. 23 24 Presently before the Court are the Parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class 25 Action Settlement (“Final App. Mot.,” ECF No. 171), Class Counsel’s Motion for Attorney 26 Fees and Costs as Part of Class Action Settlement (“Fee Mot.,” ECF No. 174), Daniele 27 Croteau’s Objection (“Obj.,” ECF No. 172) to Final Approval, Plaintiffs’ Response (“Obj. 28 Resp.,” ECF No. 175) to Objection to Class Action Settlement, Defendant SDSU’s 1 Response (“Fee Response,” ECF No. 176) to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, and Class 2 Counsel’s Time Entries (“Time Entries,” ECF No. 180) in Support of their Motion for 3 Attorneys’ Fees.1 The Court held a hearing on April 16, 2026. (ECF No. 181.) After 4 carefully considering the Parties’ arguments, the Objection, the facts, and the relevant law, 5 the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion for Final Approval, CERTIFIES the proposed 6 classes for the purposes of settlement, and GRANTS Class Counsel’s Motion for 7 Attorneys’ Fees.2 9 I. Plaintiffs’ Claims 10 Plaintiffs, “past and current female varsity student-athletes at SDSU,” initiated this 11 lawsuit against Defendants on February 7, 2022, alleging SDSU—a recipient of federal 12 funding—has engaged in intentional discrimination based on sex in its athletic programs 13 in violation of Title IX. (ECF No. 50 (“TAC”) ¶¶ 1, 17, 298–99, 332, 371); see also 20 14 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687. Plaintiffs specifically claim SDSU has violated, and is violating, 15 Title IX and its guiding regulations by (1) “depriving its female varsity student-athletes of 16 equal financial aid”; (2) “denying them equal athletic benefits and treatment”; and 17 (3) “retaliating against them because some of them sued SDSU for violating Title IX.” 18 (TAC ¶ 1.) 19 II. Settlement 20 Following extensive discovery by both parties, Plaintiffs filed for class certification 21 on November 22, 2024, which SDSU contested. (See ECF No. 115 (“Class Cert. Mot.”).) 22 On March 7, 2025, while Plaintiffs’ motion was pending, the Parties participated in a full- 23 day settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Michael S. Berg. (See ECF No. 133.) 24 25 1 Plaintiffs filed redacted time entries as ECF No. 180 and seek to file the unredacted time entries 26 under seal based on attorney-client privilege. The Court GRANTS the Motions to File Documents Under Seal (ECF Nos. 177, 178.) 27 2 The Parties acknowledge that any attorneys’ fees and/or cost liens from former Plaintiffs’ firms 28 1 The Parties continued to engage in settlement negotiations with Judge Berg serving as the 2 neutral mediator until August 13, 2025, when the Parties engaged in another half-day 3 settlement conference with Judge Berg and were able to reach an agreement. (See ECF 4 No. 153.) 5 III. The Classes 6 The Settlement Agreement provides two classes, and only members of Class 2 are 7 eligible for monetary relief. The classes are as follows: 8 Class 1: All female students who participate in intercollegiate varsity athletics 9 through the termination of the Settlement Agreement or, since February 7, 10 2022, participated in intercollegiate varsity athletics at San Diego State University. 11 Class 2: All female students who participated in intercollegiate varsity 12 athletics at San Diego State University from the 2018–2019 academic year 13 through the 2024–2025 academic year and did not receive all of the athletic financial aid they could have received 14
15 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 4.) These classes are virtually the same as the classes proposed 16 in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. (See generally Class Cert. Mot.)3 The Court 17 conditionally certified the classes when granting preliminary approval of the Settlement. 18 (See ECF No. 165 (“Prelim. App. Order”) at 14–20.) 19 IV. The Settlement Agreement 20 The Settlement Agreement provides injunctive relief for all class members and 21 monetary relief for the members of Class 2. 22 A. Monetary Relief for Class 2 Members 23 Under the Settlement Agreement, SDSU agrees to pay $300,000 to members of 24 Class 2. (See Settlement Agreement ¶ 27.) “Every participating Class 2 Member will 25 receive an individual settlement payment distribution based on her individual total number 26
27 3 The Class Certification Motion also included a “Retaliation Class” that was defined as “[a]ll female students who participated in intercollegiate varsity athletics at San Diego State University from 28 1 of qualifying academic years during the Class Period relative to the total years, in the 2 aggregate, for the entire Class 2.” (Final App. Mot. at 23.) “Members of Class 2 will 3 receive between $172.12 and $860.59, depending on the number of years they qualify as a 4 Class Member.” (Id.) Class 2 members do not need to submit a claim form to receive this 5 payment. (See id.) 6 B. Injunctive Relief 7 Under the Settlement Agreement, SDSU agrees to hire a mutually agreeable neutral 8 third-party to conduct a Gender Equity Review of its athletic department using the process 9 consistent with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ 1990 Title IX 10 Investigator’s Manual. (See Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 8–13.) SDSU further agrees it will 11 use the findings from the Gender Equity Review to implement a Gender Equity Plan. (See 12 id.) The third-party Title IX Reviewer must be satisfied that, once implemented, SDSU’s 13 athletic department will be in compliance with Title IX’s requirements regarding athletic 14 financial aid and athletic treatment and benefits by the end of the 2026–2027 academic 15 year. (See id. ¶¶ 14–18.) To monitor compliance, the proposed Settlement Agreement 16 provides that, from July 31, 2026, through July 31, 2028, SDSU will provide an annual 17 summary update regarding its implementation of the Gender Equity Plan. (See id. ¶ 21.) 18 To maintain transparency, SDSU will post the Gender Equity Plan and its annual summary 19 reports on the university’s varsity athletics website. (See id. ¶¶ 18, 22.) 20 SDSU also agrees to provide specific relief including: (1) providing equitable 21 nutrition to a comparable number of male and female student-athletes; (2) providing 22 coaches for men’s and women’s teams the option of having their teams travel by airplane 23 to competitions more than a six-hour drive away from the SDSU campus in an equitable 24 manner; (3) providing coaches for men’s and women’s teams the opportunity to have their 25 teams stay in hotels before competitions in the San Diego area in an equitable manner; 26 (5) making repairs to the women’s outdoor track, which are anticipated to be completed in 27 the 2025–2026 academic year, and continuing to assess the track facility for additional 28 repairs; (6) replacing the turf on the field used by the women’s varsity lacrosse team for 1 practices and competitions no later than the 2027–2028 academic year; (6) providing a 2 person who is not a coach or a member of the team to record and/or stream home 3 competitions equitably for men’s and women’s teams; and (7) providing professional 4 photography services and publicity equitably to men’s and women’s teams. (See id. 5 ¶¶ 24(a)–(f).) 6 C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 7 Under the Settlement Agreement, SDSU agrees “to pay a sum of $1,300,000 as a 8 negotiated sum for the reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses Plaintiffs incurred 9 pursuing this litigation.” (Settlement Agreement ¶ 31.) 10 D. Release of Claims 11 The Parties agree “all claims asserting violations of Title IX regarding athletic 12 financial aid, athletic treatment and benefits, and retaliation that were asserted or that could 13 have been asserted in this case are forever and irrevocably released by Plaintiffs, 14 individually and on behalf of the class.” (Settlement Agreement ¶ 37.) 16 In its Preliminary Approval Order, the Court conditionally certified the injunctive 17 relief and financial aid classes for the purposes of settlement. (See Prelim. App. Order at 18 14–20.) No new facts have been introduced that would change this analysis. Accordingly, 19 for the reasons previously explained, (see id.), the Court finds the requirements of Federal 20 Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) are satisfied and the Court 21 CERTIFIES, for the purposes of settlement only, the following classes: 22 Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2): 23 Class 1: All female students who participate in intercollegiate varsity athletics through the termination of the Settlement Agreement or, since 24 February 7, 2022, participated in intercollegiate varsity athletics at San 25 Diego State University. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3): 2 Class 2: All female students who participated in intercollegiate varsity athletics at San Diego State University from the 2018-2019 academic 3 year through the 2024-2025 academic year and did not receive all of 4 the athletic financial aid they could have received. 6 I. Legal Standard 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses 8 of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the 9 court’s approval.” “[S]trong judicial policy . . . favors settlements, particularly where 10 complex class action litigation is concerned.” Class Pls. v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 11 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). “The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed members of 12 the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 13 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court’s review of the settlement is meant to be 14 “extremely limited,” and the Court should consider the settlement as a whole. See Hanlon 15 v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by 16 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 17 For approval of a class settlement, the Court determines whether the proposed 18 settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To determine 19 whether a settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” district courts should consider 20 whether: 21 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the 22 class; 23 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; 24 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: 25 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; 26 (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; 27 28 / / / 1 (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment; and 2 (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and 3 (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 4 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)–(D). Additionally, courts may still refer to the other factors 6 commonly used in the Ninth Circuit (often referred to as the “Hanlon factors”): (1) the 7 strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 8 further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the 9 amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the 10 proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental 11 participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement. See In 12 re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Data Breach Litig., 129 F.4th 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2025). 13 Further, if there are “indicia of implicit collusion, then a proposed settlement” must 14 withstand an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other conflicts of 15 interest than is ordinarily required under Rule 23(e).” In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen, 129 F.4th 16 at 675 (citing In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 17 2011)). The indicia of collusion include: “(1) when counsel receives a disproportionate 18 distribution of the settlement; (2) when the parties negotiate a ‘clear sailing arrangement,’ 19 under which the defendant agrees not to challenge a request for an agreed-upon attorney’s 20 fee; and (3) when the agreement contains a ‘kicker’ or ‘reverter’ clause that returns 21 unawarded fees to the defendant, rather than the class.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, for 22 pre-class certification settlements, the Court must subject the settlement to “an even higher 23 level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other conflicts of interest than is ordinarily 24 required under Rule 23(e) before securing the court’s approval as fair.” Id. (citing Hanlon, 25 150 F.3d at 1026). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Adequate Notice 3 For the Court to approve a settlement, “[t]he class must be notified of a proposed 4 settlement in a manner that does not systematically leave any group without notice.” 5 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th 6 Cir. 1982). Class Counsel provided notice to the class members by sending the approved 7 notice via email to the class members’ email on file with SDSU’s athletic department. (See 8 Final App. Mot. at 9.) For Class 1, “it was determined that only nineteen women did not 9 receive notice.” (Id.) “Because the Notice and Settlement Agreement were posted on 10 SDSU’s athletics website and Class Counsel’s website, the preliminary approval of the 11 proposed class action settlement received significant press and social media attention, and 12 since Class 1 is for injunctive relief only,” the Parties did not provide further individual 13 notice to those nineteen women. (Id.) For Class 2, “it was determined that only thirty 14 women did not receive notice” via email and one of those women logged onto the website 15 and selected how she wanted to receive her settlement funds. (Id.) For the remaining 16 twenty-nine Class 2 members who did not receive email notice, the Settlement 17 Administrator sent a paper copy of the Notice to their last known address SDSU had on 18 file. (See id. at 9–10.) 19 Because the Parties complied with the notice procedures approved at the preliminary 20 approval stage, (see Prelim. App. Order at 22), and the Parties took reasonable measures 21 to provide notice, the Court finds notice was provided to all class members in an adequate 22 manner. See Santillan v. Verizon Connect, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-1257-H-KSC, 2024 WL 23 627998, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2024) (“While Rule 23 requires that ‘reasonable effort’ 24 be made to reach all class members, it does not require that each individual actually receive 25 notice.” (quoting Winans v. Emeritus Corp., No. 13-CV-03962-HSG, 2016 WL 107574, at 26 *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016))). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Collusion Factors 2 The Settlement Agreement does not contain a reverter clause, so the Court only 3 considers the clear sailing agreement and the potentially disproportionate distribution of 4 the settlement to Class Counsel. (See generally Settlement Agreement.) A “clear sailing” 5 arrangement provides for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class 6 funds, which carries “the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive 7 fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the 8 class.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941–42 (citation omitted). “[W]hen confronted with a 9 clear sailing provision, the district court has a heightened duty to peer into the provision 10 and scrutinize closely the relationship between attorneys’ fees and benefit to the class, 11 being careful to avoid awarding ‘unreasonably high’ fees simply because they are 12 uncontested.” Id. (citation omitted). 13 Because there is a clear sailing agreement, the Court carefully examines the 14 Settlement Agreement and Class Counsel’s fee request for signs of collusion. In doing so, 15 the Court finds that the requested attorneys’ fees are not disproportionate given the 16 requested $1,300,000 is less than half Class Counsel’s calculated lodestar amount of 17 $3,571,874.38. See infra pages 15–17. Further, considering the injunctive relief and the 18 unprecedented monetary award, the Court does not find the fee award is disproportionate 19 on its face. Lastly, because the injunctive relief makes the total benefit to the class hard to 20 numerically quantify, see Kim v. Allison, 8 F.4th 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2021), the Court 21 declines to apply a common-fund crosscheck. 4 See In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 22 926 F.3d 539, 571 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e do not require courts employing the lodestar 23 method to perform a ‘crosscheck’ using the percentage method” which is most useful when 24 “the benefit to the class is easily quantified”). 25 / / / 26
27 4 Further, because the attorneys’ fees were negotiated after the agreement on the other essential terms of the Settlement, (see ECF No. 171-4 (“Bullock Decl.”) ¶ 19), the Court finds this case does not 28 1 Overall, because the attorneys’ fees requested are not disproportionate, there is 2 substantial injunctive relief and an unprecedented monetary award, and Class Counsel 3 spent years litigating this case, the Court is not concerned that the clear sailing agreement 4 illustrates any collusion. See Anders v. Cal. State Univ., Fresno, No. 1:21-CV-00179- 5 KJM-BAM, 2025 WL 2701718, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (“Anders I”) (finding the 6 clear sailing provision was “not a substantial concern” given “the longevity of the case” 7 and “the hard-fought nature of the litigation”). Accordingly, the Court finds that—even 8 after carefully scrutinizing the relationship between attorneys’ fees and the benefit to the 9 class—the Bluetooth collusion factors do not weigh against final approval. 10 C. Rule 23 Factors 11 1. Adequate Representation 12 Adequacy involves a two-part inquiry: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel 13 have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs 14 and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 15 F.3d at 1020. The Court finds no conflict of interest for the class representatives and is 16 assured that the class representatives participated vigorously in this litigation. The Court 17 also finds that Class Counsel does not have any conflicts of interest and that they 18 prosecuted this action vigorously on behalf of the class. Accordingly, this factor weighs 19 in favor of final approval. 20 2. Arm’s Length Negotiation 21 This settlement is the product of a full-day settlement conference and an additional 22 half-day settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Michael S. Berg. (See ECF Nos. 23 133, 153.) The Parties state the “negotiations involved months of efforts and settlement 24 conferences” and the Settlement Agreement “is the product of arm’s-length negotiations 25 between the Parties and their experienced counsel after all fact discovery was complete and 26 Plaintiffs and SDSU possessed more than sufficient evidence and knowledge to allow them 27 to make informed decisions about the strengths and difficulties of their respective cases.” 28 (Final App. Mot. at 18.) Given the extent of litigation pre-settlement, (see generally 1 Docket), and the fact that the Settlement Agreement was negotiated with the oversight of 2 a federal magistrate judge, the Court finds the negotiations were serious, well-informed, 3 and negotiated at arm’s length. 4 3. Adequate Relief 5 a. Costs, Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal 6 First, as to injunctive relief, the Parties represent that, “if Plaintiffs were successful 7 at trial, the injunctive remedies would be substantially similar to the relief obtained through 8 the Settlement Agreement, as defendants in Title IX cases are afforded considerable 9 discretion in deciding how to bring their programs into compliance with Title IX.” (Final 10 App. Mot. at 19–20.) The Court agrees that courts typically allow substantial discretion 11 when ordering Title IX compliance as a remedy. See, e.g., Ollier v. Sweetwater Union 12 High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (directing the parties “to 13 jointly prepare a proposed compliance plan” and ordering the defendants to comply with 14 Title IX in all aspects as injunctive relief after a bench trial finding the defendants violated 15 Title IX), aff’d, 768 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Anders I, 2025 WL 2701718, at *8 16 (“Compelling to this Court’s decision is that Plaintiffs’ counsel represents that the remedies 17 provided in the Settlement Agreement would be substantially the same if the case were to 18 proceed through trial.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the injunctive relief is adequate, 19 especially because “Plaintiffs were able to use what they learned through discovery to 20 request and obtain relief to address specific areas of athletic treatment and benefits.” (Final 21 App. Mot. at 20.) Further, the benefit of not delaying relief is apparent because “immediate 22 resolution permits more Class Members to benefit from the steps SDSU will take.” (Id. at 23 19.) Thus, as to injunctive relief, the costs, risks, and delay of trial weigh in favor of final 24 approval. 25 Second, as to monetary relief, the Parties represent that the $300,000 negotiated 26 payment is reasonable based on the numerous disputed factual and legal issues and the 27 risks and delays of trial. (Id. at 18–19; 22–24.) The Court agrees that, without settlement, 28 this case would likely result in prolonged litigation. See Anders I, 2025 WL 2701718, at 1 *8 (“[A]s shown in other Title IX athletics litigation, there is a strong likelihood that, 2 without settlement, the parties would face years of protracted litigation in this Court and 3 the appellate courts.”). Further, prolonged litigation would be risky for Plaintiffs because 4 there are numerous contested issues. As one example, if the litigation was to continue to 5 trial, SDSU would argue, “as it has from inception, that Plaintiffs and the Class are not 6 entitled to any damages.” (Final App. Mot. at 24.) Moreover, the Court agrees that because 7 “no court has awarded damages for violation of Title IX as to athletic financial aid,” any 8 financial aid damages forecasted in Plaintiff’s complaints were speculative. In sum, due 9 to the uncertainties of continued litigation, the Court finds that the monetary relief provided 10 in this settlement is adequate and the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal weigh in 11 favor of final approval. 12 b. Effectiveness of Distributing Relief 13 “Any Class 2 members that do not select how they would like to receive settlement 14 funds will automatically receive a paper check sent via U.S. mail to their last known or 15 permanent address on file with SDSU.” (Bullock Decl. ¶ 7.) The fact that class members 16 do not need to submit a claim form to be sent their monetary damages weighs in favor of 17 final approval. See Jackson v. Fastenal Co., No. 1:20-cv-00345-NONE-SAB, 2021 WL 18 5755583 at *11 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2021) (finding “the proposed method of distributing 19 relief is effective, and weighs in favor of a finding that the settlement agreement is fair, 20 reasonable and adequate” where the class members did not have to file a claim). 21 c. Terms and Timing of Proposed Attorneys’ Fees 22 As explained, see supra Section II.B, infra pages 15–17, the requested attorneys’ 23 fees are reasonable given that they are a significant reduction from Class Counsel’s 24 lodestar. Further, SDSU will pay Class Counsel $1,300,000 “30 days after the Court’s 25 final approval” of the Settlement. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 31.) Thus, the terms and 26 timing of the attorneys’ fees weigh in favor of final approval. See Lusk v. Five Guys Enters. 27 LLC, No. 1:17-CV-0762 JLT EPG, 2023 WL 4134656, at *17 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2023) 28 (“Because Class Members will receive their shares shortly after the funds are received— 1 and Class Counsel will also be paid after final approval— the timing of the payments does 2 not weigh against approval.”). 3 d. Any Agreement Under Rule 23(e)(3) 4 Under Rule 23(e)(3), “parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any 5 agreement made in connection with the proposal.” The Parties have not identified any such 6 agreement. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of final approval. 7 4. Equitable Treatment Between Class Members 8 The Settlement does not provide for any service award for the Named Plaintiffs and 9 the Parties represent that “Plaintiffs are not receiving any additional relief outside of what 10 is set forth in the Agreement for any of the claims asserted in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended 11 Complaint.” (Settlement Agreement at 20.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 12 final approval. 13 D. Relevant Hanlon Factors 14 1. Extent of Discovery and Stage of the Proceedings 15 This settlement occurred after “three and a half years of hard-fought litigation” and 16 the completion of all fact discovery. (Settlement Agreement at 17.) Because the Parties 17 participated in extensive discovery and litigated this case up until the eve of the class 18 certification hearing, this factor weighs in favor of final approval. 19 2. Experience and Views of Counsel 20 Class Counsel is experienced in Title XI litigation and believes this Settlement is 21 fair and adequate to the class members. (See Settlement Agreement at 20–21.) 22 Accordingly, Class Counsel’s favorable view of this settlement weighs in favor of final 23 approval. 24 3. Reaction of the Class Members 25 Only one individual, Ms. Daniele (“Danni”) Croteau, a member of Class 2, objected 26 to this settlement. (See generally Obj.) Class 2 is made up of 798 individuals. (See Bullock 27 Decl. ¶ 9.) Thus, the overall reaction of the class members is favorable and weighs in favor 28 of final approval. See Nat’l Rural Telecommc’ns Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 1 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to 2 a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed 3 class settlement action are favorable to the class members.”); Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego 4 Ship Repair Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“Thus, as a purely 5 numerical observation, the overwhelming positive response to the Settlement strongly 6 supports final approval.”); Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 967 (9th Cir. 2009) 7 (affirming district court’s final approval of settlement where 54 out of 376,301 putative 8 class members to whom notice was given—0.01%—objected to settlement). 9 Further, the Court carefully reviewed Ms. Croteau’s Objection and—although 10 sympathetic to her disappointment—finds it does not indicate that the Settlement fails to 11 meet the minimum threshold of fairness and adequacy. Ms. Croteau objects on the basis 12 that the Settlement “fails to provide adequate and equitable relief to the female student- 13 athletes who have and continue to endure systemic sex-based discrimination.” (Obj. at 5.) 14 Regarding the monetary damages, Ms. Croteau states that all affected athletes should 15 receive the “full educational cost of attendance for the entire 5 years of eligibility,” and 16 athletes who suffered retaliation should receive triple that. (Id. at 15–16.) Further, 17 Ms. Croteau requests that the Court “modify the Settlement” to grant larger injunctive 18 relief. (Id. at 20–21.) 19 First, as to Ms. Croteau’s objection to monetary damages, Title IX damages cannot 20 include emotional distress damages or punitive damages. See Cummings v. Premier Rehab 21 Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 230 (2022); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002); 22 see also TAC Prayer for Relief (only explicitly seeking compensatory and nominal 23 damages). Therefore, although Ms. Croteau’s request for additional monetary damages is 24 understandable, there is no legal avenue in this case for the form of monetary relief that 25 she seeks. Moreover, “courts do not have a duty to maximize settlement value for class 26 members.” In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen, 129 F.4th at 678 (citation omitted). Second, the 27 injunctive relief is consistent with what SDSU would be required to implement if Plaintiffs 28 prevailed at trial. See supra Section II.C.3. Further, as explained in Plaintiffs’ Response 1 to the Objection, the Settlement Agreement’s release of retaliation claims releases only 2 retaliation claims based on the filing of this lawsuit. (See Obj. Resp. at 5–7; Settlement 3 Agreement ¶ 37.) Accordingly, Ms. Croteau’s retaliation claim, and any other class 4 member’s retaliation claims that are not based on retaliation from filing this lawsuit, are 5 not released by this Settlement. 6 Thus, while the Court understands that Ms. Croteau believes the Settlement to be 7 unfair,5 the Court does not find that her singular Objection weighs against granting final 8 approval. 9 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES6 10 Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]n a certified 11 class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are 12 authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). Here, the 13 Settlement Agreement provides that SDSU will pay $1,300,000 to Plaintiffs’ counsel for 14 Plaintiffs’ proposed reasonable litigation costs and attorneys’ fees. (See Settlement 15 Agreement ¶ 31.) 16
17 5 It is worth noting that some of Ms. Croteau’s concerns with the Settlement represent legal impossibilities. For example, Ms. Croteau objects on grounds that the Settlement imposes no 18 accountability on individual wrongdoers, (see Obj. at 19), but Title IX does not apply to individual wrongdoers because only recipients of federal funds may be held liable for damages under Title IX. See 19 Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Further, this Settlement cannot provide damages for unequal treatment because this claim was not asserted by Plaintiffs. (See Obj. 20 Resp. at 5; see also generally TAC.) 21 6 Defendant SDSU argues “there is no need to rule on the ‘reasonableness’ of the overall amounts 22 of hours worked and fees claimed.” (Fee Resp. at 2.) Not so. The Court must scrutinize the attorneys’ fees in consideration of the entire settlement. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 23 941 (“While attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded in a certified class action where so authorized by law or the parties’ agreement, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h), courts have an independent obligation to ensure that 24 the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” 25 (emphasis added)). Further, SDSU takes issue with Class Counsel’s characterization of the settlement terms as “injunctive relief” and monetary “damages.” (Fee Resp. at 1–2.) While the Settlement states 26 “SDSU maintains these payments are non-precedential and do not constitute an agreement that Plaintiffs or any student-athletes are entitled to the damages sought in the Third Amended Complaint,” the same 27 section of the Settlement states SDSU will pay “a total of $300,000.00 in damages.” (Settlement Agreement ¶ 27 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, SDSU’s concern with nomenclature does not have 28 1 The Court finds it appropriate to apply the lodestar method to Class Counsel’s 2 attorneys’ fee request due to the injunctive relief provided as a part of the Settlement. See 3 Kim, 8 F.4th at 1181 (“[A] district court must exercise caution when using the value of 4 injunctive relief to determine proportional attorneys’ fees and should generally avoid 5 valuing hard-to-measure injunctive relief altogether[.]”). “The lodestar figure is calculated 6 by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the 7 litigation (as supported by adequate documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the 8 region and for the experience of the lawyer.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941–42 (citation 9 omitted). While the lodestar calculation is presumptively reasonable, “the court may adjust 10 it upward or downward by an appropriate positive or negative multiplier reflecting a host 11 of reasonableness factors, including the quality of representation, the benefit obtained for 12 the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment” 13 with the foremost consideration being “the benefit obtained for the class.” Id. (internal 14 quotations omitted). 15 Here, Class Counsel’s calculated lodestar rate is $3,571,874.38. (See Fee Mot. at 16 18.) First, as to reasonableness of their hourly rates, Class Counsel submitted hourly billing 17 rates ranging from $175 to $1,375. (See id. at 15–16.) Rates over $1,000 represent the 18 high end of rates approved in this District. See Scott v. Blackstone Consulting, Inc., No. 19 21-CV-1470-MMA-KSC, 2024 WL 271439, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2024) (“Recently, 20 courts in this District have awarded hourly rates for work performed in civil cases by 21 attorneys with significant experience anywhere in range of $550 per hour to more than 22 $1[,]000 per hour.”). In this case, the hourly rates in excess of $1,000 are based on Class 23 Counsel’s expertise in litigating lawsuits in the specialized field of Title IX. (See Fee Mot. 24 at 15; ECF No. 174-2 (“Bullock Decl. Fee Mot.”) ¶ 8.) Further, the Court does not need 25 to find that each individual rate is reasonable because the $1,300,000 in requested fees 26 represents less than half the calculated lodestar. See Anders v. Cal. State Univ., Fresno, 27 No. 1:21-CV-00179-KJM-BAM, 2025 WL 3228123, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) 28 (“Anders II”) (“While counsel’s proposed hourly rates are higher than those typically 1 approved as reasonable within this district, it is not necessary to scrutinize those rates 2 further, nor counsel’s hours, as the total proposed award is less than half of the ‘lodestar’ 3 award, i.e., the number of hours expended multiplied by the proposed hourly rate.”). 4 Second, as to reasonable hours expended on the litigation, Class Counsel submitted 5 detailed billing records for their time spent on this matter. (See generally Time Entries.) 6 The billing records appear reasonable based on the vigorous advocacy in this litigation. 7 Further, the Court declines to parse through the records with a fine-tooth comb since the 8 requested fee amount in less than half the total lodestar calculation provided by Class 9 Counsel. See Anders II, 2025 WL 3228123 at *2; see also Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 10 (2011) (“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade 11 accountants.”). 12 In sum, the Court finds Class Counsel’s fee request is reasonable given the detailed 13 billing records submitted and the fact that $1,300,000 represents a significant reduction in 14 the total lodestar calculation. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Class Counsel’s Motion 15 for Attorneys’ Fees. 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 18 1. The Court FINDS the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) are satisfied and CERTIFIES, for the purposes of settlement only, 20 the following classes: 21 i. Class 1: All female students who participate in intercollegiate 22 varsity athletics through the termination of the Settlement Agreement or, since 23 February 7, 2022, participated in intercollegiate varsity athletics at San Diego State 24 University. 25 ii. Class 2: All female students who participated in intercollegiate 26 varsity athletics at San Diego State University from the 2018–2019 academic year 27 through the 2024–2025 academic year and did not receive all of the athletic financial 28 aid they could have received. 1 2. The Court GRANTS the Joint Motion for Final Approval (ECF No. 171) and 2 || FINALLY APPROVES the Settlement Agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 ||23(e) as fair, reasonable, and adequate. 4 3. The Courts ORDERS SDSU to pay the negotiated amount of $300,000 in 5 ||damages for Class 2 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 6 4. The Court CONFIRMS its finding that the proposed Plan of Allocation for 7 ||Class 2 is fair, reasonable, and adequate and APPOINTS CPT Group to serve as the 8 || Disbursement Administrator. The Court also APPROVES CPT Group’s fees, estimated 9 || to be $9,750.00, to be paid by Class Counsel. 10 5. The Court GRANTS the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 174) and 11 |} ORDERS SDSU to pay the negotiated amount of $1,300,000 for Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees 12 || and costs within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any attorneys’ fees and/or cost 13 || hens from former Plaintiffs’ firms will be the responsibility of class counsel Arthur Bryant 14 not SDSU. 15 6. As agreed by the Parties, (see ECF No. 181), the Honorable Michael S. Berg 16 || SHALL RETAIN JURISDICTION over this settlement. 17 7. The Clerk of the Court SHALL ENTER final judgment. 19 || Dated: April 20, 2026 —_—— 20 [od (2 % re Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28