Madison Academy, Inc. v. Hanvey

179 So. 3d 135, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 6, 2015 WL 403071
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 30, 2015
Docket1131235
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 179 So. 3d 135 (Madison Academy, Inc. v. Hanvey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Madison Academy, Inc. v. Hanvey, 179 So. 3d 135, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 6, 2015 WL 403071 (Ala. 2015).

Opinions

BOLIN, Justice.

I, Facts and Procedural History

On February 19, 2014, the Madison Circuit Court (“the trial court”) entered a judgment finding that Lisa Hanvey had suffered a compensable injury caused by her exposure to chemical fumes during the course of her employment with Madison Academy, Inc. (“the employer”). The trial court awarded Hanvey permanent-total-disability benefits in accordance with the Workers’ Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment. See Madison Academy, Inc.. v. Hanvey, 179 So.3d 118 (Ala.Civ. [137]*137App.2014). We granted Hanvey’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment awarding Hanvey benefits for a permanent total disability under the Act. We reverse and remand.

II. Standard of Review

In Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 895 So.2d 294, 296 (Ala.2004), .this Court stated the standard of review on a petition for a writ of certiorari in a worker’s compensation case:

“ ‘On certiorari review, this Court accords no presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court of Civil Appeals.’ Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala.1996). The Court of Civil Appeals, in turn, is bound by Ala.Code 1975, § 25 — 5—[81](e), which provides that legal issues are to be reviewed de novo, and requires that, the judgment of the trial court be affirmed if its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”

This Court has stated:

“A trial court’s judgment in a worker’s compensation case based on pure findings of fact will not be- reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence. § 25-5 — 81(e)(2), Ala.Code 1975. ‘[The appellate court] will not reverse the trial court’s finding of fact if that finding is supported by substantial, evidence — if that finding is supported by “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” ’ Ex parte Trinity Indus,, Inc,, 680 So.2d 262, 268-69 (Ala.1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance.Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)). ‘Therefore, in such -a case the appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the findings pf the trial court.’ Ex parte Professional Bus. Owners Ass’n Workers’ Comp. Fund, 867 So.2d [1099] at 1102 [(Ala.2003)]. Moreover, the Court of Civil Appeals observed in Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), that “the [1992 Workers’ Compensation] Act did not alter the rule that [an appellate court] does not weigh the evidence before the trial court.” ’ Ex parte Phenix Rental Ctr., 873 So.2d 226, 229 (Ala.2003).”

Fort James Operating Co. v. Stephens, 996 So.2d 833, 835 (Ala.2008)

. III. Analysis

The trial court stated the following in its February 19,2014, judgment:

“Lisa Hanvey was 44 years old at the time pf the trial. She has a high school education,' including attending special education classes since elementary school. She reads on a third grade level. Her past work history hás included child care.
“The relationship of employer and employee between Ms. Hanvey and Madison Academy existed as of May 1, 2011,, and continued at least through September 2011. Both parties were subject to and governed, by the Workers’ Compensation Act of Alabama, as amended. Ms. Hanvey worked at Madison Academy as a janitor from September 2006 until her health prevented her from continuing in her job. On June 21, 2011, the employer-supplied doctor, Dr. Syed Hasan, took Ms. Hanvey off work, and she did not return to work again.
“Ms. Hanvey suffers from myasthenia gravis, a neuromuscular and autoimmune disease. The disease impairs the normal function of the neuromuscular [138]*138junction causing muscle fatigue: It produces an antibody which affects the function of the acetylcholine that enables muscle contraction. The consequence is that muscles become fatigued more easi- • ly.
“Ms. Harivey’s primary care physician is Dr. Cheryl Bazzle, who has treated Ms. Hanvey since September 27, 2005. She was also treated by a number of other doctors, including employer-provided physicians Dr. Syed Hasan and Dr. Laurence Carmichael.
“Following her last visit to her employer-provided physician, Dr. Carmichael, on July 26, 2011, Ms. Hanvey continued to receive necessary medical care from her primary care physician, Dr. Cheryl Bazzle. Neurologist Dr. Amit Arora,was the initial neurologist involved in her treatment. She was subsequently referred to Dr. Gwendolyn Claussen at Kirklin Clinic in Birmingham, Alabama. Dr. Anjaneyulu Alapati took over treatment of Ms. Hanvey’s myasthenia gravis since March 29, 2012. The medical bills for these doctors and hospital stays, to the extent they were paid, were paid by Ms. Hanvey’s private health insurance through Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama. Ms. Han-vey went to the emergency room at Crestwood Hospital and at Huntsville Hospital on more than one occasion, where she was hospitalized for treatment of her symptomatic myasthenia gravis.
“Before her repeated exposure to cleaning and stripping and refinishing chemicals in May and June 2011, and the resulting respiratory distress and infection, her health condition had never prevented her from working at Madison Academy for any significant length of time; significantly, she was able to perform her job. Even the presence of diplopia, or double vision, which is characteristic of myasthenia gravis and which was noted during a routine eye exam in April 2011, did not prevent her from performing her job despite any preexisting conditions.
“In May and June of 2011, Ms. Han-vey was exposed to certain chemicals at work used to clean and treat the floors. Those chemicals are shown by their Material Safety Data Sheets to be capable of causing respiratory problems. For example, the urethane used on the gym floors may cause ‘nose and throat irritation, dizziness, headache, nausea or respiratory irritation.’ The Red Tornado wax stripper utilized by Defendant may cause harm when breathing large amounts. The baseboard cleaner and stripper utilized warns that it may ‘aggravate existing respiratory conditions such asthma.’ Her family physician. Dr. Bazzle, stated, ‘[Wlhen she got exposed to those floor chemicals, she did a crash and burn, I can’t breathe, show[ed] up in my office with an 02 sat on room air of 70 percent and had to go immediately into the ICU.’ The shortness of breath experienced by Ms. Han-vey on June 13, 2011, ‘was triggered by the chemicals,’ according to Dr. Bazzle, Her doctor further adds: ‘... she got exposed to chemicals, which flared up her — her respiratory problems that she had anyway and then triggered the im~ mune-mediated disease that she had going on.’
“The exposure to chemicals was more significant in Ms. Hanvey because, according to Dr. Bazzle, while ‘any one of us could get exposed to chemicals and develop a respiratory illness from it, ...

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Related

Madison Academy, Inc. v. Hanvey
179 So. 3d 145 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2015)

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179 So. 3d 135, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 6, 2015 WL 403071, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madison-academy-inc-v-hanvey-ala-2015.