MacImage of Maine v. Hancock County

Superior Court of Maine·Decided September 1, 2009·No. CUMcv-08-589·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. CV-08-589 .e,.,) , ,'j ~. l:'r/ L'LiOq (IA Y ? 0 AU: 5W ;. I' . vi j/-<

MACIMAGE OF MAINE LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

HANCOCK COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff MacImage of Maine LLC is seeking access under the Freedom of Access

Law to the electronic database containing documents recorded at the Hancock County

Registry of Deeds without having to pay the $1.50 per page fee imposed by the County.

Because the County recently blocked access to MacImage's ability to obtain even

unofficial copies, MacImage is seeking a preliminary injunction pending trial. Hancock

County opposes this application and is seeking a preliminary injunction of its own

forbidding MacImage from what it characterizes as hacking into its database.

The court has reviewed the affidavits and memoranda submitted by both parties.

Hancock County initially imposes a fee for recording documents (currently $16

for the first page and $2 for each additional page) and thereafter imposes a fee of $1.50

per page for copies of recorded documents. l It is the court's understanding that

Hancock County's system of providing access to its recorded land records and the fees

it imposes for copies is similar to that found in other counties. This case therefore may

constitute a test case with respect to the application of the Freedom of Access Law to

records for which county registries have historically charged fees.

1 Other charges are imposed for such things as plans, index searches above a certain number of names, and certifying documents. 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Of the four criteria that must be considered on a motion for a preliminary

injunction, the court will first consider whether MacImage has demonstrated that it has

demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the merits of its Freedom of Access

claim. See Bangor Historic Track Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 2003 ME 140 9I 9, 837

A.2d 129, 132.

The Freedom of Access Law defines "public records" in pertinent part as:

any written, printed or graphic matter or any mechanical or !?lectronic data compilation from which information can be obtained, directly or after translation into a form susceptible of visual or aural comprehension, that is in the possession or custody of an agency or public official of this State or any of its political subdivisions . . . and has been received or prepared for use in connection with the transaction of public or governmental business or contains information relating to the transaction of public or governmental business ....

1 M.R.S. § 402(3) (emphasis added).

The database maintained by the Hancock County Registry of Deeds is an

"electronic data compilation" that falls within the definition of "public records"

contained in § 402(3). Under 1 M.R.S. § 408(1) every person has the right to inspect and

copy any public record within a reasonable period of time after making a request.

Hancock County argues that it is not denying access to MacImage because,

although it will not permit MacImage to copy its database as a whole, it will allow

MacImage to copy any individual page within the database for $1.50 per page.

However, because the definition of public records includes an electronic data

compilation as a whole, not just individual records within that compilation, the court

interprets the Freedom of Access Law as requiring the County to allow MacImage to

copy the database and not just individual records.

2 The remammg question is the cost. Under the Freedom of Access Law, the

custodian of a public record may charge " a reasonable fee to cover the cost of copying."

M.R.S. § 408(3)(A).2 MacImage points out that a vice president of Aptitude Solutions,

the company that provides the database software and the website for the Hancock

records, has testified that the database and website could be configured to allow

MacImage and others to access the database as a whole (" access in bulk") at no extra

charge to the County. McGrath Dep. at 57-59. Since the cost of copying is therefore

zero, MacImage argues it should be entitled to access to the database at no extra

charge. 3

The County, however, counters that there is a separate statutory provision

governing fees for copying registry records. Specifically, the County relies on 33 M.R.S.

§ 751, which provides as follows:

Except as provided in any other provision of law, registers of deeds shall receive the following fees for:

***

14. Abstracts and copies. Making abstracts and copies from the records, a reasonable fee as determined by the county commissioners ....

The County argues that this provision is designed to allow county registries to

impose fees not just for the cost of copying but also for the costs of establishing and

maintaining the registry and the database. The court has some sympathy for this

argument. However, on the present record, the court nevertheless finds that MacImage

2 Under the Freedom of Access Law, a public agency may also charge a fee to cover "the actual cost of searching for, retrieving, and compiling the public record of not more than $10 per hour after the first hour of staff time per request." 1 M.R.S. § 408(3)(B). In this case, however, the database has already been compiled and no staff time is necessary for search and retrieval. 3 MacImage is a registered user of the County website. The record does not reflect whether it has paid any fee to register.

3 has demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its Freedom of Access claim.

This is true for three reasons.

First, the most obvious way to reconcile 1 M.R.S. § 408(3)(A) and 33 M.R.S. §

751(14) is to interpret the reasonable fee called for in § 751(14) as a reasonable fee to

cover the cost of copying as set forth in the Freedom of Access Law. Second, to the

extent that § 751(14) is interpreted as differing from § 408(3)(A), Section 751 expressly

provides that it yields to other applicable statutes ("except as provided in any other

provision of law ... "). As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, it is arguable

that § 751(14) would yield to the provisions of § 408(3)(A).

Finally, even if § 751(14) were interpreted as a free-standing exception to the

"cost of copying" provision in the Freedom of Access Law, the County has not

demonstrated on this record that the $1.50 per page that it charges is "reasonable." It

may be that the revenue generated from recording fees, from certification fees, and from

single users requesting copies is insufficient for the Registry to finance its recording

functions, its staffing needs, its database and computer costs and that therefore an

additional bulk access fee would be reasonable for the bulk access requested by

MacImage. However, the County declines to offer any bulk access fee whatsoever, and

it has not demonstrated that its per page copying fee is reasonable when bulk access is

requested.

Given the above, the court need not decide whether, even if the County were

able to establish the reasonableness of its fee given the overall cost of maintaining the

registry and its database, the Freedom of Access Law would limit any permissible fees

to copying costs. On the existing record, MacImage has demonstrated that it is likely to

prevail on the merits.

4 2. Other Criteria for a Preliminary Injunction

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MacImage of Maine v. Hancock County, (Me. Super. Ct. 2009).

MacImage of Maine v. Hancock County (MacImage of Maine v. Hancock County) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono
441 A.2d 691 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1982)
Wright v. Department of Defense & Veterans Services
623 A.2d 1283 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1993)
Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture
2003 ME 140 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
State v. Sirois
478 A.2d 1117 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1984)