Mack Miller v. Clark County, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00070
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Mack Miller, Case No. 2:23-cv-00070-CDS-DJA

5 Plaintiff Order Granting in Part the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 6 v. Granting the Defendants’ Partial Summary Judgment 7 Clark County, et al.,

8 Defendants [ECF Nos. 61, 64]

9 10 Plaintiff Mack Miller brings this § 1983 suit against defendant Clark County and 11 Preventative Measures Security Firm LLC, alleging personal injury arising out of a Clark County 12 Board of County Commissioners meeting where two security guards physically removed Miller 13 from the meeting (the “incident”). See Compl., ECF No. 2-2. On January 12, 2023, Preventive 14 Measures removed this action from the Eighth Judicial District Court. See Pet., ECF No. 2. 15 Thereafter, Miller amended his complaint, adding defendants Marco Solorio and Leonard 16 Morris. Am. compl., ECF No. 17. 17 On July 30, 2025, Clark County filed a motion for summary judgment. See Mot. for summ. 18 j., ECF No. 61. This motion is fully briefed. See Resp., ECF No. 70; Reply, ECF No. 71. That same 19 day, Preventive Measures, Solorio, and Morris (“the defendants”) filed a motion for partial 20 summary judgment. See Mot. for partial summ. j., ECF Nos. 64, 65. This motion is also fully 21 briefed. See Resp., ECF No. 69; Reply, ECF No. 72. For the reasons stated herein, I grant Clark 22 County’s motion for summary judgment and the defendants’ partial summary judgment motion. 23 24 25 26 1 I. Background1 and undisputed facts 2 A. Summary of the events 3 On September 21, 2021, Miller attended a Clark County Board of Commissioners meeting 4 held at the Government Center’s Commission Chambers to consider “passing a resolution 5 declaring COVID-19 misinformation a public health crisis.” ECF No. 17 at 3, ¶¶ 13, 16. During the 6 meeting, a dispute broke out between meeting attendees and the defendants. Id. at ¶ 14. A Clark 7 County Commissioner attempted to restore order to the hearing but was not successful, so the 8 Commissioner ordered that the chambers to be cleared. See Elando Johnson dep., Def.’s Ex. F, 9 ECF No. 61 at 35–36.2 In his complaint, Miller alleged that when he was exiting chambers, he 10 observed a security guard shoving a female attendee, and when Miller asked the individual to 11 identify himself, he was “rushed, shoved and attacked” by Solorio, Morris, and other Preventive 12 Measures security guards. ECF No. 17 at ¶¶ 17–18. That guard was later identified as Clark 13 County Security Guard (Cooperman), and Miller yelled and cursed at Cooperman. Meredith 14 dep., Pl.’s Ex. 6, ECF No. 69 at 141;3 Millers dep., Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 69 at 18. Miller was then 15 escorted out of chambers. Pl.’s Ex. 6, ECF No. 69 at 141. 16 Miller alleges that when he was being physically lifted by Solorio, Morris, and other 17 Preventive Measures guards, his back was shoved through the commission chambers double 18 doors, through the hallway, and then ultimately through a metal detector that was in the 19 hallway of the Commission chambers. Id. at ¶ 19. Miller alleges that he fell backwards into 20

21 1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to the plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 17) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. 22 2 Clark County’s motion violates Local Rule IC 2-2(3), which requires exhibits and attachments “be attached as separate files,” not as part of the base document. Given the age of this case and the need for 23 judicial efficiency, the court does not strike the filings under Local Rule IA 10-1(d). However, Clark County is cautioned that future violations of the rules may result in the court striking inappropriately 24 filed documents or exhibits. Adherence to the rules assists the court in resolving motions more expeditiously. 25 3 Both of Miller’s responses to the summary judgment motions also violate Local Rule IC 2-2(3), which requires exhibits and attachments “be attached as separate files,” not as part of the base document. The 26 same admonishment applies—future violations of the rules may result in the court striking inappropriately filed documents or exhibits. 1 someone, and at some point, Solorio, Morris, and other Preventive Measures security guards 2 knocked the metal detector into Miller’s head which caused him to lose consciousness and hit 3 the back of his head on the floor. Id. at ¶ 22. 4 The defendants contend that Miller was agitated and was acting “highly aggressive” in 5 both behavior and language. Sutton dep., Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 65 at 10; Def.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 61 6 at 77. Despite being ordered to leave, Miller did not comply; rather, he allegedly shoved 7 Preventive Measures Operation Manager, David Sutton. Def.’s Ex. J, ECF No. 61 at 72. Sutton 8 radioed for assistance in removing Miller and Officer Solorio grabbed Miller to take him outside. 9 Id. 10 Miller was carried out of chambers by Preventive Measures security guards through the 11 subject metal detector, causing the metal detector to tip. Video, Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 12 00:36–0:39; Video, Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 61 at 00:00–0:03.4 However, Miller never appears to hit 13 his head on the metal detector or floor, nor does he appear to trip over anyone. Def.’s Ex. C, ECF 14 No. 61 at 00:00–0:05; Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 00:35–0:42. Prior to the metal detector tipping 15 over, Clark County Officer Johnson can be seen removing a red board to clear the path for Miller 16 to go through. See Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 61 at 00:00–0:06; Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 00:35–0:40. 17 That same officer caught the metal detector as it was tipping and prevented it from falling on the 18 floor and on Miller. See Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 61 at 00:00–0:06; Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 00:35– 19 0:45. Thereafter, Miller is slowly placed on the ground after going past the metal detector. See 20 Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 61 at 00:05–0:10; Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 00:39–0:44.5 21 22 23

24 4 When being carried through the metal detector, Miller is jumping and not cooperating. See Def.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 61 at 00:36–0:39; Def.’s Ex. C, ECF No. 61 at 00:00–0:03. Also shown in the video were Clark 25 County security officers (in a tan uniform) and Preventive Measures security guards (in blue with the word “SECURITY” on their uniform). 26 5 Miller could not recall if his head hit the metal detector nor if his head hit the floor when he was being escorted out. Pl.’s Ex. 5, ECF No. 69 at 141; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 69 at 19. 1 B. Undisputed facts 2 There is no dispute that the incident occurred on September 21, 2021, during a Clark 3 County Commission meeting at the Government Center. ECF No. 69 at 6; ECF No. 64 at 6. 4 Preventive Measures was a private security company contracted by Clark County to provide 5 security services at various county locations. ECF No. 69 at 5; ECF No. 64 at 6. Preventive 6 Measures’ guards were required to maintain order, patrol premises, handle disruptions, and 7 ensure safety, with specific protocols for uniforms, training, and incident reporting. Id. 8 Preventive Measures’ guards were armed, unlike Clark County employees who were unarmed, 9 and Preventive Measures was hired to serve as a deterrent to potential crime and violence. Id. 10 II. Legal standard 11 Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 12 to the nonmovant, indicates “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that “the movant is 13 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect 14 the outcome of the suit” based on the governing law, and a dispute is genuine “if the evidence is 15 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty 16 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “mere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine 17 issue of material fact exists” is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 18 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, a moving defendant need only 20 point to an absence of evidence on an element of the plaintiff’s case. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 21 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56 by demonstrating the absence of 22 any genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the party resisting summary judgment to 23 “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250– 24 51. “To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a genuine 25 dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.” Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 26 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2018); Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The 1 nonmoving party “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, 2 through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME 3 Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). 4 III. Discussion 5 On July 30, 2025, Clark County move for summary judgment on Miller’s second, fifth, 6 sixth, and seventh claims. See generally ECF No. 61. On August 20, 2025, the court entered an 7 order granting Clark County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to claims one through 8 five and seven. ECF No. 68. The court also dismissed the unidentified and unnamed DOE 9 defendants. Id. That same day, Miller filed a response stating that the “only viable claim against 10 Defendant Clark County is its negligence/premises liability claim,” ECF No. 70 at 4, so I only 11 address Clark County’s argument for summary judgment as to the sixth claim. 12 Preventive Measures, Solorio, and Morris move for partial summary judgment on Miller’s 13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well 14 as the parallel claims under article I, section 18 of the Nevada constitution, asserting that they 15 cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are not state actors, and no constitutional 16 violation occurred. ECF No. 64. In opposition, Miller argues that the defendants qualify as state 17 actors under § 1983, and their conduct was excessive and unconstitutional. ECF No. 69. I first 18 address Clark County’s motion as to Miller’s sixth claim. 19 A. Clark County’s summary judgment (ECF No. 61) is granted. 20 In Miller’s complaint, he alleges that Clark County had a duty to ensure that the subject 21 metal detector was properly anchored to the ground to prevent it from toppling over in the 22 manner it did after officers and security guards “violently tackled” Miller through the subject 23 metal detector. ECF No. 17 at 11, ¶ 71. 24 Clark County moves for summary judgment, arguing that it had no actual notice of a 25 hazard with the subject metal detector. ECF No. 61 at 20. Clark County further argues that 26 while Miller’s complaint claims that it had a duty to ensure the subject metal detector was 1 properly anchored on the ground, there is no such duty for a political subdivision of the State of 2 Nevada. See id. (citing NRS 41.033). 3 In opposition, Miller does not address the notice requirement; instead he argues that 4 NRS 41.031 prohibits Clark County from claiming sovereign immunity concerning civil liability 5 unless an exception to the general waiver of liability applies. ECF No. 70 at 3. To support this 6 argument, Miller asserts that his theory of liability is “based upon the fact that the subject metal 7 detector was not anchored to the floor, thereby creating the tipping hazard.” Id. at 4. In reply, 8 Clark County argues that Miller is attempting to circumvent NRS 41.033’s actual notice 9 requirement by claiming that Clark County created the tipping hazard, and Miller’s argument 10 conflates the duties owed by private landowners to entrants on their property with those owed 11 by the State of Nevada and its political subdivisions. ECF No. 71 at 5. I agree. 12 The State of Nevada has generally waived its immunity for state tort claims in state court 13 under Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) 41.031. Although NRS 41.031 waives sovereign immunity 14 for state tort claims brought in state court, with respect to federal court cases, Nevada does not 15 waive its sovereign immunity. See NRS 41.031(3); see also O’Connor v. Nevada, 686 F.2d 749, 750 16 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Nevada has explicitly refused to waive its immunity to suit under the eleventh 17 amendment. The Supreme Court has made it clear that section 1983 does not constitute an 18 abrogation of the eleventh amendment immunity of the states.” (citation omitted)). NRS 41.033 19 specifically provides: 20 No action may be brought under NRS 41.031 or against an officer or employee of the State or any of its agencies or political subdivisions which is based upon: (a) 21 Failure to inspect any building, structure, vehicle, street, public highway or other public work, facility or improvement to determine any hazards, deficiencies or 22 other matters, whether or not there is a duty to inspect; or (b) Failure to discover 23 such a hazard, deficiency or other matter, whether or not an inspection is made. 24 NRS 41.033(1) (emphasis added). 25 26 1 NRS 41.033, however, “does not provide immunity to the public entity if that entity fails 2 to take reasonable action once it gains express knowledge of the hazard.” Chastain v. Clark Cnty. 3 Sch. Dist., 866 P.2d 286, 288 (Nev. 1993). Miller’s complaint alleges that Clark County had a duty 4 to ensure that the subject metal detector was properly anchored to prevent it from toppling 5 over. ECF No. 17 at 11. And in his opposition to the summary judgment motion, Miller argues 6 that Clark County created this hazard “by failing to properly anchor the subject metal detector 7 to the floor.” ECF No. 70 at 4. Thus, he contends his theory of liability does not arise out of 8 notice; rather, it is grounded in that Clark County created the metal detector hazard. 9 Immunity under NRS 41.033(1) “will not bar actions based upon a public entity’s failure 10 to act reasonably when it has express knowledge of a hazard.” Ridgway v. Sun Valley Gen. 11 Improvement Dist., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155912, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 18, 2015) (citing Nardozzi v. 12 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 823 P.2d 285, 287 (Nev. 1992)). But fatal to Miller’s argument is the lack of 13 evidence and points and authorities to support his position. Indeed, Miller fails to cite any 14 evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Clark County had expressed any 15 knowledge of the alleged metal detector hazard prior to the plaintiff’s injury. For the purposes of 16 determining immunity, the issue is whether the defendant knew that the subject metal detector 17 was a hazard—not whether the defendant created the hazard. Stated otherwise, Miller must 18 show that Clark County knew the metal detector was a hazard and then failed to act. Miller fails 19 to meet his burden. The record is devoid of any evidence showing Clark County (1) knew the 20 unsecured metal detector was a hazard or (2) knew of any similar event related to the subject 21 metal detector that would have placed Clark County on notice. On the other hand, Clark 22 County provides evidence showing that it did not have knowledge that the detector needed to 23 be anchored down, there had never been a prior incident where the detector had tipped, or any 24 other information that would constitute notice. See Cooperman decl., Def.’s Ex. K, ECF No. 61 at 25 105–106; Cooperman dep., Def.’s Ex. L, ECF No. 61 at 111–117. As such, Clark County is immune. 26 Consequently, I grant Clark County’s motion for summary judgment on Miller’s sixth claim. 1 B. Preventive Measures’ partial summary judgment (ECF No. 64) is granted. 2 Preventive Measures moves for summary judgment on Miller’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and article 1, section 18 of 4 the Nevada constitution. See ECF No. 64. Preventive Measures argues that the defendants: were 5 not acting under color of state law, are immune from liability under § 1983, and lack the requisite 6 state action to trigger federal constitutional protections. Id. They further assert that even if 7 liability did attach, the officers’ actions during the September 21, 2021, incident were 8 “objectively reasonable, involving minimal and proportionate force to ensure public safety and 9 compliance with evacuation directives without rising to the level of excessive force or an 10 unlawful seizure.” Id. at 3. Thus, Preventive Measures contends that they are entitled to 11 summary judgment. 12 In opposition, Miller argues that Solorio and Morris are state actors under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983, and that their conduct was excessive and unconstitutional. See ECF No. 69. Miller argues 14 that when the state integrates private actors into the performance of its essential functions, the 15 acts of those private parties are attributable to the state. Id. at 9. Miller further argues that 16 maintaining order at an official government meeting is arguably a core government function, 17 especially in a public space such as the Commission chamber during a County Commissioners’ 18 meeting open to the public. Id. In terms of the government nexus test, Miller argues that the 19 relationship between the County and the defendants was not incidental but integral. Id. At the 20 heart of Miller’s argument is that “by authorizing and relying on private security to police 21 expressive activity within that forum, the County entwined itself with [d]efendants Solorio’s 22 and Morris’ challenged conduct.” Id. Miller asserts that Solorio and Morris were not authorized 23 to use physical force. Id. at 10. He further asserts that the report issued by his expert creates a 24 genuine issue of material fact as to whether the force used by Solorio and Morris was excessive, 25 so summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. 26 1 “When determining whether a private party acted under color of law, a court starts with 2 the presumption that private conduct does not constitute state action.” Sutton v. Providence St. 3 Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). But action by private entities 4 may be state action, if there is significant state involvement. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382 5 (9th Cir. 1983). Indeed, “[s]tate action may be found if . . . there is such a close nexus between 6 the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that 7 of the State itself.” Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)). To find state action, a 9 two-part test must be satisfied. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982). Part 10 one of the test determines if the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of 11 some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a 12 person for whom the State is responsible. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. Part two of the test determines 13 whether the party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state 14 actor. Id. Both parts of test must be met to find state action. See Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 15 1151 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 Lugar and its progeny have established at least four ways to identify if a private actor’s 17 conduct qualifies as state action for the purposes of § 1983: (1) the private actor performs a 18 public function (the public-function test), (2) the private actor engages in joint activity with a 19 state actor (the joint action test), (3) the private actor is subject to governmental compulsion or 20 coercion (the state compulsion test), or (4) there is a governmental nexus with the private actor 21 (the government nexus test). See Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). The public 22 function and government nexus test are relevant here.6 23 24 25 6 Because Miller seemingly agrees that the state compulsion and joint action tests do not apply to the 26 facts of this case, they are not addressed herein. See ECF No. ECF No. 69 at 9 (stating that “the state compulsion test and joint action test likely do not apply”). 1 “Under the public[-]function test, when private individuals or groups are endowed by 2 the [s]tate with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or 3 instrumentalities of the [s]tate and [are] subject to its constitutional limitations.” Id. at 1093 4 (quoting Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553–54 (9th Cir. 2002)). The public-function test is satisfied 5 only upon a showing that the function at issue is “both traditionally and exclusively 6 governmental.” Id. 7 The government nexus test may be satisfied where the court finds a sufficiently close 8 nexus between the state and private actor “so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated 9 as that of the State itself, or where the State has so far insinuated into a position of 10 interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” See 11 Flournoy v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173356, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2023) (citing 12 Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, 975 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2020)). 13 Miller contends that there are “still questions of fact that preclude summary judgment 14 concerning whether Defendants Solorio and Morris were acting as state actors under the public 15 function and government nexus tests” so summary judgment is precluded. ECF No. 69 at 9. But 16 Miller’s mere argument fails. First, Miller summarily contends that Solorio and Morris are state 17 actors because they maintained order (policed “expressive conduct”) at an official government 18 meeting which is a core government function. But Miller fails to cite any authority or evidence to 19 support his assertion. While Solorio and Morris were hired as security guards through 20 Preventive Measures for the county, the contract between Clark County and Preventive 21 Measures states that a “successful bidder shall act as an independent successful bidder and not 22 as the agent of the county in performing the contract.” Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 64 at 34.7 Further, 23 the scope of work involved in the bid for Preventive Measures contract stated:

24 25 7 The defendants’ motion also violates Local Rule IC 2-2(3), which requires exhibits and attachments “be 26 attached as separate files,” not as part of the base document. They are also cautioned that future violations of the rules may result in the court striking inappropriately filed documents or exhibits. 1 Security Officers shall assist in emergency situations and be able to identify conflict and intervene expeditiously and courteously. Security Officers are a visual 2 deterrent to possible problems at County facilities. The degree of response can be described as “mild confrontation”. The Security Officer’s actions in breaking up a 3 physical disturbance are limited to a visual and vocal presence. Security officers are not to become embroiled in any altercation that cannot be quelled by their 4 presence or words. If those efforts fail, then the police are to be notified. Security 5 Officers are responsible for efficient performance of their duties under normal and emergency conditions. 6 7 ECF No. 64 at 39. Miller failed to address the bid and the contract and their role in this court’s 8 determination if the Solorio and Morris were state actors or not. This absence is critical given 9 the contract establishes a line between what the defendants were permitted to do, and when 10 police (i.e. state actors) must be notified to get involved. While the contract and bid are not 11 dispositive in my analysis, Miller’s failure to provide evidence showing that Preventive 12 Measures’ duties under its contract was “both traditionally and exclusively governmental” is 13 fatal. 14 A motion for summary judgment is not defeated by solely relying on conclusory 15 allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Yet 16 that is precisely what Miller attempts to do here, but this is insufficient. So I find Solorio and 17 Morris are not state actors, especially given a collection of persuasive authority that states 18 otherwise. See King v. Ashley, 2014 WL 3689582, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (explaining actions 19 of private security guards generally do not constitute state action under § 1983); Sheets v. Woelk, 20 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2916, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2026) (explaining because private parties 21 commonly perform security services, even on government property, the private party’s alleged 22 work cannot transform him into a state official) (emphasis added); Hughes v. AT&T, 2019 U.S. 23 Dist. LEXIS 222061, at *3 n.33 (D. Alaska Dec. 5, 2019) (collecting cases holding that a private 24 security guard is not a state actor under § 1983). 25 26 1 While this case is a closer call than others because of the underlying circumstances, the 2 evidence shows that the nature of Preventive Measures job was not to serve as a Clark County 3 peace officer. Under the contract, Preventive Measures’ security guards were required to 4 maintain order, patrol premises, handle disruptions, and ensure safety, with specific protocols 5 for uniforms, training, and incident reporting. ECF No. 69 at 5; ECF No. 64 at 6. Though 6 Preventive Measures hired the security guards to serve as a deterrent to potential crime and 7 violence, they were not police officers. Id. Miller argues that the defendants’ “authority to remove 8 attendees, restrict speech, and enforce rules of decorum was not self-derived, but was delegated 9 directly by the County.” ECF No. 69 at 9. He further argues that Solorio and Morris’s conduct 10 was carried out according to government directives. Id. But Miller fails to cite any evidence 11 indicating that the nature of the relationship between the defendants and Clark County was 12 akin to giving Solorio and Morris police powers authority. Compare Johnson v. LaRabida Children’s 13 Hosp., 372 F.3d 894, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a security guard that could patrol and 14 eject unruly persons from a hospital, but who could not carry a weapon and had to call the 15 police when individuals became belligerent was not a state actor), and Rabieh v. Paragon Sys., 316 F. 16 Supp. 3d 1103, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting a motion to dismiss without prejudice where a 17 plaintiff failed to set forth the scope of power given to security guards hired to protect 18 government offices), with Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 19 that private security guards who are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they 20 are de facto police officers may qualify as state actors under the public function test), and Griffin 21 v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (holding that an amusement park employee who was a 22 deputized sheriff of the County, wore a Sheriff’s uniform and badge, and violated park visitors 23 for criminal trespassing, was a state actor). 24 The record shows that the Preventive Measures’ officers were not conferred plenary 25 police authority, and Miller fails to cite evidence supporting his contention that the scope of 26 their power transformed them into state actors. The evidence cited by the county on the other 1 hand supports that the scope of the security officers’ duties was narrow. First, Preventive 2 Measures—not the county—was responsible for training its own security guards. Defs.’ Ex. B, 3 ECF No. 72 at 30, 35. Second, a Clark County manager testified during her deposition that there 4 was a no use-of-force policy for security personnel, and Preventive Measures would have 5 received this policy. Def.’s Ex. N, ECF No. 61 at 160–61. That same manager explained that 6 private vendors had their supervisors and on-site leads that would give direction, id. at 156, and 7 that private security guards were not allowed to use physical force under Clark County policies; 8 rather, they were supposed to observe and then report it to her, or depending on the severity of 9 the situation, call 911. Id. at 161. Miller argues that “the guard depended on the state for authority, 10 guidance, and legitimacy.” ECF No. 69 at 9. Again, Miller fails to cite any authority to support 11 that, even if true, this converts the Preventive Measures offices into state actors. See Holmes v. 12 Dillard’s Dep’t Store, 2024 WL 1298029, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2024) (explaining the fact that 13 private parties call police does not transform into state actors). 14 Even if there was some guidance provided by Clark County to the security officers 15 through this safety procedures (Pl.’s Ex. 2, ECF No. 69 at 22), Miller simply fails to establish 16 with admissible evidence that the security officers were state actors. The video evidence 17 however shows Solorio and Morris were not being directed by the Clark County officials when 18 they decided to carry Miller out of chambers. See generally Video files, Def.’s Exs. C–D, ECF No. 19 63 (filed manually). In other words, the video shows that the defendants acted upon their own 20 security training, which was extensively provided to them by Preventive Measures, not Clark 21 County. See Sutton dep., Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 72 at 30–31, 35. Because Miller fails to create a 22 genuine issue of material fact as to his first cause of action asserting Fourth and Fourteenth 23 Amendment violations, I grant summary judgment in favor of Preventive Measures, Solorio, and 24 Morris on Miller’s first cause of action.8 25 8 Because I find that Miller failed to create a genuine issue a material fact to support his position that the 26 defendants were not state actors, I do not address the merits of the defendants’ and Miller’s arguments as to the reasonableness of the seizure and force. 1 Finally, Miller asserts in his fifth claim that Solorio and Morris violated his 2|| constitutional guarantees under article I, section 18 of the Nevada constitution, requiring him to 3|| be “free from unreasonable seizures or excessive force.” See ECF No. 17 at 10, 9 64. The 4] defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “the 5|| objective reasonableness standard under article 1, section 18, aligns with the Fourth Amendment 6|| analysis for excessive force and unreasonable seizure claims, and because Defendants’ actions 7|| were objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, no violation of Plaintiff's 8}| Nevada constitutional rights occurred.” See ECF No. 64 at 12.° 9 As a threshold matter, I sua sponte find that the defendants are not subject to violations 10} under article 1, section 18 of the Nevada constitution because, for the reasons set forth above, the 11|| defendants were not state actors under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See Jones v. L.A. Cent. Plaza LLC, 74 F.4th 1053, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the court may grant a summary judgment motion on grounds not raised by a party). So the 14|| defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this fifth claim. Conclusion 16 IT IS ORDERED that Clark County’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 61] is 17|| GRANTED as set forth in this order. Therefore, Clark County is dismissed. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ Sion for partial summary judgment 19|| [ECF No. 64] is GRANTED. / | 20 Dated: February 25, 2026 LZ 21 he — ‘istizia D. Sit 22 nyted States District Judge 23 / ; 24 25 26]|° Miller does not address the defendants’ fifth cause of action arguments in his opposition. See generally ECF No. 69.