Macias v. Smith's Food and Drug Center

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedDecember 17, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-01554
StatusUnknown

This text of Macias v. Smith's Food and Drug Center (Macias v. Smith's Food and Drug Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Macias v. Smith's Food and Drug Center, (D. Nev. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 BENJAMIN MACIAS, 7 Case No.: 2:20-cv-01554-JAD-NJK Plaintiff, 8 ORDER v. 9 [Docket No. 13] SMITH’S FOOD AND DRUG CENTER, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Pending before the Court is Defendant Smith’s Food and Drug Center’s motion to 13 strike/exclude Plaintiff’s untimely disclosed medical records and bills. Docket No. 13. The Court 14 has considered Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff’s response, and Defendant’s reply. Docket Nos. 13, 15 14, 16. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the following 16 reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. Docket No. 13. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff alleges that, on October 13, 2017, he tripped over a broom and fell at Defendant’s 19 store. Docket No. 1-1 at 4. On October 7, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant and filed a complaint in 20 state court alleging negligence. Id. at 1, 5. 21 Initially, the case was referred to the state court’s mandatory arbitration program. Docket 22 No. 3 at 2. The arbitrator issued a scheduling order, setting a discovery cutoff of July 2, 2020. 23 Docket No. 14 at 5. After the discovery cutoff, Plaintiff disclosed bills and records of past and 24 future medical treatment. Docket No. 13 at 4–5. Based on the potential damages reflected in the 25 records for future medical treatment, Plaintiff requested removal from the state court’s mandatory 26 arbitration program. Id. at 6. The case was removed from the mandatory arbitration program, 27 with Plaintiff paying all fees and costs of the arbitrator. Id. 28 1 On August 21, 2020, Defendant removed the action to this Court based on diversity 2 jurisdiction. Docket No. 1. On September 17, 2020, the parties convened for a Rule 12(f) 3 conference and subsequently filed a joint proposed discovery plan.1 Docket No. 10. The parties 4 submitted that they had conducted discovery before Defendant filed its notice of removal. Id. at 5 2. Thereafter, on September 25, 2020, the Court entered a scheduling order and set a discovery 6 cutoff of February 17, 2021. Docket No. 11. On November 19, 2020, Defendant filed the instant 7 motion to strike. Docket No. 13. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A. Rule 26 Disclosures 10 Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires parties to provide initial disclosures to the opposing parties 11 without awaiting a discovery request. The initial disclosures must include a computation of each 12 category of damages claimed by the disclosing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). The 13 damages computation enables the defendant to understand the contours of its liability exposure 14 and, by extension, to make informed decisions regarding settlement. Frontline Med. Assocs., Inc. 15 v. Coventry Health Care, 263 F.R.D. 567, 569 (C.D. Cal. 2009). “While a party may not have all 16 of the information necessary to provide a computation of damages early in the case, it has a duty 17 to diligently obtain the necessary information and prepare and provide its damages computation 18 within the discovery period.” Jackson v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 586, 593 19 (D. Nev. 2011). In addition to disclosing damages computation, Rule 26 requires the disclosing 20 party to make available the documents that support its damages computation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 21 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments. 22 The disclosing party also has a duty to supplement incomplete or inaccurate disclosures in 23 a timely manner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). The key inquiry is whether the timing of the supplemental 24 disclosure is reasonable based on when the information was available to the disclosing party. 25 American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Vistana Condo. Owners Assoc., 2016 WL 1611585, at *2 (D. Nev. 26 Apr. 21, 2016). While the disclosing party has a duty to obtain sufficient information within a 27 1 Unless otherwise noted, references to “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil 28 Procedure. 1 reasonable timeframe as to what damages she will claim, Rule 26 provides for needed flexibility 2 in supplementing the initial disclosure damages computation as the case progresses and 3 circumstances evolve. Silvagni v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 237, 241 (D. Nev. 2017). 4 However, “[s]upplementation under the Rules means correcting inaccuracies . . . based on 5 information that was not available at the time of the initial disclosure.” Keener v. United States, 6 181 F.R.D. 639, 640 (D. Mont. 1998). Rule 26(e) does not “create a loophole through which a 7 party . . . who wishes to revise [his] initial disclosures . . . can add to them to [his] advantage after 8 the court’s deadline for doing so has passed.’” Luke v. Family Care and Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 9 Fed. App’x 496, 500 (9th Cir. 2009). The Rules provide that “litigants should not indulge in 10 gamesmanship with respect to the disclosure requirements.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), Advisory 11 Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments. 12 B. Rule 37(c)(1) Sanctions 13 When a disclosing party fails to disclose or supplement its Rule 26 disclosures, courts turn 14 to Rule 37 to determine if sanctions are appropriate. Rule 37 provides in pertinent part:

15 If a party fails to provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or 16 witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, 17 u nless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Rule 37(c)(1) “gives teeth” to the requirements of Rule 26. Yeti by Molly, 19 Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Generally, an exclusion 20 sanction is “self-executing” and “automatic.” Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments. 21 Nonetheless, courts are entrusted with “particularly wide latitude” in exercising this discretion to 22 impose sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1). Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106. 23 In exercising that discretion, courts determine initially whether the failure to comply with 24 the disclosure requirements was either substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 25 The party facing sanctions bears the burden of establishing that substantial justification or 26 harmlessness exists. Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107. Courts consider several factors to determine 27 whether substantial justification and harmlessness exist, including (1) prejudice or surprise to the 28 party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) 1 the likelihood of disruption of trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness in not timely disclosing the 2 evidence. See Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th 3 Cir. 1999); Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. App’x. 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 4 “Rule 37(c)(1) does not require the court, in all instances, to exclude evidence as a sanction 5 for a late disclosure that is neither justified nor harmless.” Jackson, 278 F.R.D. at 594.

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Related

Gerald Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc.
687 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.
259 F.3d 1101 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Jackson v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
278 F.R.D. 586 (D. Nevada, 2011)
Silvagni v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
320 F.R.D. 237 (D. Nevada, 2017)
Keener v. United States
181 F.R.D. 639 (D. Montana, 1998)

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Macias v. Smith's Food and Drug Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/macias-v-smiths-food-and-drug-center-nvd-2020.