Mack v. Secretary of Health & Human Services

747 F. Supp. 1208, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11073, 1990 WL 157364
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedAugust 9, 1990
DocketCiv. A. No. 89-0638
StatusPublished

This text of 747 F. Supp. 1208 (Mack v. Secretary of Health & Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mack v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 747 F. Supp. 1208, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11073, 1990 WL 157364 (W.D. La. 1990).

Opinion

JUDGMENT

SHAW, District Judge.

This matter was referred to United States Magistrate, Mildred E. Methvin, for her Report and Recommendation. After an independent review of the record in this case, the Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate is correct and this Court adopts the conclusions of the magistrate.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment is denied and that Mack be awarded appropriate benefits consistent with an onset date of October 5, 1987.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MILDRED E. METHVIN, United States Magistrate.

This social security appeal was referred to me for the purpose of review, report and recommendation pursuant to this court’s standing order of March 3, 1986.

BACKGROUND

Evelyn Mack was born on February 4, 1942, has an eleventh grade education, and has worked in the past as a housekeeper in [1209]*1209a nursing home (Tr. 66; 33; 86). She applied for supplemental security income on October 6, 1987 claiming disability since October 5, 1987 due to health problems associated with gout, arthritis, high blood pressure, anxiety and an eye disorder (Tr. 66-69).

An administrative hearing was held on July 11, 1988 and on August 1, 1988 an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an opinion denying benefits (Tr. 28-65; 13-19). The AU found as follows: the medical evidence establishes that Mack has a severe impairment resulting from an eye disease called Sjogren’s Syndrome, but she does not have an Appendix 1 impairment; Mack’s allegations of musculoskeletal complaints of pain “were fabrications” (Tr. 17); there is no objective medical evidence of an underlying pathology causing weakness, dizziness and sleeplessness; Mack can perform work-related activities except for prolonged reading of fine print and working in an environment containing smoke, fumes and chemicals in amounts exceeding those found in home, office or retail settings; Mack must wear sunglasses when outdoors and must take a 10 to 15-minute-break every 2lk hours to lubricate her eyes; Mack has no exertional impairments; Mack is unable to perform her past relevant work; if Mack’s nonexertional limitations did not significantly compromise her ability to perform work at all exertional levels, § 204.00 of Appendix 2 indicates that Mack is not disabled; if her capacity to work at all levels were significantly compromised, the remaining work which Mack would functionally be capable of performing would be considered in combination with her age, education, and work experience to determine whether a work adjustment could be made; considering the type of work which Mack is functionally capable of performing in combination with her age, education, and work experience, Mack can be expected to make a vocational adjustment to work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy, such as, child care worker, light cashier jobs, unskilled clerical jobs and laundry worker jobs, therefore, Mack is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Tr. 17-19).

On December 21, 1988, the Appeals Council granted Mack’s request for review because the AU failed to include a specific acknowledgement that once a claimant is found to be unable to perform her past relevant work, the burden of showing that she can perform other work shifts to the Secretary. The Appeals Council noted that a vocational expert testified that Mack could perform such jobs as a child care worker, cashier, clerical worker and laundry worker and that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council then concluded:

Once an individual is found unable to perform her past relevant work because of her impairments, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which she can perform, consistent with her medically determinable impairments, functional limitations, age, education, and work experience. In the instant case, a vocational expert testified that, given an individual with the claimant’s vocational background and the residual functional capacity for a wide range of work at all exer-tional levels discussed above, she could perform such jobs as child care worker, cashier, clerical, and laundry worker. The vocational expert also indicated that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, taking into consideration the claimant’s age, education, and past relevant work, and using Section 204.00 in Appendix 2 to Sub-part P of Regulations No. 4 as a framework for decisionmaking, the Appeals Council concludes that the claimant is not under a “disability” in accordance with Section 416.920(f) of the regulations. In identifying and finding specific jobs the claimant can perform, consistent with her impairments, limitations, age, education, and work experience, the Secretary has met the burden imposed by the Social Security Act regulations.

(Tr. 6).

The decision of the Appeals Council is the final decision of the Secretary from which Mack now appeals (Tr. 5-7).

[1210]*1210ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the Secretary’s finding of non-disability is supported by substantial evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court’s review “is limited to a determination that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence existing in the record as a whole and that no errors of law were made.” Neal v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir.1987); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

* * * However, we may not reweigh the evidence in the record, nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary, even if the evidence preponderates against the Secretary’s decision ...

Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.1988). See also Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1169 (5th Cir.1986); Neal, supra, 829 F.2d 528 at 530. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is:

... such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, but “no substantial evidence” will be found only where there is a “conspicuous absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.”

Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

An x-ray report dated July 25, 1983 shows that Mack had mild soft tissue swelling, but no fracture, in her right ankle (Tr. 152).

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)

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747 F. Supp. 1208, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11073, 1990 WL 157364, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mack-v-secretary-of-health-human-services-lawd-1990.