Macy v. Browne
This text of 224 F. 359 (Macy v. Browne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Much testimony was taken, and the District Court found that when complainants offered their tea for entry the standard samples contained no coloring matter whatever,, but did contain a far greater amount of other foreign substances than did complainants’; that the tea refused entry is worth in the open market nearly four times as much per pound as is the standard sample by which its. acceptance or rejection was gauged; that the sole cause for rejecting the tea in question is that it showed coloring matter, to wit, Prussian blue, in proportion ranging from 9 to 19 parts of blue in a million of other and unobjectcd to elements. It is conceded by both sides that Prussian blue cannot be proved to produce any deleterious results; that it is found in the United States Pharmacopeia as a drug sometimes, used for common purposes. A careful study of the testimony results in the conclusion that these findings of fact are entirely accurate.
It is now contended for the government that although the board may be satisfied that a certain lot of tea is fully equal, indeed superior, to the standard — in purity, in quality, and in fitness for consumption— the board must nevertheless reject it, if they find that it contains coloring or facing matter. It does not seem to us that the statute warrants such rejection, unless the coloring matter plus other impurities makes the tea below standard in purity, or- the coloring matter makes the tea below standard in quality, or the coloring matter makes the tea less fit for consumption than the standard. Within the field of investigation confided to them the Board of Examiners are the sole judges; but they have been given no authority to extend the field of investigation beyond the limits staked out by Congress. If Congress had intended that tea should be rejected because of coloring matter which was not sufficient in quantity, or such in character as to bring it below standard in the three particulars specified, it must be presumed that Congress would have so stated in the act. We do not see that Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525, applies. That case held merely that the board was the final judge in its allotted field; it did not indicate that the board had any power to extend that field.
The record shows that this tea is superior to standard in all three, specified requirements. It also shows that nevertheless it will be re[362]*362jected as soon as the board examines it, because of a fourth unspecified requirement. The members of the board are appointed, by the Secretary, who has the power to remove them; it is not disputed that they will act in conformity to the requirements he has prescribed for their guidance in regulations 22 and 23. Indeed, upon inquiry as to the issues by the District Judg'e, counsel for the government conceded that it was the intention of the officers of the government-“to keep out all the tea that has any coloring matter in it, no matter whether such matter was put into it, so far as the observer can discover, for the purpose of coloring it or not, or whether it is mere carelessness or accident”; also thát teas will be rejected “if the said teas are found to contain matters adapted for use as coloring or- facing of any kind or in any quantity, irrespective of whether the same is or is not used or applied so as to conceal damage or inferiority.”
The decree is reversed, and cause remitted, with instructions to decree in conformity with this opinion.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
224 F. 359, 140 C.C.A. 45, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 1871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/macy-v-browne-ca2-1915.