MacK v. Lewis

298 F. Supp. 1351, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9055
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 6, 1969
DocketCiv. A. 2331
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 298 F. Supp. 1351 (MacK v. Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MacK v. Lewis, 298 F. Supp. 1351, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9055 (S.D. Ga. 1969).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LAWRENCE, District Judge.

Louis Mack was slain by Savannah police detectives on the night of April 26, 1968. His mother brings this action for damages for the homicide under the Civil Rights statutes of the United States *1352 and under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants are:

1. The Mayor of Savannah
2. The Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah
3. The City Manager
4. The Chief of Police
5. A Lieutenant of Police
6. The Captain of the “Detective Bureau” of the City Police Department
7. Two detectives on the police force.

It is alleged that on the night in question the two detectives referred to were (to quote paragraph 17 of the complaint) engaged in

“a common scheme and plan to lure, entice, provoke and entrap Negroes in the area of East Waldburg Street to present themselves in such places and positions so as to make it appear that homicide would be justified. While carrying out such scheme and plan the son of the named plaintiff herein was lured into a position where he could be and was in fact brutally and fatally rendered a victim of unjustified homicide. Then and there, the defendants, by agreement and acting in a conspiratorial manner, did assault, batter and take the life of Louis Mack.”

Paragraph 11 alleges that the Mayor, City Manager and Police Chief had knowledge of the “attitudes and potential for unwarranted violence against Negroes” possessed by the Captain of the Detective Bureau and the two detectives who are sued. The complaint charges that the defendants were acting under color of statutes, laws and customs and that the acts of the two detectives, which were without reasonable cause, were committed upon the instruction, knowledge and consent of the said captain of detectives and the said lieutenant in the Police Department of the city. It is averred that defendants were engaged “in a conspiracy pursuant to a pattern and practice of discriminating against Negroes with the intent to deprive them of their civil rights * *

Each of the defendants moved to dismiss. The Mayor of Savannah, the City Manager, the Chief of Police, the Captain of Detectives and the lieutenant in the Police Department have also filed motions for summary judgment. The affidavits deny any conspiracy, knowledge of the event or knowledge of any disposition on the part of the two detectives for unwarranted violence against members of the Negro race.

The two sections of the Civil Rights laws principally relied on by plaintiff are:

(a) Title 42 § 1983 which provides that “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance * * * custom * * * of any State * * * subjects * * * any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law * * tt

(b) Title 42 § 1985 which provides, in part, a right of action for damages in the federal courts against any “two or more persons” in a State who conspire, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of depriving others of equal protection of the law or equal privileges or immunities under the laws.

Is the City of Savannah liable for damages under Title 42 § 1983 and § 1985 as a result of deprivation of civil rights through wrongful acts of policemen under color of law? A municipality is not a “person” under either of these sections and is not responsible for injuries or damages to another. Sutton v. City of Philadelphia et al., D.C., 286 F.Supp. 143; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 6 Cir., 250 F.2d 700, certiorari denied 356 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 813; Spiesel v. City of New York, D.C., 239 F.Supp. 106, affirmed 2 Cir., 342 F.2d 800, certiorari denied 382 U.S. 856, 86 S.Ct. 109, 15 L.Ed.2d 94; Ocasio v. Bryan, 3 Cir., 374 F.2d 11; Spampinato v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 311 F.2d 439, certiorari denied, *1353 372 U.S. 980, 83 S.Ct. 1115, 10 L.Ed.2d 144; Agnew v. City of Compton, 9 Cir., 239 F.2d 226, certiorari denied 353 U.S. 959, 77 S.Ct. 868, 1 L.Ed.2d 910; Patrum v. Martin, D.C., 292 F.Supp. 370.

I am aware that in United States ex rel. Washington v. Chester County Police Department, 294 F.Supp. 1157 a District Court in Pennsylvania said that while a municipal corporation could not be sued as such under § 1983 its liability under § 1981 stood on a different footing since “The law under that section is not as clear, crystalized and well-settled as is the judicial gloss on § 1983.” 1 Here, however, the plaintiff is not proceeding under § 1981 and, further, I disagree with the notion that a municipality, which is not subject to suit for damages as a “person” by reason of deprivation of equal protection of law under § 1983 and § 1985, can be sued for damages by reason of depriving an individual of the identical rights under § 1981.

Nor can an action for damages be maintained here against the Mayor in his offical capacity or as an individual. According to the uncontradicted affidavit of J. Curtis Lewis:

“Deponent states that he has not at any time directed any police officers, particularly the defendants named herein, concerning the trapping of criminals or anyone else.
Deponent states that he was not present at the time of the apprehension of Louis Mack and his ensuing death and that he has no personal knowledge by his own observation of any of the incidents leading up to or relating to the apprehension of Louis Mack and his subsequent death.
Deponent states that he at no time directed or ordered the arrest, apprehension or trapping of said Louis Mack nor did he conspire with any of the other defendants for the arrest, apprehension or trapping of said Louis Mack.”

It was held in Jordan v. Kelly et al., D.C., 223 F.Supp. 731:

“The chief of police would not be responsible for the wrongful acts of the officer unless he was present or unless it is shown he directed such acts or personally cooperated in them, and there is no dispute but that he was not present, did not direct and did not cooperate in the making of the arrest.”

In Patrum v. Martin, 292 F.Supp.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
298 F. Supp. 1351, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9055, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mack-v-lewis-gasd-1969.