No. 14578 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980
JAMES MAePHERSON et al. , Plaintiffs and Respondents, VS.
FRANKLIN R. SMOYER et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Petaja, Smoyer and Berry, Helena, Montana Jeanette Berry argued, Helena, Montana Far Respondents: Hughes, Bennett, Kellner and Sullivan, Helena, Montana John Sullivan argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: November 19, 1980 Decided: DEC 3 0 1986 m -* - 2 -- Filed: >Y,, 2 Mr.J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
P l a i n t i f f s b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of
t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t s e e k i n g i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and t o
q u i e t t i t l e t o r e a l property. Defendants c o u n t e r c l a i m e d f o r
i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f and t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e r t y i n
question. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r of
p l a i n t i f f s and d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n t e r c l a i m i n i t s en-
tirety. From t h i s judgment d e f e n d a n t s a p p e a l .
A t i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l i s a s m a l l t r a c t of l a n d ,
p e r h a p s no l a r g e r t h a n 2 5 f e e t i n l e n g t h . Easement i s s u e s ,
t h e r e f o r e , make up t h e b u l k of t h e argument. Property a s
w e l l a s c i v i l procedure i s s u e s w e r e presented f o r review.
The c a s e i s a d i s p u t e among n e i g h b o r s who a r e
owners of c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y on t h e n o r t h f a c e of a h i l l
l o c a t e d on t h e s o u t h boundary of Helena, Montana. Speci-
f i c a l l y , t h e p r o p e r t y i n c l u d e s L o t s 1 t h r o u g h 2 3 of Block 1
4 1 of t h e C o r b i n S u b d i v i s i o n of t h e C i t y of Helena; most of
t h e c l o s e d and v a c a t e d n o r t h - s o u t h a l l e y t o t h e w e s t of
t h e s e L o t s 1 t h r o u g h 2 3 ; L o t s 2 4 t h r o u g h 36 of Block 4 2 of 1
t h e C o r b i n S u b d i v i s i o n ; and t h e c l o s e d and v a c a t e d Cooke
S t r e e t l o c a t e d between L o t s 1 t h r o u g h 2 3 of Block 4 1 and 1
L o t s 2 4 t h r o u g h 3 6 o f Block 4 2 . W i t h i n t h i s t r a c t of l a n d
t h e r e i s a r o a d p r o v i d i n g a c c e s s t o a l l r e s i d e n c e s on t h e
hill.
The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s w e r e d e r i v e d from t h e e x t e n d e d
f i n d i n g s of f a c t made by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
The o n l y p l a t on r e c o r d i s t h e C o r b i n S u b d i v i s i o n
r e c o r d e d i n L e w i s and C l a r k County. The o r i g i n a l owners,
t h e S c h i l l e r s , p e t i t i o n e d t h e C i t y of Helena f o r v a c a t i o n of
a p o r t i o n of Cooke S t r e e t and t h e n o r t h - s o u t h a l l e y s l o c a t e d
w i t h i n t h e 4 0 0 b l o c k of Cooke S t r e e t . I n 1952 t h e C i t y of Helena g r a n t e d t h e p e t i t i o n by
means o f a r e s o l u t i o n . The r e s o l u t i o n v a c a t e d and d i s c o n -
t i n u e d t h a t p o r t i o n o f Cooke S t r e e t l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e
d i s p u t e d a r e a , s u b j e c t t o a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t no b u i l d i n g be
b u i l t t h e r e o n and a l s o s u b j e c t t o t h e r i g h t s of any p u b l i c
u t i l i t y company, i n c l u d i n g t h e C i t y , t o u s e t h e l a n d v a c a t e d
f o r s e r v i c i n g t h e a r e a and a d j a c e n t a r e a i n t h e C i t y o f
Helena.
I n 1958, t h e S c h i l l e r s q u i t c l a i m e d t o t h e C i t y o f
Helena a l l of t h e i r " r i g h t s , t i t l e , i n t e r e s t , c l a i m and
demand" t o a l l t h e v a c a t e d a l l e y s and t h e p o r t i o n o f v a c a t e d
Cooke S t r e e t l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e e x t e r i o r b o u n d a r i e s of
Blocks 4 1 and 4 2 . The S c h i l l e r s t h e n r e p e t i t i o n e d f o r t h e
c l o s i n g and v a c a t i o n of t h e n o r t h - s o u t h a l l e y s and t h e
p o r t i o n o f Cooke S t r e e t l o c a t e d w i t h i n Blocks 4 1 and 4 2 .
T h i s p e t i t i o n w a s g r a n t e d e f f e c t i v e December 29, 1958, by
t h e C i t y of Helena. The 1958 r e s o l u t i o n d i d n o t c o n t a i n any
c o n d i t i o n s o r r e q u i r e m e n t s which f o r b i d s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
b u i l d i n g s on t h e v a c a t e d a r e a s .
I n 1960 t h e S c h i l l e r s conveyed t o p l a i n t i f f , James
Macpherson, t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . The l a n d a t t h a t t i m e
was n o t developed and s e r v e d a s h o r s e p a s t u r e .
I n 1961 t h e Macphersons b u i l t a house a t t h e h i g h e s t
p o i n t on t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n , marked a s "M" on t h e d i a -
gram. Macphersons b u i l t a switchback r o a d s t a r t i n g a t t h e
n o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of L o t 36, Block 4 2 , which l e d t o t h e i r
house.
From 1963 t h r o u g h 1970 Macpherson s o l d and conveyed
o t h e r t r a c t s of l a n d w i t h i n t h i s b l o c k t o s e v e r a l o t h e r
persons. Through a series of conveyances, Macpherson a t -
tempted t o r e t a i n a n easement on a n a c c e s s r o a d t o h i s house. In 1970 Macpherson sold and conveyed land to the Ecks, predecessors in interest of defendants Smoyer of Lots 21 through 23. Lots 21 through 23 have a steep east to west slope, with the higher ground located to the east. The east 25 feet of these lots, the property in dispute on which the access road is located, is a bench-like area which is approxi- mately on the same level as that on which the Macphersons' house is built. Immediately to the west of the bench-like area, the property drops off steeply to the west.
Macphersons offered to sell the Ecks the west 100 feet of Lots 21 through 23, Block 41. A buy-sell agreement was entered into. Later, it was discovered that because of recent ordinance changes the sale, as proposed in the buy-
sell agreement, would not leave the Ecks with sufficient lot t o a l l o w c o n s t r u c t i o n of a house t h e r e o n . Macphersons
a g r e e d t o convey t o t h e Ecks t h e e a s t 25 f e e t of L o t s 21
t h r o u g h 2 3 Block 41,and t o r e s e r v e t h e r e o n a n easement f o r
Macphersons t o i n g r e s s and e g r e s s f o r driveway p u r p o s e s .
The deed f o r t h e s a l e was r e c o r d e d . Plaintiffs did not
i n t e n d t o convey t o t h e Ecks any p a r t of c l o s e d and v a c a t e d
Cooke S t r e e t t o t h e e a s t of L o t s 21 t h r o u g h 23, Block 4 1 ,
and t h i s was known t o and u n d e r s t o o d and a c c e p t e d by t h e
Ecks.
During t h e Ecks' ownership of t h e t r a c t of l a n d now
owned by d e f e n d a n t s , t h e y o c c a s i o n a l l y d r o v e up ' t h e s w i t c h -
back r o a d , beyond t h e p o i n t a t which i t f i r s t e n t e r e d i n t o
p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y a t t h e w e s t end o f L o t s 28 and 29,
Block 42. The Ecks' a c t i v i t y i n t h i s r e g a r d w a s t o d e t e r -
mine whether it would b e p o s s i b l e t o have cement t r u c k s pour
c o n c r e t e f o r t h e Ecks' p l a n n e d r e s i d e n c e from a p o i n t o f f
p l a i n t i f f s ' driveway on t h e e a s t 25 f e e t o f L o t s 21 t h r o u g h
23. S t a n l e y Eck u n d e r s t o o d t h a t h e needed p l a i n t i f f s '
p e r m i s s i o n t o d r i v e up t h e r o a d beyond t h e p o i n t a t which i t
f i r s t e n t e r e d i n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y a t t h e w e s t end of
L o t s 28 and 29, Block 42, and he s o u g h t and o b t a i n e d s u c h
p e r m i s s i o n from p l a i n t i f f s .
On J a n u a r y 30, 1973, t h e Ecks conveyed t h e t r a c t of
l a n d t o E r v i n and K a t h e r i n e C h e s t e r . On September 1 9 , 1975,
t h e C h e s t e r s conveyed t o d e f e n d a n t s , F r a n k l i n R . and Ann L.
Smoyer, husband and w i f e , L o t s 21 t h r o u g h 23, Block 4 1 , a l l
of t h e c l o s e d and v a c a t e d a l l e y t o t h e w e s t of s a i d L o t s 2 1 and 22 and t h e e a s t one-half of t h e c l o s e d and v a c a t e d a l l e y
t o t h e w e s t of s a i d L o t 23.
A t t h e t i m e of d e f e n d a n t s ' p u r c h a s e of t h e p r o p e r t y , t h e r e were no s t r u c t u r e s l o c a t e d t h e r e o n . Defendants subse- q u e n t l y c o n s t r u c t e d a r e s i d e n c e on t h i s p r o p e r t y , which was
f i r s t o c c u p i e d by d e f e n d a n t s i n J u n e 1976.
Access t o d e f e n d a n t s ' r e s i d e n c e i s by means of a n
a s p h a l t driveway c o n s t r u c t e d by d e f e n d a n t s d u r i n g t h e summer
of 1976 on t h e w e s t p o r t i o n s of L o t s 2 1 and 22, Block 4 1 ,
and on t h e e a s t p o r t i o n o f t h e c l o s e d and v a c a t e d a l l e y t o
t h e w e s t of s a i d l o t s . D e f e n d a n t s ' driveway l e a d s from t h e
s w i t c h b a c k r o a d t o a two-car g a r a g e l o c a t e d i n t h e w e s t
ground f l o o r p o r t i o n of d e f e n d a n t s ' r e s i d e n c e .
The s w i t c h b a c k r o a d , from t h e p o i n t a t which i t f i r s t
e n t e r s o n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y a t t h e w e s t end of L o t s 28
and 29, Block 42, t o t h e p o i n t a t which i t dead-ends a t
p l a i n t i f f s ' residence, has, s i n c e t h e t i m e of i t s construc-
t i o n i n 1961, been c o n s i d e r e d by p l a i n t i f f s t o be t h e i r
p r i v a t e driveway. S i n c e 1961 a l l of t h e maintenance and
improvement of t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e r o a d h a s been a t t h e s o l e
d i s c r e t i o n and e x p e n s e of p l a i n t i f f s . I n 1973 p l a i n t i f f s
p l a c e d a post-and-chain g a t e on t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e r o a d .
During t h e summer of 1976 d e f e n d a n t s d r o v e t h e i r v e h i -
c l e s up t h e switchback r o a d t o t h e e a s t of t h e i r a s p h a l t
driveway and r e s i d e n c e and o n t o p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y .
Defendants would t h e n n e g o t i a t e t h e u - t u r n l o c a t e d w i t h i n
t h e l o t s , would p r o c e e d a l o n g t h e r o a d t o t h e w e s t and would
p a r k and l e a v e t h e i r v e h i c l e s i n t h e a r e a where t h e r o a d
c r o s s e s t h e e a s t 2 5 f e e t of L o t s 2 1 t h r o u g h 23.
D e f e n d a n t s parked t h e i r v e h i c l e s on t h e d i s p u t e d
p r o p e r t y , l o c a t e d and marked a s "A" on t h e diagram. plain-
t i f f s made r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s t o d e f e n d a n t s t o remove t h e i r
vehicles. Defendants c o n t i n u e d t o p a r k t h e i r v e h i c l e s i n
t h i s area. P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d a d e c l a r a t o r y a c t i o n t o determine t h e
n a t u r e of t h e p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t s of t h e d i s p u t e d a r e a .
Defendants answered and c o u n t e r c l a i m e d .
P r i o r t o t h e conveyance of t h e l a n d t o t h e Ecks i n
1970, p l a i n t i f f s o p e n l y and c o n t i n u o u s l y used and m a i n t a i n e d
a l a r g e p o r t i o n o f t h e a r e a of c l o s e d and v a c a t e d Cooke
S t r e e t between L o t s 21 t h r o u g h 23, Block 4 1 , and L o t s 2 4
t h r o u g h 26, Block 4 2 , f o r driveway p u r p o s e s and a s a means
o f i n g r e s s and e g r e s s t o t h e i r r e s i d e n c e . P r i o r t o defen-
d a n t s ' f i l i n g of a c o u n t e r c l a i m , t h e r e was no c h a l l e n g e o r
o b s t r u c t i o n o r any c o n t e s t on t h e r o a d .
Defendants r a i s e numerous i s s u e s on t h i s a p p e a l , c r e -
a t i n g t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a complex l a n d d i s p u t e . Upon c l o s e
r e v i e w w e f i n d one i s s u e w i l l d i s p o s e of t h e e n t i r e p r o p e r t y
dispute:
Whether t h e r e s e r v e d easements i n t h e deed from t h e
p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e Ecks, t h e p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t of
d e f e n d a n t s , c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h t h a t d e f e n d a n t s have no
r i g h t o f a c c e s s o v e r p l a i n t i f f s ' p r i v a t e driveway.
W e l i m i t o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s matter t o t h e deed
from p l a i n t i f f s t o t h e Ecks, by which p l a i n t i f f s f i r s t
conveyed t h e l a n d now owned by d e f e n d a n t s . This instrument
and i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n t r o l l i n g . The Eck deed con-
t a i n s two r e s e r v e d e a s e m e n t s i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s , a s
f i r s t parties. The r e s e r v e d easements p r o v i d e d a s f o l l o w s :
" e x c e p t i n g and r e s e r v i n g o u t of t h e g r a n t e d p r e m i s e s t o t h e F i r s t P a r t i e s , t h e i r h e i r s and a s s i g n s , t h e following:
"An easement, right-of-way and r i g h t of p r i v a t e driveway upon and o v e r a l l of t h e E a s t Twenty- f i v e F e e t ( E 2 5 ' ) of e a c h of s a i d L o t s 2 1 , 22 and 23, f o r t h e e x c l u s i v e u s e a s a driveway and means of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s by t h e F i r s t P a r - t i e s , t h e i r h e i r s and a s s i g n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h the use, maintenance, repair and/or reconstruc- tion of the private driveway presently located on the East Twenty-five Feet (E 25' ) of each of said Lots 21, 22 and 23; and "An easement, right-of-way and right of ingress and egress over and upon a certain strip of land Twenty Feet (20') in width following the present access roadway furnishing ingress and egress to all of the lands of the First Par- ties, running over and across the premises herein conveyed, for the purpose of using (in common with Second Parties, their heirs and assigns), maintaining, repairing and improving said roadway which presently crosses said tract and provides access to the tract herein con- veyed and access to the lands of the First Parties, together with the right in the First Parties, their heirs and assigns, to maintain and/or reconstruct said roadway." The reserved easements are binding on defendants, as they are the successors in interest of the Ecks. Defendants have no right to use the access road known as Cooke Lane or South Cooke located within the exterior boundaries of the property at which point the access road first crosses onto plaintiffs' retained property at the west end of Lots 28 and 29 of Block 42. Upon a complete review of the record, we come to that conclusion based on the following considera- tions: The Document 1. The reserved easements in the deed from plaintiffs to the Ecks are reservations and exceptions out of the granted premises and do not expressly provide anyone with a right-of-way over the land retained by plaintiffs. 2. Defendants' claim of a right to use the access road beyond the point it first crosses plaintiffs' property at the west end of Lots 28 and 29, Block 42, is inconsistent with the reading of the first reserved easement in the deed. The easement expressly reserves "all of the east 25 feet of [defendants'] property as a private driveway .. . the e x c l u s i v e u s e a s a driveway and means of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s
t o t h e p r o p e r t y r e t a i n e d by [ p l a i n t i f f s ] t o t h e e a s t . "
Defendants a r e e x c l u d e d from t h e u s e of t h i s a r e a of t h e
driveway. The e a s t 25 f e e t o f d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y i s f o r
plaintiffs' "exclusive use."
3. The f i r s t r e s e r v e d easement i n t h e deed from p l a i n -
t i f f s t o t h e Ecks d o e s - c o n t a i n any p r o v i s i o n s f o r " i n not
common" u s e of t h e a c c e s s r o a d beyond p l a i n t i f f & ' p r o p e r t y
f o r o t h e r persons. This i s i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t t o the exis-
t e n c e of a n e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n f o r a n " i n common" u s e i n t h e
second r e s e r v e d easement i n t h e Eck deed r e l a t i n g t o t h e
c e r t a i n s t r i p o f l a n d l o c a t e d on t h e w e s t end of L o t 21,
which w a s c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o i n s u r e a c c e s s on t h e r o a d f o r
r e s i d e n t s who l i v e h i g h e r up on t h e h i l l .
4. S e c t i o n 70-1-516, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t a r e s e r v a t i o n
o u t of t h e g r a n t of p r o p e r t i e s i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d i n f a v o r
of t h e grantor.
The I n t e n t - - P a r t i e s of t h e
1. S t a n l e y Eck, who o r i g i n a l l y h a n d l e d t h e n e g o t i a -
t i o n s w i t h p l a i n t i f f s which l e d t o t h e d r a f t i n g and execu-
t i o n of t h e "Eck" d e e d , u n d e r s t o o d t h e r e s e r v a t i o n t o mean
t h a t he needed p l a i n t i f f s ' p e r m i s s i o n t o t r a v e l on t h e
a c c e s s r o a d a f t e r t h e p o i n t where t h e r o a d f i r s t e n t e r e d on
p l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y a t t h e w e s t end of L o t s 28 and 29,
Block 42. Eck, i n f a c t , asked f o r and r e c e i v e d p e r m i s s i o n
from p l a i n t i f f s b e f o r e d r i v i n g on t h e r o a d beyond t h a t
point. T h i s layman's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s l i m i t e d p r o p e r t y
i n t e r e s t s i n t h a t s m a l l p a r c e l of l a n d i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e a d i n g s of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , t h e i n t e n t of t h e g r a n t o r
( p l a i n t i f f s ) , t h e p h y s i c a l l o c a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y and
o t h e r f i n d i n g s made by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Here, t h e p a r t i e s , by t h e i r c o n d u c t , i n t e n d e d t o c o n s i d e r i t a n e x c l u s i v e
easement f o r p l a i n t i f f s . S t a t e By and Through Montana, E t c .
v. Cronin ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. , 587 P.2d 395, 35 St.Rep.
1798; Larson v. B u r n e t t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 158 Mont. 421, 492 P.2d 921.
2. The e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t of p l a i n t i f f s i n d r a f t i n g t h e
deed was t h a t t h e a r e a was r e s e r v e d f o r a p r i v a t e driveway
f o r t h e i r e x c l u s i v e use.
The L o c a t i o n - -e Area and P h y s i c a l Facts of t h --
Our r e a d i n g o f t h e f i r s t r e s e r v e d easement i s con-
s i s t e n t with t h e physical f a c t s of t h e property. The e a s t
25 f e e t of d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y i s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y a bench-
l i k e e x t e n s i o n of p l a i n t i f f s 1 p r o p e r t y . The r e a s o n f o r t h i s
i s t h a t a t t h e w e s t end o f t h e e a s t 2 5 - f o o t p o r t i o n of de-
f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y , t h e ground l e v e l d r o p s s h a r p l y t o t h e
w e s t t o t h e p o i n t where d e f e n d a n t s ' r e s i d e n c e i s l o c a t e d i n
t h e w e s t e r n p o r t i o n of t h e i r l o t . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e road
dead-ends a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' r e s i d e n c e , which i s l o c a t e d a t
t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t of t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n . These f a c t s ,
taken t o g e t h e r , are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e conclusion t h a t t h e
" i n common" u s e o f t h e switchback r o a d e n d s where t h e p a v i n g
e n d s , a t t h e p o i n t a t which t h e r o a d f i r s t e n t e r s o n t o
p l a i n t i f f s 1 r e t a i n e d p r o p e r t y a t t h e w e s t boundary of L o t s
28 and 29, Block 4 2 .
D e f e n d a n t s ' a s s e r t i o n s t h a t t h e y own o r have a n i n -
t e r e s t i n t h a t p a r c e l of l a n d by a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p e r t y t h e - o r i e s do n o t m e e t t h i s C o u r t ' s agreement. The l i t i g a t i o n i n
t h i s case i s clear. The i s s u e s u r r o u n d s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
and r e a d i n g of t h e deed w i t h t h e f a c t s a p p l i e d t o t h a t
r e a d i n g . W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h e o t h e r p r o p e r t y t h e o r i e s
advanced t o t h i s C o u r t and s h a l l n o t a d d r e s s them s p e c i -
f i c a l l y o n l y t o uphold t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e x t e n s i v e and
p r o p e r f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w . The residential hill in dispute has been overburdened by claims and counterclaims of alternative property theories that surpass most complex land cases before this Court. There is no need here to further impose that burden on this small tract of land. Among numerous alleged errors raised by defendants during the course of this litigation, this Court finds it imperative to address one in particular: Whether defendants' affidavits of disqualification of the district judge, which were filed after the entry of the district judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law, prevented the judge from entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs in accordance with the findings and conclusions. Defendants contend that they effectively disqualified the district judge from entering judgment in this case by the filing of affidavits of disqualification after entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of plain- tiffs. In addition, defendants suggest that the judge should not have accepted jurisdiction of this case because of certain business dealings which the judge and his wife have had with James Macpherson and with the attorney for plaintiffs, John Sullivan. We find that the filing of the affidavits was untimely and that the allegations of bias were without merit. Briefly,
the record reflects the following facts: The district judge entered his findings and conclusions on September 18, 1978, at which time he directed plaintiffs "to prepare a judgment in accordance with the . . . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and to present the same to the Court on or before the 26th day of September, 1978." On September 25, 1978, defendants filed an affidavit of
disqualification of the district judge, together with a motion for disqualification which stated that it was being made "pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, 34 State Rep. 26."
The affidavit of disqualification was signed by defendant Franklin R. Smoyer and was certified to have been made in "good faith" by counsel for defendants, Charles E. Petaja and J. Mayo Ashley. The affidavit alleged that Smoyer had observed actions by the district judge throughout the course of the trial "that indicated that he was biased and preju- diced against [defendants] and in favor of Plaintiffs." On September 27, 1978, the district judge held an in- chambers conference with counsel for both parties to discuss the effect of defendants' affidavit of disqualification. The September 27 conference was not reported, but the topics discussed were mentioned during a similar conference the next day which was reported. In addition, counsel for defendants conceded that they themselves did not agree with their clients' allegations of bias and prejudice on the part of the judge, noting that they had "tremendous personality problems with [their clients]." On September 28, 1978, defendants pointed out that the affidavit of disqualification was an attempt to disqualify the judge "for cause," and that under subsection 6 of the Supreme Court's new disqualification rule, a hearing would
have to be held on the allegations contained therein before a judge assigned by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argued that the attempted disqualification was untimely and that the court had jurisdiction to enter judg- ment under the decision in In re Miller's Estate (1924), 71 Mont. 330, 229 P. 851. Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment on October 2, 1978. On October 31, 1978, c o u n s e l f o r d e f e n d a n t s i n i t i a t e d
a n unscheduled, u n n o t i c e d - p a r t e c o n f e r e n c e w i t h t h e d i s - ex
t r i c t judge, a t which t i m e t h e y a d v i s e d t h e judge t h a t t h e y
had " d i s c o v e r e d " ( i n t h e p u b l i c r e c o r d s of Lewis and C l a r k
County) c e r t a i n o t h e r b u s i n e s s a f f a i r s t h a t a f f e c t e d t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o receive a f a i r t r i a l .
On November 1, 1978, t h e d i s t r i c t judge e n t e r e d judg-
ment. I t w a s t h e n f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k of c o u r t and n o t i c e
o f e n t r y was g i v e n by b o t h t h e c l e r k of c o a r t and c o u n s e l
for plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter, the court f i l e d a
minute e n t r y s t a t i n g : "The motion f o r e n t r y of judgment i n
t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r was g r a n t e d t h i s day. The judg-
ment h a v i n g been e n t e r e d , t h e C o u r t withdraws from f u r t h e r
proceedings i n t h i s cause." Later t h a t afternoon, defen-
d a n t s f i l e d a "Supplemental A f f i d a v i t f o r D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n
o f J u d g e , " i n which t h e y s e t f o r t h o t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s
which t h e y contended d e m o n s t r a t e d a " c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t "
on t h e p a r t o f t h e judge, which " l e d t o b i a s and p r e j u d i c e
a g a i n s t [ d e f e n d a n t s ] d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . "
Defendants f i l e d t h e i r d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n a s one " f o r
c a u s e " under s u b s e c t i o n 6 of t h i s C o u r t ' s new d i s q u a l i f i c a -
t i o n rule--which w a s promulgated on December 2 9 , 1976, t o be
e f f e c t i v e f o r a c t i o n s f i l e d on o r a f t e r March 1, 1977. his
c a s e was f i l e d on F e b r u a r y 1 5 , 1977, p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e
d a t e of t h e new d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n r u l e . The c o n t r o l l i n g
d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n r u l e , t h e r e f o r e , w a s former s e c t i o n 93-901,
R.C.M. 1947.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f a c t o r s which amount t o a n a u t o m a t i c
d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n under s u b d i v i s i o n s (1) t h r o u g h ( 3 ) of
s e c t i o n 93-901, R.C.M. 1947, s u b d i v i s i o n ( 4 ) p r o v i d e s t h a t a
p a r t y may d i s q u a l i f y a d i s t r i c t judge upon making and f i l i n g an a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e p a r t y ". . . has reason t o believe,
and d o e s b e l i e v e , he c a n n o t have a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l h e a r -
i n g o r t r i a l b e f o r e a d i s t r i c t judge by r e a s o n of t h e b i a s
o r p r e j u d i c e of s u c h judge." Under t h i s p r o v i s i o n , a judge
c o u l d be d i s q u a l i f i e d even a f t e r t r i a l t o p r e v e n t him from
r u l i n g on p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n s , such as a motion f o r a new
trial. S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t of F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t .
( 1 9 6 2 ) , 140 Mont. 447, 450, 373 P.2d 314, 316.
Nevertheless, t h i s C o u r t h a s r e c o g n i z e d an e x c e p t i o n
f o r t h e e n t r y o f judgment i n c a s e s where t h e d i s q u a l i f i -
c a t i o n i s attempted a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n i n a case b u t p r i o r
t o t h e e n t r y of judgment p u r s u a n t t o t h a t d e c i s i o n . Thus,
i n I n r e M i l l e r ' s E s t a t e , s u p r a , one of t h e i s s u e s was whe-
t h e r " t h e d i s t r i c t judge, having been d i s q u a l i f i e d a f t e r t h e
v e r d i c t , was w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y t o r e n d e r judgment." This
Court held:
"This c o u r t decided i n S t a t e ex rel. Carleton v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 33 Mont. 138, 8 Ann. C a s . 752, 82 Pac. 789, t h a t a n a f f i d a v i t i m p u t i n g b i a s and p r e j u d i c e may be f i l e d a f t e r a t r i a l h a s been had and w h i l e a motion f o r a new t r i a l i s pending, a t any t i m e b e f o r e t h e d a t e s e t f o r t h e h e a r i n g of such motion. In so f a r a s t h a t d e c i s i o n p e r m i t s a change of judge, when a p p l i - c a t i o n i s made under S e c t i o n 8868 [ s e c t i o n 93- 901, R.C.M. 19471 p r i o r t o t h e d a t e s e t f o r a h e a r i n g upon a motion f o r a new t r i a l upon t h e ground t h a t it i s --- a p r o c e e d i n g p r o hac v i c e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e t r i a l of t h e c a u s e on t h e m e r i t s , w e have no p a r t i c u l a r f a u l t t o f i n d w i t h he r u l e it. -- t h e r e - announced may n o t , however, - extended t o permit t h e f i l i n g - - d i s q u a l i - be of a f y i n g a f f i d a v i t a f t e r v e r d i c t and p r i - - t h e - or to e n t r y of judgment. The r e n d i t i o n of judgment - - -- p a r t - - t r i a l - t-e a c t i o n i s t o o m u c h a -o f t h e of h - -e m e r i t s - - c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s a s e p a r a t e , on t h t o be independent in the s e n s e t h a t t h e t e r m s -- - -i-used i n t h e f o r e g o i n g s e c t i o n . The t r i a l c o u r t committed no e r r o r i n d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e a f f i d a v i t and r e n d e r i n g j u d g m e v Mont. a t 336, 229 P. a t 852. (Emphasis added.)
The r u l e of M i l l e r ' s E s t a t e i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . The
f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s e n t e r e d by t h e d i s t r i c t judge, p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e a f f i d a v i t of d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,
e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t e d t h a t a judgment b e p r e p a r e d " i n a c c o r d -
a n c e w i t h " t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . R u l e 58, M.R.Civ.P.,
r e q u i r e d t h a t where t h e c o u r t d i r e c t s e n t r y o f judgment f o r
r e l i e f o t h e r t h a n money o r c o s t s , " t h e judge s h a l l p r o m p t l y
s e t t l e o r a p p r o v e t h e form o f t h e judgment and d i r e c t t h a t
i t b e e n t e r e d by t h e c l e r k . " Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e
judgment was as much a p a r t o f t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s
a s t h e judgment r e q u i r e d by t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t i n M i l l e r ' s
Estate. Accordingly, although t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n pre-
v e n t e d t h e d i s t r i c t judge from r u l i n g on p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n s
u n d e r R u l e s 59 and 6 0 , M.R.Civ.P., and from w i t h d r a w i n g t h e
f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d , i t was n o t
e f f e c t i v e t o p r e v e n t e n t r y o f judgment i n f a v o r o f p l a i n -
t i f f s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s e n t e r e d
on September 1 8 , 1978.
W e find t h a t defendants' f i l i n g of a n a f f i d a v i t f o r a n
a t t e m p t e d d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t judge was u n t i m e l y
made. The d i s t r i c t judge was c o r r e c t i n e n t e r i n g h i s judg-
ment and w i t h d r a w i n g from t h e c a s e .
T h i s c a s e i s , from i t s i n c e p t i o n , a s p l e n d i d example o f
a n a b u s e o f t h e j u d i c i a l system. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was
b u r d e n e d by e x c e s s i v e a r g u m e n t s and p r o c e d u r e s many t i m e s
t h e amount t h a t a c t u a l l y s h o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d . This Court
was a l s o b u r d e n e d by b r i e f s o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y l e n g t h . How-
e v e r , p l a i n t i f f s ' r e q u e s t t h a t w e impose and assess a
penalty against defendants i n t h i s case i s without m e r i t .
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f R u l e 3 2 , M.R.App.Civ.P., is not appli-
c a b l e a s t h e r e w e r e l e g i t i m a t e i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g deed i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n of r e a l p r o p e r t y law p r e s e n t e d . Affirmed.
We concur:
%~CP%%&,& Chief Justice