Maddox v. Katzman

332 N.W.2d 347, 1982 Iowa App. LEXIS 1556
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
DecidedDecember 29, 1982
Docket2-66492
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 332 N.W.2d 347 (Maddox v. Katzman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347, 1982 Iowa App. LEXIS 1556 (iowactapp 1982).

Opinion

OXBERGER, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from judgment entered against them in this action to determine the parties’ rights to the use of certain beach front property on Lake West Okoboji. Plaintiffs, owners of lots not adjacent to the beach, claim that they have easements by virtue of certain provisions of a 1905 plat which give them the right to access to the beach for bathing purposes and for the erection of docks and boathouses and by prescription. Defendants, owners of the beach front property in question, assert absolute title, free and clear of any alleged easements, and raise other affirmative defenses as well. Because this case was tried in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further findings.

Plaintiffs and defendants are all landowners in the Terrace Park subdivision which is located on the south shore of Lake West Okoboji. Green’s Beach, a portion of which is the center of controversy in this case, abuts the south shore and is separated from Terrace Park by Okoboji Boulevard. In 1905, H.O. Green filed a plat of Terrace Park which dedicated certain areas (including streets and boulevards) to public use. The plat also contained the following provision:

“I, the said H.O. Green, do hereby expressly reserve and retain the title in fee to all that portion of land in said plat designated as parks and as Greens Beach, with the exception that each owner of a summer residence in this plat shall have the right to use said beach for bathing purposes, and the right of the use of the beach for the erection of a private dock, and a use of a portion of the shore line of said beach extending forty feet back from the water’s edge and twelve feet in width along the water’s edge for the purpose of erecting a private boat house.”

*349 In tbeir petition, filed on March 18, 1976, plaintiffs claimed, as owners of inland lots, that they and their predecessors in title had access to the lake using Green’s Beach as a result of the exception granted in the plat and also by their “actual open, adverse and notorious use of the access, ingress and egress to the lake across or on Greens Beach for a period of 50 years.” Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants have prevented their access to the lake and their use of Green’s Beach by fencing off a portion of the beach 1 and have executed conveyances among themselves so as to divide up the beach and establish fee title in themselves in derogation of plaintiffs’ rights. The petition concluded with a two-fold prayer for relief — plaintiffs wanted the right to use Green’s Beach under the 1905 plat quieted in them and also wanted defendants restrained from restricting plaintiffs’ access to the lake through the beach.

Defendants filed various answers and amended answers raising a host of affirmative defenses including: plaintiffs’ claim is barred by their failure to file claims to preserve their alleged easement under the Marketable Title Act (Iowa Code §§ 614.-34, .35); defendants have obtained fee title of the beach lots both through claim of title and by adverse possession; the alleged easement was unenforceable because of the vagueness of the dedication in the plat; and

H.O. Green, the original grantor, abandoned any plan of creating easements across the beach by making later conveyances of portions of the beach free and clear of any easements or other forms of equitable servitude. Defendants also filed counterclaims alleging that plaintiffs’ petition clouded their title to the beach lots and wanting absolute title to be quieted in them.

After a number of continuances were granted to avoid automatic dismissal under Iowa R.Civ.P. 215.1, trial to the court was commenced on September 30, 1980, and lasted three days. The court issued its findings, conclusions and decree on February 9, 1981. The court concluded that the language contained in the 1905 plat was not intended by H.O. Green to create an easement on Green’s Beach in favor of the lot owners in Terrace Park. It was also determined that Green abandoned any plan he may have had for the development of Terrace Park by replatting the area after 1905 and by making a number of conveyances of Terrace Park lots without specifying the alleged easement with one exception — a 1908 warranty deed to one Irvin Tepley containing the easement. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that they had established an easement by prescription or adverse possession since they did not prove continuous and hostile use of the beach as a means of access to the lake. Plaintiffs’ petition was therefore denied and title to the beach lots was quieted in the various defendants except for Roger and Lois Johnson who did not enter an appearance and were not represented at trial. Plaintiffs initiated this appeal.

I. We must first determine the effect of that language in the 1905 plat which is at issue in this case. Plaintiffs claim that H.O. Green intended to create an easement appurtenant to the lots in Terrace Park; some defendants claim the plat created only an exception while others claim it is a revocable license. We do not decide this question solely on the basis of the words used in the instrument, however; instead, we must try to ascertain the intent of the grantor, both by looking at the instrument and by examining the attendant circumstances. In speaking of determination of the differences between exceptions and easements, the supreme court said:

We think, however, that the question whether a right reserved, excepted or created is one which runs with or is annexed to the land or is one of a temporary or personal character, is not ordinarily to be determined by the use of either of these words, but the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by looking to the entire instrument and the circumstances attending and characterizing the transaction which the writing witnesses....
*350 To use the language of the Minnesota court:
“The day is past for adhering to technical or literal meaning of particular words in a deed or other contract against the plain intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument.” Long v. Fewer (Minn.), [53 Minn. 156] 54 N.W. 1071.

McCoy v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co., 176 Iowa 139, 143, 155 N.W. 995, 996-97 (1916); see also Paul v. Blakely, 243 Iowa 355, 358, 51 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1952) (regarding the differences between easements and licenses). An easement has been defined in this state as “ ‘a liberty, privilege, or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from ownership of the soil, and because it is a permanent interest in another’s land, with a right to enter at all times and enjoy it, it must be founded upon a grant by writing or upon prescription.’ ” Independent School District of Iowa v. DeWilde, 243 Iowa 685, 692, 53 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1952) (citations omitted).

With these principles in mind, we think it is clear that H.O.

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Bluebook (online)
332 N.W.2d 347, 1982 Iowa App. LEXIS 1556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maddox-v-katzman-iowactapp-1982.