Mack v. American Electric Telephone Co.

74 A. 263, 79 N.J.L. 109, 50 Vroom 109, 1909 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 23
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 8, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 74 A. 263 (Mack v. American Electric Telephone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mack v. American Electric Telephone Co., 74 A. 263, 79 N.J.L. 109, 50 Vroom 109, 1909 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 23 (N.J. 1909).

Opinion

Tlie opinion of the court was delivered by

Trenchard, J.

This action was brought by a debenture bondholder of the defendant company to recover the amount of forty defaulted interest coupons which have been detached from the bonds, but are still in the hands of the bondholder.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, and specially a condition of the bond from which the coupons have been detached, restricting individual action.

The cause came on for trial at the Camden Circuit. A jury was waived and the evidence submitted in form of an agreed state of facts.

The trial judge reserved decision and certified to this court for our advisory opinion the following questions:

“First. Whether an unpaid detached coupon in the form on which the plaintiff has declared in the hands of a bond-. [110]*110holder who has detached the same, is still a part of the bond from which detached so as to make the holder of said detached coupon a bondholder within the meaning of the conditions of the bond?

“Second. Whether a bondholder having unpaid coupons can institute an action at law to recover the amount due on said coupons independent of the trustee appointed to administer the trusts of the agreement under which said bonds were issued without having first joined in a request with holders of one-third of the outstanding bonds to the trustee to act and said trustee shall have refused to act?”

Each of the coupons sued upon called for the payment by the American Electric Telephone Company to the bearer on a date named in each, at the office of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, in the city of New York, of the sum of $.30 for six months’ interest then due on its debenture six per cent, sinking fund gold bond “subject to the conditions of said debenture.”

The bonds from which such coupons were detached on their face were to mature April 1st, 1920, and each contained the following condition: “This debenture bond is issued and accepted upon the express agreement that the conditions endorsed hereon are part hereof and are accepted as part of the consideration herefor.”

The conditions endorsed upon the bonds may be summarized and stated where material as follows: (1) Limiting aggregate issue. (2) Providing for registration. (3) Providing for a sinking fund and for the redemption of bonds therefrom by purchase or by lot. (4) Beservation of right to redeem entire issue at one hundred and five per cent, and interest. (5) “In case .the company shall at any time hereafter execute any mortgage upon its property or franchises to secure the payment of debenture or other bonds hereafter issued, the holders of the debenture bonds of the present series shall be entitled as they respectively elect: (a,) To exchange their debenture bonds of the present series for an equal amount at par of such new debenture or other bonds; or (S) to declare the principal of their debenture bonds of the present series forthwith due, [111]*111and simultaneously with the issue of such new debenture or other bonds, to receive payment of their debenture bonds of the present series at the price of par and accrued and unpaid interest.” Paragraph 6 provides that “in case the company makes default in the payment of any interest maturing on its said debenture bonds and such default continues for thirty days, or in case it makes default in any payment into the sinking fund and any such default continues for the period of six months, then, and in either of such events, said Knickerbocker Trust Company, acting as the agent or trustee of the holders of said debenture bonds then outstanding (hereby irrevocably appointed as such agent or trustee by the company, the maker hereof, and each person who shall take and hold one or more of the debenture bonds of this series) shall, if requested so to do in writing by the owners of one-third in amount of said debenture bonds then outstanding, declare the principal of all said outstanding debenture bonds to be, and the company, the maker hereof, agrees with the trust company, for the benefit of the holders of said debenture bonds, that the same shall forthwith become immediately due and payable. In case of any such default as aforesaid, said trust company shall proceed when and in such manner as requested in writing by the holders of one-third in amount of said debenture bonds to enforce the' rights of the debenture bondholders, said trust company acting as the agent or trustee appointed as above provided, of the holders of all said outstanding debenture bonds. No debenture bondholders shall have the- right to take any action or commence or conduct any proceeding in enforcement of said debenture bonds independently of said trust company unless he shall first have joined with holders of one-third of the outstanding debenture bonds in a request to the trust company to act and such request shall have been refused. * * * It is the intention * * * that in ease of default as above mentioned, payment thereof shall be enforced by and through said Knickerbocker Trust Company, as agent or trustee under an express trust.” * * *

Paragraph 7 provides for the form of interest coupon.

[112]*112We think that the detached defaulted coupons are separate causes of action independent of the bond.

A bond and the coupons are not parts of one debt — they are separate debts, and may be held by different persons, and suit on tire one does not bar suit on the other. Jones Company v. Guttenberg, 37 Vroom 659, 666.

It follows, therefore, that the unpaid detached coupons in question are not still a part of the bond from which they were detached, so as to make the holder thereof a bondholder within the meaning of the conditions of the bond.

A¥e think that the restriction in paragraph 6 of the conditions, requiring a concert of one-third of the bondholders, does not apply to a suit upon the defaulted interest coupons.

The restrictive language of the sixth paragraph applies only to the remedies given to the bondholders on the bond in that paragraph,in the event of default before the maturity of the bond (1) in the payment of interest, and (2) in the annual payment to the sinking fund. The rights otherwise secured to the bondholders are (1) to receive payment of the principal of the bond upon maturhy, April 1st, 1920; (2) to receive payment of interest thereon according to the tenor of the several interest coupons; (3) in the event that the company at any time thereafter executes a mortgage upon its property or franchises to secure bonds thereafter to he issued, then the holders of the present bonds have the additional right “as they respectively elect” either to exchange their bonds for mortgage bonds or to declare the principal of their bonds of the present series forthwith due and to receive payment therefor.

All of the last mentioned rights are given in absolute terms as individual rights. There is nothing in the bond nor in the conditions to suggest that every bondholder is not absolutely entitled to receive the face value of the bond and sue therefor, if necessary, upon its maturity, April 1st, 1920. This also applies to the interest coupon; and the language by which the bondholder is given the right to exchange or demand payment upon the subsequent execution of a mortgage is expressly given to each individual holder. It will [113]

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Bluebook (online)
74 A. 263, 79 N.J.L. 109, 50 Vroom 109, 1909 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mack-v-american-electric-telephone-co-nj-1909.