This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-1758
Madina Ula, Appellant,
vs.
Bertil Eugene Gunnarson, Respondent.
Filed July 7, 2014 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CV124650
Nuro Bedaso Dedefo, Columbia Heights, Minnesota (for appellant)
Colleen M. Spreadbury, Mark K. Hellie, Regional Legal Staff Counsel, American Family Insurance, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal arising from a personal-injury action, appellant challenges the jury’s
damages award, arguing that the district court erred by (1) not admitting the testimony of
appellant’s chiropractor; (2) not admitting evidence of appellant’s other medical bills;
(3) excluding a question relating to appellant’s transportation costs on the special-verdict form; (4) admitting evidence that appellant received unemployment benefits; and
(5) denying appellant’s motion for a new trial or additur. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 4, 2011, respondent Bertil Gunnarson was driving in a parking lot when
he hit a pedestrian, appellant Madina Ula. Ula was taken to the hospital. She
experienced pain, but did not fully communicate that to her treating physicians, and once
she was at home, she claimed that she could not lift one of her arms. She continued to
feel pain in her left shoulder and neck and sought treatment from a family practice
physician. She also saw a chiropractor, which she claimed was helpful for treating her
pain.
Ula commenced a personal-injury action against Gunnarson, claiming that she
sustained permanent injuries and disability, suffered from pain, had lost wages, and
incurred $33,000 in medical expenses. Gunnarson admitted liability, but contested
damages, and a jury trial was held. Gunnarson did not personally appear for trial, and his
counsel informed the jury at the beginning of the proceedings, using language agreed
upon by the parties and the court, that Gunnarson would not be present because of his
unfavorable health.
At trial, Ula’s doctor testified that she prescribed Tylenol and rest after Ula’s first
post-accident visit. When Ula returned complaining of arm pain, her doctor took an x-ray
and MRI of Ula’s shoulder and observed a small tear in one of the tendons. The doctor
also determined that Ula suffered from some arthritis in her shoulder. The doctor
referred Ula for physical therapy and to an orthopedic specialist. Surgery was not
2 recommended, and the doctor continued to monitor Ula, concluding that she would likely
need ongoing management of her pain. The district court admitted evidence relating to
Ula’s chiropractic treatment but excluded the testimony of Ula’s chiropractor because
Ula failed to disclose the witness during discovery.
Gunnarson offered the testimony of his own medical expert, an orthopedic surgeon
who examined Ula following the accident and prior to trial. Based on his examination of
Ula and her medical records, Gunnarson’s expert testified that Ula’s complaints of pain
were unrelated to the accident, opining that while she may have strained her spine as a
result of the accident, her pain was related to a degenerative condition. He rejected any
claim that Ula’s shoulder pain was related to the accident, and he concluded that the
treatment Ula’s doctor provided in the six to eight weeks after the accident would have
addressed any related ailments.
Gunnarson also contested Ula’s lost-wage claims because Ula was not employed
at the time of the accident and because she conceded, by filing for unemployment
benefits, that she was able to work. Ula testified that she filed for unemployment benefits
when she was out of work, which was common because of the seasonal nature of her job,
but stated that she was unaware that one of the requirements for eligibility included an
affirmation that the applicant is not disabled and is able to work.
The jury returned a special verdict, finding that Ula did not suffer permanent
injuries from the accident. The jury awarded Ula $1,000 in damages for past pain,
disability, and emotional distress; $3,000 for past medical expenses; and nothing for past
wage loss, diagnostic tests, and future damages. Ula filed a motion for a new trial, or, in
3 the alternative, additur of $30,000 to the final judgment for past medical expenses. Ula
argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, claiming that the jury
misused information that Ula received unemployment benefits after the accident and that
the jury was prejudiced by its unwarranted sympathy for Gunnarson. The district court
denied Ula’s motion, and this appeal followed.
DECISION
I. Standard of review
“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d
42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). The district court “has broad discretion
regarding the form and substance of special verdict questions.” SCSC Corp. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995). “We review a district court’s new
trial decision under an abuse of discretion standard.” Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v.
Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 892 (Minn. 2010). An appellate court “will not set aside a jury
verdict on an appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial unless it is
manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Navarre v. S. Wash. Cnty. Sch., 652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn.
2002) (quotations omitted). The decision of whether to grant additur rests within the
district court’s discretion. Rush v. Jostock, 710 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Minn. App. 2006),
review denied (Minn. May 24, 2006).
4 II. Evidentiary rulings and special-verdict form
On appeal, Ula challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary rulings,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not admitting the testimony of
Ula’s chiropractor or evidence of her other medical bills. Ula also argues that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that she received unemployment
benefits and by excluding a question relating to her transportation costs on the special-
verdict form. But “matters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings and jury
instructions are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion for a new trial
in which such matters have been assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d
200, 201 (Minn. 1986). Ula did not challenge the district court’s evidentiary rulings or
jury instructions in her motion for a new trial. These issues are waived as a result. Thiele
v.
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-1758
Madina Ula, Appellant,
vs.
Bertil Eugene Gunnarson, Respondent.
Filed July 7, 2014 Affirmed Reyes, Judge
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27CV124650
Nuro Bedaso Dedefo, Columbia Heights, Minnesota (for appellant)
Colleen M. Spreadbury, Mark K. Hellie, Regional Legal Staff Counsel, American Family Insurance, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this appeal arising from a personal-injury action, appellant challenges the jury’s
damages award, arguing that the district court erred by (1) not admitting the testimony of
appellant’s chiropractor; (2) not admitting evidence of appellant’s other medical bills;
(3) excluding a question relating to appellant’s transportation costs on the special-verdict form; (4) admitting evidence that appellant received unemployment benefits; and
(5) denying appellant’s motion for a new trial or additur. We affirm.
FACTS
On April 4, 2011, respondent Bertil Gunnarson was driving in a parking lot when
he hit a pedestrian, appellant Madina Ula. Ula was taken to the hospital. She
experienced pain, but did not fully communicate that to her treating physicians, and once
she was at home, she claimed that she could not lift one of her arms. She continued to
feel pain in her left shoulder and neck and sought treatment from a family practice
physician. She also saw a chiropractor, which she claimed was helpful for treating her
pain.
Ula commenced a personal-injury action against Gunnarson, claiming that she
sustained permanent injuries and disability, suffered from pain, had lost wages, and
incurred $33,000 in medical expenses. Gunnarson admitted liability, but contested
damages, and a jury trial was held. Gunnarson did not personally appear for trial, and his
counsel informed the jury at the beginning of the proceedings, using language agreed
upon by the parties and the court, that Gunnarson would not be present because of his
unfavorable health.
At trial, Ula’s doctor testified that she prescribed Tylenol and rest after Ula’s first
post-accident visit. When Ula returned complaining of arm pain, her doctor took an x-ray
and MRI of Ula’s shoulder and observed a small tear in one of the tendons. The doctor
also determined that Ula suffered from some arthritis in her shoulder. The doctor
referred Ula for physical therapy and to an orthopedic specialist. Surgery was not
2 recommended, and the doctor continued to monitor Ula, concluding that she would likely
need ongoing management of her pain. The district court admitted evidence relating to
Ula’s chiropractic treatment but excluded the testimony of Ula’s chiropractor because
Ula failed to disclose the witness during discovery.
Gunnarson offered the testimony of his own medical expert, an orthopedic surgeon
who examined Ula following the accident and prior to trial. Based on his examination of
Ula and her medical records, Gunnarson’s expert testified that Ula’s complaints of pain
were unrelated to the accident, opining that while she may have strained her spine as a
result of the accident, her pain was related to a degenerative condition. He rejected any
claim that Ula’s shoulder pain was related to the accident, and he concluded that the
treatment Ula’s doctor provided in the six to eight weeks after the accident would have
addressed any related ailments.
Gunnarson also contested Ula’s lost-wage claims because Ula was not employed
at the time of the accident and because she conceded, by filing for unemployment
benefits, that she was able to work. Ula testified that she filed for unemployment benefits
when she was out of work, which was common because of the seasonal nature of her job,
but stated that she was unaware that one of the requirements for eligibility included an
affirmation that the applicant is not disabled and is able to work.
The jury returned a special verdict, finding that Ula did not suffer permanent
injuries from the accident. The jury awarded Ula $1,000 in damages for past pain,
disability, and emotional distress; $3,000 for past medical expenses; and nothing for past
wage loss, diagnostic tests, and future damages. Ula filed a motion for a new trial, or, in
3 the alternative, additur of $30,000 to the final judgment for past medical expenses. Ula
argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, claiming that the jury
misused information that Ula received unemployment benefits after the accident and that
the jury was prejudiced by its unwarranted sympathy for Gunnarson. The district court
denied Ula’s motion, and this appeal followed.
DECISION
I. Standard of review
“The admission of evidence rests within the broad discretion of the [district] court
and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d
42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). The district court “has broad discretion
regarding the form and substance of special verdict questions.” SCSC Corp. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995). “We review a district court’s new
trial decision under an abuse of discretion standard.” Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v.
Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 892 (Minn. 2010). An appellate court “will not set aside a jury
verdict on an appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial unless it is
manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Navarre v. S. Wash. Cnty. Sch., 652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn.
2002) (quotations omitted). The decision of whether to grant additur rests within the
district court’s discretion. Rush v. Jostock, 710 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Minn. App. 2006),
review denied (Minn. May 24, 2006).
4 II. Evidentiary rulings and special-verdict form
On appeal, Ula challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary rulings,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not admitting the testimony of
Ula’s chiropractor or evidence of her other medical bills. Ula also argues that the district
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that she received unemployment
benefits and by excluding a question relating to her transportation costs on the special-
verdict form. But “matters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings and jury
instructions are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion for a new trial
in which such matters have been assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d
200, 201 (Minn. 1986). Ula did not challenge the district court’s evidentiary rulings or
jury instructions in her motion for a new trial. These issues are waived as a result. Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Even if not waived, the district court did not abuse its discretion in making these
rulings. First, the district court did not admit the testimony of Ula’s chiropractor because
the chiropractor was not disclosed as a witness during discovery, and the testimony was
duplicative of information already contained in the admitted chiropractic records. Minn.
R. Evid. 403. Second, the district court refused to admit evidence of Ula’s other medical
bills for lack of foundation, finding that they related to medical services that were
unrelated to Ula’s alleged injuries and also contained erroneous charges that were later
removed. Some billing entries did not even contain information that identified Ula as the
patient, and the district court refused to admit them for a lack of reliability. Third, the
district court admitted records that Ula received unemployment benefits, concluding that
5 their admission was not unfairly prejudicial when Ula, who claimed damages for lost
wages, received unemployment benefits for which she affirmed that she was not disabled
and was able to work. Id. Finally, the district court, after admitting evidence that Ula
traveled to receive treatment for her injuries, excluded a question from the special-verdict
form relating to Ula’s transportation costs because there was no evidence in the record
establishing that Ula had actually incurred costs for transportation. Moreover, Ula’s
request to include the question was untimely. All of these matters are in the district
court’s sound discretion, and, based on a thorough review of the record, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in making its determinations.
III. Motion for new trial or additur
Ula argues that the district court erred in denying a new trial or additur because
information that Ula received unemployment benefits after the accident “inflamed the
jury” and that the verdict is so inadequate it could only have been rendered on account of
unfair prejudice. This claim has no merit.
Ula relies on Walser v. Vinge, 275 Minn. 230, 146 N.W.2d 537 (1966), to support
her argument. In Walser, the jury did not award damages for pain or suffering or for
wage loss, despite testimony regarding plaintiff’s two surgeries and diminished ability to
work. Id. at 232-33, 146 N.W.2d at 538-39. The district court denied plaintiff’s request
for a new trial, and the supreme court reversed, holding that, when liability is established
and a jury awards pecuniary damages, a jury should also “take into consideration proven
damages resulting from pain and suffering, loss of wages, and impairment of earning
capacity.” Id. at 235, 146 N.W.2d at 540.
6 Appellant’s reliance on Walser is misplaced. Unlike that case, where there was
compelling testimony of permanent injury, here there was no objective evidence of
permanent injury, and no surgery was performed as a result of the accident. Id. at 232-
33, 146 N.W.2d at 538-39; Rush v. Jostock, 710 N.W.2d 570, 577-78 (Minn. App. 2006),
review denied (Minn. May 24, 2006). Gunnarson’s expert testified that Ula’s complaints
of pain were unrelated to the accident and that short-term treatment would have
addressed any ailments suffered as a result of the accident. The jury was free to accept or
reject that evidence. Similarly, based on the testimony and evidence, there is no support
for Ula’s claim that the jury misused information that Ula received unemployment
benefits. The jury was free to reject Ula’s claim that she suffered lost wages as a result of
her injuries and awarded damages consistent with a short duration of medical care from a
family practitioner after the accident. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Ula’s motion for new trial or additur.
Affirmed.