USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 1 of 22
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-2054
MADHUSUDAN KATTI, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated members of his class,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WARWICK A. ARDEN, in his individual and official capacity; MYRON FLOYD, in his individual and official capacity; STITH “TOM” GOWER, in his individual and official capacity; JEAN GOODWIN, in her individual capacity; KEN ZAGACKI, in his individual capacity,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:23−cv−00233−M−BM)
Argued: October 24, 2025 Decided: December 2, 2025
Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson joined. Judge Heytens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
ARGUED: Valerie Bateman, NEW SOUTH LAW FIRM, Carrboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lindsay Vance Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 2 of 22
Jeremy D. Lindsley, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 3 of 22
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
The first time Madhusudan Katti sought tenure at North Carolina State University
(NCSU), his application was denied. The next time—three years later—it was approved.
According to Katti, the “only” plausible inference from that experience is that the first
tenure decision was an act of discrimination and retaliation. Opening Br. at 17–18.
The district court disagreed, and so do we. Katti’s own complaint made clear that
there were a host of legitimate reasons for the first tenure decision. To infer foul play from
Katti’s conclusory allegations would be nothing more than speculation. The result would
be to impair academic freedom, which promises the university the ability to “determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach,” free from court intervention. Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
I.
We begin by recounting the facts. Because this is an appeal from a dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we take as true the facts alleged in
the complaint. Doe v. Univ. of N.C. Sys., 133 F.4th 305, 310 (4th Cir. 2025).
A.
Katti is an Indian man and a professor in NCSU’s Leadership in Public Science
program. He was first hired to a tenure-track position at NCSU in August 2016. Like all
tenure-track professors, he spent the next few years in a probationary period. Tom Gower,
Katti’s department head, met with Katti annually during the probationary period to review
his performance. Ken Zagacki, another faculty member, sometimes joined the meetings.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 4 of 22
In June 2019, Katti ended his probationary period by applying for tenure. The first
decisionmaker to review his application was an Interdisciplinary Retention, Promotion, and
Tenure Committee (IRPTC). Twelve faculty members, including Zagacki and Jean
Goodwin, sat on the IRPTC. After considering Katti’s application, they decided—by a vote
of six to five, with Zagacki not voting—not to recommend Katti for tenure.
After the IRPTC came to its decision, Katti’s application was passed to the college
dean, Myron Floyd, and then to the university provost, Warwick Arden. Among other
information, they were provided a letter from Gower expressing his view of Katti’s
application. Floyd and Arden ultimately came to the same conclusion as the IPRTC. In
April 2020, Arden informed Katti that his tenure application was denied.
Undaunted, Katti proceeded to reapply. In April 2023, he was granted tenure.
B.
Katti filed this lawsuit after receiving tenure the second time he applied. In this suit,
he sought damages from Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, Gower, and Zagacki, arguing that their
conduct the first time he applied was unlawful in several ways. First, he alleged that they
racially discriminated against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Second, he alleged that they retaliated against his
“non-traditional teaching methods” in violation of the First Amendment. J.A. 132. He
brought his claims under the cause of action provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Katti’s amended complaint focused primarily on Goodwin and Gower. With respect
to Goodwin, the complaint pointed out that she wrote a memorandum to Gower criticizing
Katti’s “persistent inability to meet his responsibilities” in a class the two of them co-
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 5 of 22
taught. J.A. 72, 89–90. It also alleged that Goodwin told Katti he was
“incapable/incompetent,” J.A. 91, omitted his work from a social media post promoting
the work of other colleagues, and encouraged the IRPTC to deny him tenure. This behavior,
Katti argued, revealed Goodwin’s “personal malice” towards him that had “no source other
than . . . his race and ethnicity.” J.A. 126–27. She should, he continued, have recused
herself from the IRPTC under an NCSU policy requiring recusals when necessary to
prevent “an actual or [the] appearance of a . . . conflict of interest.” J.A. 119–21.
With respect to Gower, the amended complaint alleged that he included false,
overblown, or untimely criticisms in his end-of-year performance reviews and in his letter
to the tenure decisionmakers. In Katti’s 2017 performance review, for example, Gower
stated—inaccurately, says Katti—that Katti was so absent that his students in the
prestigious Doris Duke Conservation Scholars program transferred to another school. In
Katti’s 2018 performance review, Gower stated—misleadingly, says Katti—that Katti
taught only one class that year and received low student evaluation scores, and that Katti’s
“loose and reactive” teaching style was causing “friction” with colleagues and students.
J.A. 103. And in Gower’s letter regarding tenure, he pointed out that students had
complained about Katti’s “lack of guidance and availability” as a mentor and that the Doris
Duke incident caused NCSU to “almost los[e] the program”—another distortion, according
to Katti. J.A. 83–84, 95.
Katti’s allegations with respect to Zagacki, Floyd, and Arden are more difficult to
parse. Zagacki (and Gower), he argued, “enabl[ed]” Goodwin by failing to seek her
removal from the IRPTC—a course of action that “can only be explained by” racial animus.
5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 6 of 22
J.A. 119. Floyd, he pointed out, also failed to take action even though Katti informed him
of Goodwin’s “biases.” J.A. 108. Arden signed the letter informing Katti of his denial of
tenure. And all of them participated in a process that, as the complaint framed things, did
not appreciate the true measure of Katti’s qualifications. The complaint otherwise failed to
allege any relevant facts about the role Zagacki, Floyd, and Arden played in the decision
to deny Katti tenure.
The crux of Katti’s amended complaint was the allegation that a white professor
would have fared better than he did in the same tenure process. While he asserted it
numerous times, though, the complaint included just two structured comparisons between
himself and white colleagues. The first was a chart at ¶ 209 that showed that five white
colleagues, all hired between 2013 and 2017, were granted tenure while Katti was not. The
second was a chart at ¶ 213 that showed that a particular white colleague was granted tenure
despite publishing fewer articles, delivering fewer conference presentations, and securing
fewer grants than Katti. Neither chart stated whether Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, Gower, or
Zagacki played a role in the decisions to grant the white professors tenure.
C.
After considering Katti’s amended complaint, the district court dismissed it under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim. With respect to Katti’s race discrimination claims
under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981, the court observed that the complaint
contained “conspicuously little regarding race” and concluded that the claims were
therefore “speculative.” J.A. 160. With respect to Katti’s First Amendment retaliation
6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 7 of 22
claim, the court held that Katti had neither identified any protected speech nor plausibly
alleged that such speech was the cause of his tenure denial. This appeal followed.
II.
Before we turn to the merits of Katti’s claims, we outline the principles governing
our review.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That means it
must plead facts that, when accepted as true, “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plausible claim to relief “demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal applies to each claim against each
defendant in a civil action. Id. at 676. That is true in every suit, but it bears special emphasis
in a § 1983 suit like this one, where “vicarious liability is inapplicable” so the focus is on
each defendant’s “own individual actions.” Id. Allegations against a common employer
cannot substitute for allegations of “personal involvement” by the individual defendants.
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). Nor can alleged conduct by one
individual defendant be attributed to another. Id.
In this suit, then, the district court was obligated to dismiss Katti’s claims unless it
could reasonably infer that Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, Gower, and Zagacki—each, by their
own individual actions—violated the Equal Protection Clause, § 1981, and the First
7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 8 of 22
Amendment. We review the district court’s decision de novo. Sysco Mach. Corp. v. DCS
USA Corp., 143 F.4th 222, 228 (4th Cir. 2025).
Because this suit concerns a university tenure process, there is an additional set of
principles at play—principles that counsel a “restrained” approach. Regents of the Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
As we have long recognized, a university’s decision to grant or deny tenure is
informed by many decisionmakers and by “varied, inevitably subjective factors.”
Mayberry v. Dees, 663 F.2d 502, 519 (4th Cir. 1981). The decisionmakers often include
dozens of faculty across multiple committees. The factors they consider include the quality
of the professor’s “scholarship, . . . pedagogy, [and] . . . service to the university.” Id. at
514. When all is said and done, a professor might be denied tenure because his research is
shallow, because his teaching is ineffective, because his collegial contributions are scant,
or for any combination of reasons reflecting the views of the faculty involved.
Courts are not well positioned to second-guess these determinations. Each depends
upon an evaluation of “cumulative information” by people who not only know the
professor well but have expertise in his particular field. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (quoting
Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1978)). Evaluations do
not, moreover, lend themselves easily to quantitative analysis. A single article may make
a seminal contribution to a discipline that more numerous articles, while useful, are hard
pressed to equal. A comparison of article counts between two professors may fail to
elucidate the quality of the insights therein. Determining the size of their respective
8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 9 of 22
intellectual imprints, then, calls for the exercise of judgment, not the application of an
algorithm. All the more so because a grant of tenure provides the professor “security in
continued employment” that can almost never be revoked. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 599 (1972).
While it is true that tenure decisions can reflect insularity or personal favoritism, the
judgment at play remains “scholarly,” not legal. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-
Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d
316, 345–46 (4th Cir. 1980)). No legal rule can resolve whether a theory about bird
population dynamics in urban areas 1 is more innovative than one about the role of chestnut
trees in indigenous communities. 2 Courts thus work from a deficit which even expert
testimony would be challenged to entirely overcome. That is why “when judges are asked
to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show great
respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225.
Even if we were well-positioned to review these decisions, doing so would create
fissures in the bedrock of higher education: academic freedom. Such freedom “thrives not
only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students,
but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy
1 See John M. Anderies, Madhusudan Katti & Eyal Shochat, Living in the City: Resource Availability, Predation, and Bird Population Dynamics in Urban Areas, 247 J. Theoretical Biology 36 (2007). 2 See S. Kathleen Barnhill-Dilling & Jason A. Delborne, The Genetically Engineered American Chestnut Tree as Opportunity for Reciprocal Restoration in Haudenosaunee Communities, 232 Biological Conservation 1 (2019).
9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 10 of 22
itself.” Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted). It was the latter sphere of
protection, sometimes described as “university autonomy,” that Justice Frankfurter
invoked when he spoke of the university’s latitude to “determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach.” Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). And it is
this latter sphere, no less a “special concern of the First Amendment” than the former, that
is at play when we are asked to review claims of tenure discrimination. Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
If tenure committees were motivated to grant tenure by fear of court intervention, it
would create “an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust” that would contravene in the most
direct way this commitment to university autonomy. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250). When such an atmosphere takes hold, “[s]cholarship cannot
flourish.” Id. Fear of litigation could also spark an epidemic of “tenure inflation” echoing
the grade inflation that often plagues higher education.
The upshot of these principles is not that there is no role for courts in reviewing
claims of tenure discrimination. There is no categorical “university exception” to the civil
rights laws. Our role, however, is a limited one. We are “narrowly directed” to consider
whether the denial of tenure was due to unlawful animus. Adams, 640 F.3d at 557 (quoting
Smith, 632 F.2d at 345–46). And consistent with our ordinary pleading standards, a
professor alleging animus must present “more than suspicion, more than unproven
possibilities” before we will subject the tenure process to our scrutiny. Mayberry, 663 F.2d
at 520. Anything less would convert courts—against all precedent and logic—into “Super-
Tenure . . . Review Committees.” Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1979).
10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 11 of 22
III.
With these principles in mind, we turn to Katti’s claims of race discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981. The district court found that neither met accepted
pleading standards, and we agree.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from denying persons “the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This powerful proscription “keeps
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant
respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
To plead an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. First,
he must plausibly allege that the defendant treated him differently than someone else
“similarly situated” in all relevant respects. Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2022).
Second, he must plausibly allege that, under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny,
the difference in treatment is unjustified. Id.; see also Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 252
(4th Cir. 2017).
In the context of university tenure, “similarly situated in all relevant respects” means
that the tenure committee has adjudged the plaintiff and his comparator to have a similar
quality of “scholarship, . . . pedagogy, [and] . . . service to the university,” or similar
performance in the other categories they deem essential. Mayberry, 663 F.2d at 514. If the
two tenure candidates are similar in those ways, but different when it comes to race, then
the plaintiff has sufficiently pled the first prong of our equal protection test.
11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 12 of 22
Katti’s allegations in this case fall well short of that standard. The chart at ¶ 209 of
his amended complaint pointed out that Katti did not receive tenure in 2020 while five
white professors did between 2013 and 2023. But it contained no information whatsoever
about the quality of those professors’ work. The chart at ¶ 213 fares slightly better by
pointing out that Katti published more articles, delivered more conference presentations,
and secured more grants than a white colleague who received tenure. But, as we discussed
above, scholarship quantity is an imperfect metric for scholarship quality. While Katti’s
higher numbers could make a difference if all other things were equal, “things, when
teaching qualifications are being examined at the university level, are practically never
equal.” Id. at 511.
In any event, Katti’s complaint did not suggest that research productivity was the
primary reason he was denied tenure. Instead, Goodwin and Gower’s criticisms of Katti—
which Katti believes were the driving force behind his denial—focused on his teaching,
mentorship, and administrative skills. Goodwin, for example, spoke about Katti’s
“persistent inability to meet his responsibilities” in a class the two of them co-taught. J.A.
72, 89–90. Gower highlighted Katti’s low teaching load, low student evaluation scores,
“loose and reactive” teaching style, and “lack of guidance and availability” as a mentor.
J.A. 95, 103. Gower also believed that Katti caused NCSU to “almost los[e]” the Doris
Duke Conservation Scholars program. J.A. 83–84. By drawing a comparison solely on the
basis of research productivity, the chart at ¶ 213 missed the forest for the trees.
Katti’s allegations fall short for another reason. Neither the chart at ¶ 209 nor the
chart at ¶ 213 stated whether Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, Gower, and Zagacki were even
12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 13 of 22
involved in the decisions to grant tenure to the white professors identified as comparators.
Without an allegation that these defendants were involved, there is no way the district court
could have reasonably inferred that they treated Katti and a similarly situated comparator
differently. Try as he might, Katti cannot pin the institutional actions of NCSU on the
individual defendants in this case.
Section 1981 guarantees “[a]ll persons” the same right “to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This statutory provision,
originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “guards generally against race-
based discrimination in the workplace.” Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A., 985 F.3d 392, 399
(4th Cir. 2021).
To plead a § 1981 violation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both that the defendant
intended to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the discrimination interfered with a
contractual interest.” Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)). Intentional
discrimination under § 1981 is discrimination that “would not have happened but for the
plaintiff’s race.” Id. (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned
Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020)).
Each of the bases on which Katti asks us to infer intentional race discrimination is
highly speculative. First, Katti asks us to infer intentional race discrimination from the fact
that Goodwin and her colleagues criticized him—without, he says, having “any real
reason” to do so. Opening Br. at 20. He points to our decision in Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l
13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 14 of 22
Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2003), where we found an inference of employment
discrimination reasonable. In that case, however, the employer did “not suggest that [the
employee’s] work . . . was subpar” but denied the employee a job opportunity anyways. Id.
at 544. That case is not this case. Goodwin and Gower’s persistent criticisms of Katti’s
teaching and mentorship here provide ample basis for their belief that his work was subpar.
If that is not a “real reason” for them to oppose granting him tenure, it is hard to fathom
what is.
Katti next asks us to infer intentional race discrimination from the fact that Goodwin
did not recuse herself from the IRPTC and that Gower and Zagacki did not compel her to
recuse. Opening Br. at 18–19. According to Katti, Goodwin’s presence on the committee
violated NCSU’s conflict-of-interest policy. While a failure to follow standard operating
procedures might support an inference of discrimination in another case, see, e.g., Merritt
v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2010), we are not
convinced there was any such failure here. A conflict of interest is a “division of loyalties.”
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002). Goodwin’s belief that Katti was
“incapable/incompetent,” J.A. 91, was not a conflict of interest when the very task before
the IRPTC was to decide whether Katti was capable and competent. In fact, since her belief
was the product of her experience co-teaching a class with Katti, it was precisely the kind
of informed perspective the IRPTC had every reason to solicit.
Katti also asks us to infer intentional race discrimination from what he alleges is
different treatment afforded to him and his white colleagues. Opening Br. at 12–13, 15. It
is true that different treatment between a plaintiff and a comparator who is similarly
14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 15 of 22
situated in all relevant respects can support an inference of intentional discrimination under
§ 1981, just as it can support an equal protection claim. See Lemon, 985 F.3d at 399–400;
Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 305–06. But as we explained above, Katti’s amended complaint falls
well short of alleging a similarly situated comparator.
Ultimately, Katti’s theory of race discrimination falters. The facts he alleged about
Goodwin and Gower had nothing to do with race, and he alleged almost no facts at all
about Arden, Floyd, and Zagacki. That he argues their actions can “only be explained” by
race does not make it so. J.A. 119–22, 126–27. By offering speculation rather than facts,
Katti pled precisely the kind of “[l]abels, conclusions, recitation of a claim’s elements, and
naked assertions” that the Rules of Civil Procedure forbid. Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 305
(quoting ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2019)).
In fact, an “obvious alternative explanation” for Katti’s denial of tenure emerges
from his complaint: the decisionmakers who reviewed his first tenure application believed
he was not qualified. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780
F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). Katti evidently believes he
was qualified, but that by itself suggests nothing about whether they did. His conjecture is
not enough to push his claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570.
IV.
We now turn to Katti’s First Amendment claim: that he was unlawfully denied
tenure in retaliation for his “non-traditional teaching methods.” J.A. 132. We agree with
the district court that this claim was insubstantial.
15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 16 of 22
The First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth, prevents the states from
“abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. This proscription safeguards not
just “the affirmative right to speak, but also the ‘right to be free from retaliation’” on the
basis of protected speech. Adams, 640 F.3d at 560 (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v.
McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000)).
When a professor at a public university claims he suffered retaliation because of his
speech, we first examine whether his speech was protected by the First Amendment at all.
Id. at 560–61. The answer to that question is “yes” if the professor spoke “upon a matter
of public concern,” either in his capacity as a private citizen, id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)), or by
way of “scholarship and teaching” in his capacity as a professor, id. at 563–64 (citing
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)). If the answer is “yes,” we ask whether his
protected speech caused the university to take an adverse action against him. Id. at 560–
61; see also McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998) (asking if the speech
was a “substantial factor” in the adverse action). Finally, we use the Pickering–Connick
balancing test to weigh the professor’s interest in speaking against the university’s interest
in taking the adverse action. Adams, 640 F.3d at 560–61.
It is possible that teaching methods, in another case, could fall within the zone of
protection afforded by the First Amendment to speech related to “scholarship and
teaching.” But that is a question we need not now address, because Katti disclaims the
scholarship and teaching label altogether:
16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 17 of 22
The [District] Court inferred from Dr. Katti’s employment as a university professor that his [First Amendment] complaints were about “the content of his courses” and his “scholarship” which they were not.
Opening Br. at 10. Nor did Katti’s amended complaint even make clear what “methods” of
teaching, if any, were at issue. It did not identify Katti’s methods by name, describe how
they work, or articulate an academic justification for them. It did not contrast them with
other methods or explain what made Katti’s less traditional. It did not even allege that his
methods were an intentional component of his teaching. Instead, it simply pointed out that
Gower believed Katti’s “loose and reactive” presence in the classroom caused “friction”
with students and that Katti received low student evaluation scores. J.A. 93–94, 103. The
only reasonable inference we can draw from these facts is that Gower was a critic of Katti’s
teaching quality, not his teaching methods. And we can draw no inferences at all about
Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, or Zagacki, whom Katti did not mention in his First Amendment
arguments. Without more, Katti has not identified speech that could form the basis of a
First Amendment claim.
Finally, the defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity, which protects
government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because Katti has not alleged any plausible claims
to relief, we need not consider whether qualified immunity would otherwise bar them.
17 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 18 of 22
VI.
It is beyond peradventure that each person, regardless of race or ideology, should
have a fair shot when he or she applies for a government job. We have vindicated this
principle at public universities time and time again, and for good reason. See, e.g., Hollis
v. Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 369, 381 (4th Cir. 2025) (reversing summary judgment
on a professor’s discrimination and retaliation claims); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors
Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying qualified immunity to
university officials on an instructor’s retaliation claims); Adams, 640 F.3d at 565
(extending the First Amendment’s protections to a professor’s writings on “civil rights,
campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion, homosexuality, religion, and morality”). But the
gravity of the problem a law was designed to address tells us nothing about the merits of a
particular plaintiff’s claim that it was violated. For that, we rely on the plaintiff to plead a
plausible case. Katti did not do so.
In so concluding, we express no position on the merits of Katti’s original tenure
application. Katti may have been a fine teacher and scholar at the time he first applied for
tenure, or he may not have been. We hold only that Arden, Floyd, Goodwin, Gower, and
Zagacki, and the non-defendants involved in reviewing Katti’s application, were entitled
to exercise their discretion in making that determination. All parties involved may now
turn their attention from this court to the noble enterprise in which they were heretofore
engaged—that of education.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
18 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 19 of 22
TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree the district court properly dismissed Katti’s First Amendment claim and his
race discrimination claim against Jean Goodwin. But I would reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Katti’s individual-capacity race discrimination claims against the four other
defendants.
My biggest concern with the district court’s analysis is its statement that, because
“discretionary decisions such as whether to grant tenure necessarily implicate a host of
subjective factors,” it is “exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff” like Katti “to show disparate
treatment.” JA 160 (quotation marks removed and emphasis added). That was error. There
is no “subjective factors” exception to the Equal Protection Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1981—
in the academy or elsewhere. Many employment decisions involve “complex judgments
and numerous decisionmakers.” Mawakana v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of the D.C., 926 F.3d
859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2019). And courts (including this one) have shown themselves fully
capable of adjudicating employment discrimination claims by professors. See, e.g., Hollis
v. Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 369, 381–84 (4th Cir. 2025) (reversing a grant of
summary judgment against a professor who alleged sex discrimination).
Like any plaintiff who believes they were treated differently than a similarly situated
comparator, all Katti needed to do at the motion-to-dismiss stage was “plausibly” allege
that he is similar “in all relevant respects” to at least one person who was treated more
favorably than him. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (first quote); Nordlinger
v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (second quote). Colleagues need not be identical to be valid
comparators. See Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019).
19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 20 of 22
Nor may a court—at either the motion-to-dismiss or summary judgment stage—simply
credit a defendant’s factual assertion that a proposed comparator is inappropriate. See id.
at 225.
In my view, the complaint’s allegations about Jason Delborne are sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss. The complaint alleges that Katti and Delborne had “very
similar” professional backgrounds and were hired into the same department overseen by
the same leaders (the non-Goodwin defendants) for the same role. JA 124–25. * It also
alleges that Katti was a strong performer in all areas of the job and that his tenure
application was—on at least some metrics—as impressive or more impressive than
Delborne’s. Finally, the complaint alleges that Delborne is White and Katti is not, and that
Delborne received tenure and Katti did not. In my view, those allegations are sufficient to
make Delborne a plausible comparator at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
To be sure, the quantity of an employee’s work product—the primary metric on
which the complaint alleges Katti outperformed Delborne—is not the only thing employers
care about, nor is quantity always a good proxy for quality. But detailed factual allegations
about two employees’ comparative productivity may still “establish a plausible basis for
believing” the plaintiff and the comparator were “similarly situated.” Coleman v. Maryland
Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30
(2012). And that is all a plaintiff needs to survive a motion to dismiss.
Because the four non-Goodwin defendants all lead or oversee the department, it *
seems plausible to me that they all played a role in both Katti and Delborne’s tenure processes.
20 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 21 of 22
To see why, imagine a suit brought by a female sales associate who was denied a
raise. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is as good—if not better—at her job than a
male colleague who got a raise, and it offers as support the fact that the plaintiff closed 100
deals that year while her male colleague only closed 10. The complaint further alleges that
both sales associates worked for the same supervisor, in the same department, and had the
same job title. That complaint should survive a motion to dismiss because it has plausibly
alleged that the plaintiff and her male colleague were “in all relevant respects alike.”
Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
Of course, discovery could reveal that the two sales associates were not, in fact,
evenly matched. For one thing, the complaint’s allegations may not be borne out by the
evidence. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)
(explaining how the nature of a plaintiff’s burden changes depending on the stage of
litigation). Or perhaps the complaint left out information that may prove critical to the court
at the summary judgment stage, or to the factfinder at trial. Maybe the male colleague made
the most lucrative sale in company history. Maybe the plaintiff closed more new deals but
struggled to hold onto existing customers. And so on. But a court should not dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim just because its allegations may not tell the whole
story or because the court can identify plausible and lawful alternative explanations for the
employer’s adverse action. See Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (to
survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim”).
21 USCA4 Appeal: 24-2054 Doc: 53 Filed: 12/02/2025 Pg: 22 of 22
The same is true here. The complaint alleges Katti was a strong performer and an
even more productive scholar than a White colleague in the same department who received
tenure. True, discovery could reveal that Katti and Delborne were not so alike after all.
Perhaps Delborne published fewer articles than Katti, but one was especially influential.
Maybe the department needed a chestnut tree scholar (Delborne’s field of expertise) more
than a bird expert (Katti’s). But as with the suit brought by the hypothetical sales associate,
those possibilities do not—at the motion-to-dismiss stage—negate the otherwise plausible
story told by Katti’s complaint. For that reason, I would reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Katti’s individual-capacity race discrimination claims against the
non-Goodwin defendants and remand for further proceedings.