Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York

267 F. Supp. 356, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8321
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 10, 1967
Docket67 Civ. 635
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 267 F. Supp. 356 (Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Madera v. Board of Education of City of New York, 267 F. Supp. 356, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8321 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

Opinion

MOTLEY, District Judge.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The minor plaintiff, Victor Madera, is a 14 year old pupil enrolled in Public School 22, a junior high school in the New York City public school system. On February 2, 1967, Victor was suspended from school by the principal. He has been out of school since that date.

After Victor was suspended, the principal of his school notified the District Superintendent of District No. 1, Miss Theresa Rakow, a defendant in this suit. 1 Miss Rakow notified Victor’s parents, the adult plaintiffs, that a conference would be held in her office on February 17,1967 with regard to Victor’s suspension. The notice advised: 1) there would be a Spanish speaking person at this conference to translate “for all of us,” and 2) a friend could be brought to assist the parents in this translation. The notice stated: “You are hereby advised that you are to be present at this conference. Please bring (Victor) with you * * The letter was in both English and Spanish. Victor’s mother speaks Spanish; she does not speak or understand English. The principal’s actions and Miss Rakow’s actions were taken pursuant to General Circular No. 16, (1965-1966). 2 This circular embodies the rules and regulations promulgated by the other defendants, the Board of Education of the City of New York and the Superintendent of Schools, with regard to pupil suspensions.

After Victor’s parents received the notice, they secured an attorney who contacted Miss Rakow’s office to notify her that the attorney would appear at the February 17 hearing. 3 The attorney was advised that he could not attend the hearing. Circular No. 16 provides as follows:

“Inasmuch as this is a guidance conference for the purpose of providing an opportunity for parents, teachers, counselors, supervisors, et al., to plan educationally for the benefit of the child, attorneys seeking to represent the parent or child may not participate.” (Circular No. 16, p. 5)

On February 16, 1967, at 8:15 P.M., after notice to defendants and oral argument, this court issued a temporary restraining order restraining defendants as follows:

“From holding any proceedings at which the rights of any of the plaintiffs may be affected and, particularly, from conducting the ‘Assistant Superintendent’s Hearing’ scheduled for February 17, 1967, without permitting plaintiffs’ legal counsel to be present and to perform his tasks as an attorney.”

*359 The incident which precipitated Victor’s suspension on February 2 resulted in the filing of a charge of juvenile delinquency against him on February 8 by a teacher, an employee of defendant Board of Education, in the Family Court. New York Family Court Act, §§ 712, 733. 4 The same attorneys representing plaintiffs here also were retained to represent Victor in the Family Court. The New York Family Court Act, § 728, gives Victor the right to counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. On February 28, the claim that Victor was a juvenile delinquent was dismissed by the Family Court. There “was a substitution and a finding that has not been completed, a fact-finding that (Victor) is a young person in need of supervision.” 5

Defendants did not proceed with the February 17 hearing under the conditions permitted by the temporary restraining order. The order also required counsel for both sides to appear in court on February 21, at which time reargument would be heard on the temporary restraining order and plaintiffs’ application for a three-judge court.

On February 21, defendants requested and were granted a continuance on the ground that all defendants had not been served. Defendants agreed to a continuance of the temporary restraining order until March 1 at which time, if a three-judge court was not required, the court would proceed to hear plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.

On February 24, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction. The original complaint predicated jurisdiction wholly upon Title 28, United States Code, § 1331. Declaratory relief, 6 interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief were sought. The original complaint prayed for the convening of a special three-judge district court to hear and determine this action. Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 2281, 2284. The amended complaint also prayed for the convening of a three-judge court but invoked an additional jurisdictional base for this cause, i. e., Title 28, U.S.C., § 1343. The amended complaint relied upon the provisions of Title 42, U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 as the federal statutes giving rise to this cause of action.

On March 1, 1966, this court ruled that this cause is not properly a cause of action requiring a statutory three-judge court. Under constitutional attack here is a provision of a circular issued by a local school board, not the constitutionality of any state statute. 7 The “no attorneys provision” is not mandated by any state law. However, the circular is promulgated pursuant to authority granted by a state statute. New York Education Law, McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 16, § 2554(13) (b). Nevertheless, the attack upon the circular does not present the type of constitutional challenge to state action that would require the convening of a three-judge court. The guiding principle for three-judge court cases was laid down by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 61 S.Ct. 480, 85 L.Ed. 800 (1941) as follows:

“To bring this procedural device into play — to dislocate the normal operations of the system of lower federal courts and thereafter to come directly to this Court — requires a suit which seeks to interpose the Constitution against enforcement of a state policy, whether such policy is defined in a state constitution or in an ordinary statute or through the delegated legislation of an ‘administrative board or commission’. The crux of the business is procedural protection against an improvident state-wide doom by a federal *360 court of a state’s legislative policy.” (at 251, 61 S.Ct. at 483).

Consequently, where that which is under attack is not mandated by state law but is only a regulation of a local school board, adopted on its own volition, and is not of state-wide application, although authorized by state law, the controversy may be properly adjudicated by a single judge court. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Va., 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed. 2d 256 (1964); Sweeney, et al., v. State Board of Public Assistance, 36 F.Supp. 171 (M.D.Pa.1940), aff’d 3 Cir., 119 F.2d 1023.

When the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction commenced on March 1, defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot on the ground that the Family Court proceeding had already taken place.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
267 F. Supp. 356, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madera-v-board-of-education-of-city-of-new-york-nysd-1967.