Mack Coal Company v. Hill

162 S.W.2d 906, 204 Ark. 407, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 78
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJune 1, 1942
Docket4-6783
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 162 S.W.2d 906 (Mack Coal Company v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mack Coal Company v. Hill, 162 S.W.2d 906, 204 Ark. 407, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 78 (Ark. 1942).

Opinion

Griffin Smith, C. J.

Nine claims allowed by Workmen’s Compensation Commission were appealed to Sebastian circuit court for the Greenwood district, or to Logan circuit court for the Northern district. All were affirmed. This court was then appealed to. By agreement the causes were consolidated.

Correct determination of the amount due each claimant is the issue. 1

Section 12 of Act 319, approved March. 15, 1939, referred to the people and approved November 5, 1940, is shown in the margin, the section appearing as a single paragraph. 2

As stated by appellants, tbe principal controversy involves methods employed by the commission and approved by the circuit courts in determining* “average weekly wages. ’ ’

Frank Hall, Ralph Walker, Joseph R. Hill, Dewey Dacus, and Ira Elmo Bailey were killed. Yess Gosnell, George William Koch, John Sherman Hicks, and Coy Highfield, were injured. All were members of United Mine Workers. Their union had contracts with the various coal companies which provided for a maximum five-day week. In most instances contracts called for a fixed daily wage, but in some instances pay was on a tonnage or yardage basis.

What is the meaning* of average iveehly wages¶

By what process of reasoning, or by what construction, must we gather from § 12 the legislative intent!

A correct assize is of great importance to all of the litigants.

Subsection (h) of § 2, Act 319, defines wages as the rate at which service is recompensed under the contract in force at the time the accident occurs, including the reasonable cash value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer; also gratuities received in the course of employment from others than the employer, if bestowed with the employer’s knowledge.

Calling attention to introductory words used in § 12— “except as otherwise specifically provided, the basis for compensation under this Act shall be the average weekly wages earned by the employee at the time of the injury ’ ’ —the commission’s opinion- is that where an injured employe worked under a definite contract of hire at a definite daily rate for a definite number of hours a day and a definite number of days a week, ‘ ‘ there is nothing left to determine.” The commission then continued: “All is known that needs to be known to establish the average weekly wage being earned by the injured employee at the time of the injury. ’ ’

And again: “Where there is no such definite contract of hire or no definite rate or definite number of hours a day or definite number of days a week, then resort must be had to the formulas set out under § 12 to determine the average weekly wage. This would also be true when the injured employee was a piece-worker, working by the ton, yard, cord, article, etc., or where there was a variance in daily wages or similar uncertainties requiring determination”.

Appellants call attention to certain known facts which necessarily attach to the character of work involved. The. industry in Arkansas “. . . is of a peculiar nature. These mines produce coal mainly for domestic consumption in various localities throughout the northern and midwestern states. It naturally follows that extent of the demand . . . governs almost entirely. . . . There is demand for the product only in the colder months. This naturally means that in the spring and summer months there is little or no demand for the product of these mines, and as a result they do not produce for the market during these periods”.

Production ordinarily begins about August 1 and continues until March of the following year. Each mine operates an average of 118' days annually. Union contracts with the operators provide that, because of seasonal slack, a joint board of miners and owners may extend, from five to six, the days composing a week in order, as appellants say, “. . . that the industry may be able to work at capacity during the season of heavy orders without being penalized through the payment of overtime. ’ ’

Another custom peculiar to the industry is the frequency with which workers change from one mine to another, “year in and year out.”

Replying to the commission’s holding that certain fixed standards must be recognized, appellants argue there was no definite contract of hire, and no definite daily rate for fixed hours. It is conceded the contracts called for a maximum of daily hours, a maximum number of days a week, ‘£ and even a maximum number of hours a week, and provide that all time worked in excess of such maximum shall be compensated as .overtime”. 3

Certain exceptions appear in Act 319, notably in §§ 13 and 23. That there are exceptions, say appellants, is justification for their contention that the phrase, “ except as otherwise specifically provided”, found in § 12, has reference to departures from § 12; hence, it is stressed, in supplying the exceptions, it was not intended that subsection (h) of § 2 should form the basis of compensation. But, say appellants, even if subsection (h) had been intended as a method of .determination, it is not applicable to the instant cases because there is no definite contract of hire, etc.

Beginning with the’second word in the first line of the printed Act at page 791, the direction is: “. . . but if the injured employee lost more than seven days during [the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding injury], although not in the same week, then the earnings for the remainder of such fifty-two weeks shall be divided by the number of weeks remaining after the time so lost has been deducted.”

It is appellees’ belief that this class embraces all injured employes who worked within the period of fifty-two weeks preceding injury, but who lost more than seven days. Argument is that it is immaterial whether work was, or was not, continuous; nor was it important that the injured person worked in consecutive weeks. The total number of days actually devoted to the mas-tor’s service is ascertained in weeks, “. . . and the .total earnings for the entire period are to be divided by the number of weeks actually worked.” From this, it is submitted, the average weekly wage constituting the . basis for compensation is ascertained.

The next class falls within the Act’s provision that “When the employment prior to the injury extended over a period of less than fifty-two weeks, the method of dividing the earnings during that period by the number of weeks and parts thereof during which the employee earned wages shall be followed.”

As to this group, it is appellees’ thought that total earnings during the period of employment is divided by the time applied, computed in weeks; and this, it is claimed, . . gives the average weekly wages, which is the basis for compensation.”

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Bluebook (online)
162 S.W.2d 906, 204 Ark. 407, 1942 Ark. LEXIS 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mack-coal-company-v-hill-ark-1942.