Madar v. State
This text of 376 So. 2d 446 (Madar v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In this appeal defendant seeks reversal of his conviction of keeping a gambling house. We affirm. Defendant was tried in the Circuit Court and a jury found him guilty of this charge under Section 849.01, Florida Statutes (1977). The defendant was charged in a two-count information filed in Circuit Court. Count One charged keeping a gambling house contrary to Section 849.-01, Florida Statutes (1977), by running a bingo game not in compliance with Section 849.093, Florida Statutes (1977). The defendant moved to dismiss the information and urged that the charge against him was actually a misdemeanor instead of a felony and that the case should have been filed in County Court. Section 849.01, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a violation thereof [447]*447is a third degree felony.1 Section 849.093, Florida Statutes (1977), the Florida bingo law, provides that violation thereof is a misdemeanor.2
The basic question is whether there is a difference between the felony charge of keeping a gambling house and the misdemeanor charge of knowingly engaging in an improper bingo game.
Appellant argued below and rear-gues here that Sections 849.093 and 849.01, Florida Statutes (1977), proscribe the identical crime. He thus maintains the statutes are vague and he should be charged under the misdemeanor provisions of Section 849.-093 rather than the felony provisions of Section 849.01. As stated by our Supreme Court in Fayerweather v. State, 332 So.2d 21 (Fla.1976). “It is not unusual for a course of criminal conduct to violate laws that overlap yet vary in their penalties. Multiple sentences are even allowed for conduct arising from the same incident.” Supra at 22. Confronted with a similar argument to the one below, this Court [448]*448recently held in State v. Zimmerman, 370 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) that the felony of false certification of a campaign report under Section 106.07(6) was a separate crime from the misdemeanor of filing a false campaign report under Section 106.-19(1). In Zimmerman, the State appealed an order transferring the cause to County Court. This Court reversed finding the matter properly charged in Circuit Court as a felony because the felony statute required proof of an additional element. We reach a similar conclusion here that appellant was properly charged with a felony because the two gambling statutes, Sections 849.093 and 849.01, are different in that Section 849.093 is a specialized exception to the general prohibition against gambling. See Carroll v. State, 361 So.2d 144 (Fla.1978).
Carroll holds the bingo statute constitutional and points out that the Legislature of this State has allowed “worthy organizations” to receive the benefits of the statute. The bingo statute is basically a classification statute. To come within the bingo statute exception a defendant must first be a three-year old, non-profit organization or a veterans’ organization engaged in charitable, civic, community, benevolent, religious, scholastic, or other similar activities. The status of the defendant as being within the class of “worthy organizations” is a threshold question for the application of the Section 849.093 exception. An individual who is not such a “worthy organization” may not have the benefit of the bingo statutory exception. If such an individual operates a bingo game and violates the other elements of Section 849.01, he may be found guilty of keeping a gambling house. This crime by an individual (not a “worthy organization”) has been classified by the Legislature as a felony. The difference between the two statutes is basically the status of the defendant.
In the instant case the State presented evidence that defendant was not within the class of “worthy organizations” in the bingo statute. This was presented to the jury as a factual question and the jury impliedly found against the defendant on the issue. In conclusion we find the evidence was sufficient to support the felony conviction herein and that the trial court did not err in refusing to transfer the matter to the County Court as a misdemeanor.
AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
376 So. 2d 446, 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15683, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/madar-v-state-fladistctapp-1979.