Macias v. Kaplan-Seikmann

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 8, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00280
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Jesus M acias, et al., ) No. CV-22-00280-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiffs, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Drue Kaplan-Seikmann, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 )

15 Before the Court are Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings filed by 16 Defendants Drue Kaplan-Siekmann, Carla White, and Southwest Human Development, 17 Inc. (“SWHD”) (collectively the “SWHD Defendants”) (Doc. 99) and Defendants Britney 18 Galati, Lourde Ramos-Bautista, Kevin Jones, Randy Hinckley, Maureen Jobe, Angela 19 Castro, Lee Eastman, Phyllis Mitchum, Dawn Bradford, and Katalina Taunima 20 (collectively the “DCS Defendants”) (Doc. 110). The Court rules as follows. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiffs Jesus and Francine Macias, divorced parents of four daughters, initiated 23 this action on February 19, 2022, on behalf of themselves and their four minor children. 24 (Doc. 1). On December 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint 25 (“SAC”). (Doc. 62). The SAC alleges claims against eighteen defendants, all related to the 26 investigation and removal of the children from their parents’ custody by the Arizona 27 Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) and the resulting dependency proceedings in 28 Maricopa County Superior Court that were eventually dismissed in February 2020. (Doc. 1 62). Three defendants have been dismissed.1 (Docs. 77, 88). The remaining defendants 2 have answered the SAC. (Docs. 69, 70, 73, 90). On January 20, 2023, one defendant, Dr. 3 Tasha Haggar, moved to dismiss the following three claims asserted against her: (1) Count 4 Four, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for judicial deception; (2) Count Five, a § 1983 claim for 5 conspiracy to commit judicial deceptions; and (3) Count Ten, for intentional infliction of 6 emotional distress (“IIED”). (Doc. 76). On March 27, 2023, the Court dismissed the § 1983 7 claims and the IIED claim asserted by Mr. and Ms. Macias as individuals based on the 8 statute of limitations. (Doc. 89 at 5–6). However, the Court held that the statute of 9 limitations is tolled for the § 1983 claims and the IIED claim brought on behalf of the four 10 minor children. (Doc. 89 at 5–6). After considering the merits of the claims, the Court 11 found that all Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for IIED and held that the only surviving 12 claims against Dr. Haggar are the two § 1983 claims—Counts Four and Five—brought on 13 behalf of the four minor children. (Doc. 89 at 9). The Court will summarize the allegations 14 against the defendants who have filed the pending Motions for Partial Judgment on the 15 Pleadings. (Docs. 99, 110). 16 As of April 2016, all four daughters, the oldest two of whom are severely autistic, 17 resided with Ms. Macias. (Doc. 62 at 3). On April 21, 2016, DCS received an anonymous 18 report of child abuse and neglect stating, among other things, that the children were on 19 severe food restrictions consisting of limited water and a small amount of bean soup and 20 carrots for each meal. (Doc. 62 at 11). This set off nearly four years of conflict between 21 Ms. Macias and DCS. 22 On May 6, 2016, DCS workers went to the Maciases’ home and seized all four 23 Macias children. (Doc. 62 at 17–18). On May 10, 2016, DCS determined that the four 24 children were in no imminent danger, and the children were returned to Ms. Macias’ care. 25 26 1 All claims against Defendants Forensic Counseling & Evaluations LLC, the Arizona Department of Child Safety, and Kathleen Purdy have been dismissed. On August 27 31, 2022, Defendant Bonnie Platter also moved for dismissal of all claims alleged against her (Doc. 31), however, the Court only granted dismissal for Counts Four, Five, and Eight. 28 (Doc. 60 at 17; Doc. 77). 1 (Doc. 62 at 22). On May 25, 2016, DCS filed an In-Home Dependency Petition in juvenile 2 court in Maricopa County requesting that the four children be declared dependent as to 3 both Mr. and Ms. Macias. (Doc. 62 at 23). The four Macias children initially remained in 4 Ms. Macias’ care following the filing of the dependency petition. (Doc. 62 at 23). However, 5 on June 30, 2016, DCS again removed the Macias children from Ms. Macias’ custody. 6 (Doc. 62 at 28–29). 7 On July 29, 2016, Ms. Macias and the four Macias children began therapeutic 8 supervised visits. (Doc. 62 at 36). The visits were supervised by SWHD. (Doc. 62 at 36). 9 On October 14, 2016, however, the juvenile court issued an order stopping Ms. Macias’ 10 visits and all communication with the children. (Doc. 62 at 38). In November 2016, 11 pursuant to the juvenile court’s order, Ms. Macias submitted to a psychological evaluation. 12 (Doc. 62 at 39). On January 30, 2017, Ms. Macias was diagnosed with a personality 13 disorder, which she contends was the result of false and misleading information provided 14 by DCS and SWHD. (Doc. 62 at 40–41). Thereafter, DCS allowed Ms. Macias to have 15 limited contact with her children through monitored telephonic visitations. (Doc. 62 at 43). 16 On November 29, 2017, DCS petitioned the juvenile court for permanent severance 17 of Ms. Macias’ parental rights. (Doc. 62 at 43). The proceedings culminated in a 20-day 18 severance trial held over a ten-month period. (Doc. 62 at 43, 48). On January 17, 2020, the 19 juvenile court denied the petition to terminate Ms. Macias’ parental rights, finding that 20 DCS and SWHD failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. (Doc. 62 at 48– 21 51). On February 21, 2020, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency matter in its 22 entirety. (Doc. 62 at 52). Still, Ms. Macias’ interaction with her children was limited to, at 23 most, supervised visitation from no later than August 2016 through late 2020. (Doc. 62 at 24 37, 52). 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed 27 — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The issue presented by a Rule 12(c) motion is substantially the same 1 as that posed in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion — whether the factual allegations of the complaint, 2 together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief. See Cafasso v. 3 Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, “[a] claim has 4 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 5 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 7 (2007)). 8 In analyzing a 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in 9 the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 10 party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). However, a court “need not 11 assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States 12 ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the 13 pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s 14 pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. 15 Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Courts have 16 discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to 17 simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of judgment. See Lonberg v. City of 18 Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 The SAC asserts six § 1983 claims against the various individual DCS Defendants. 21 Those claims include: (Count One) unlawful removal of the four Macias children and 22 interference with familial relations; (Count Three) unlawful continuing custody of the four 23 Macias children; (Count Four) judicial deception; (Count Five) conspiracy to commit 24 judicial deception; (Count Six) failure to make reasonable efforts to reunite the Macias 25 family; and (Count Nine) violation of Ms. Macias’ right to make medical decisions for her 26 daughters. The SAC also asserts Counts Four and Five against the SWHD Defendants and 27 Count Six against Defendants SWHD and Siekmann-Kaplan. The SAC also asserts a state 28 law claim for IIED against the DCS Defendants and the SWHD Defendants. 1 Within their respective motions, the DCS Defendants and the SWHD Defendants 2 argue that all claims directly against Defendants Hinckley, Taunima, and White should be 3 dismissed entirely, Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 and IIED claims are barred by the statute 4 of limitations, and all Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for IIED. The Court will address each 5 argument in turn. 6 a. Claims Against Defendants Carla White, Randy Hinckley, and Katalina 7 Taunima 8 “Under Section 1983, a supervisor can be held liable in his or her individual capacity 9 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, 10 or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 11 constitutional violation.’” Schindler v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 21-CV-02984-JSW, 2023 12 WL 2414864, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2023) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 13 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is appropriate where 14 the allegations are conclusory and unsupported by specific facts.” Lee v. Washington State, 15 985 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1993). 16 i. Carla White 17 The SWHD Defendants move to dismiss Counts Four, Five and Ten asserted against 18 Defendant White because the SAC fails to assert specific allegations against Defendant 19 White to support these claims. (Doc. 99 at 4–6). The SAC alleges that Defendant White 20 was employed by SWHD as a Visitation Supervisor, and that her “actions were taken in 21 that capacity and were done in intentional or reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights under 22 federal law.” (Doc. 62 at 6). The SAC alleges that the SWHD Defendants “(1) severely 23 restricted [Ms. Macias’] interactions with her children and (2) recorded allegations that 24 were either completely false or deliberately slanted and biased against [Ms. Macias].” 25 (Doc. 62 at 36–37). The SAC does not allege any additional facts to support these 26 allegations. The SAC also does not assert any other allegations against Defendant White. 27 Plaintiffs argue that these allegations are sufficient to plead a claim of judicial 28 deception and conspiracy against Defendant White. The Court disagrees. To begin, 1 Plaintiffs argue that the SAC “at least implicitly places [Defendant White] in a position to 2 supervise SWHD’s actions relating to the Macias family.” (Doc. 104 at 5–6). Plaintiffs also 3 argue that the SAC specifically alleges that Defendant White was responsible for SWHD’s 4 false allegations against Ms. Macias. (Doc. 104 at 5–6). This argument is insufficient. Even 5 if Defendant White supervised SWHD’s actions relating to the Macias family it would not 6 be enough to subject her to liability. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) 7 (“Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates.”). 8 Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendant White engaged in wrongful conduct that was 9 sufficiently connected to the constitutional violations. (Doc. 114 at 7–8). Accordingly, 10 Counts Four, Five and Ten asserted against Defendant White are dismissed. The Court, 11 however, rejects the SWHD Defendants’ request for sanctions under Rule 11. See Calif. 12 Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1987) 13 (reversing an award of sanctions where, although the evidence was weak and could not 14 survive summary judgement, the court could not “say that the complaint [was] so lacking 15 in plausibility as to ... subject [the attorney] to sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11”). 16 ii. Randy Hinckley 17 The DCS Defendants move to dismiss Counts One, Three, Nine, and Ten asserted 18 against Defendant Hinckley because the SAC fails to assert specific allegations against 19 Defendant Hinckley to support these claims. (Doc. 110 at 5–6). The SAC only alleges that 20 Defendant Hinckley was employed by DCS as a Supervisor, and that his “actions were 21 taken in that capacity and were done in intentional or reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights 22 under federal law.” (Doc. 62 at 4–5, 11–12). Plaintiffs argue that they should be able to 23 pursue claims against Defendant Hinckley because he supervised one of the defendants 24 directly involved in the investigation. (Doc. 122 at 8). As previously explained, however, 25 Defendant Hinckley’s supervisory title is not enough to hold Defendant Hinckley liable for 26 Plaintiffs’ injuries. Because the SAC does not allege that Defendant Hinckley was 27 personally involved in wrongdoing connected to the claims asserted against him, Counts 28 One, Three, Nine, and Ten asserted against Defendant Hinckley are dismissed. 1 iii. Katalina Taunima 2 Finally, the DCS Defendants move to dismiss Counts Four, Five, Nine, and Ten 3 asserted against Defendant Taunima because the SAC fails to assert specific allegations 4 against Defendant Taunima to support these claims. (Doc. 110 at 5–6). The SAC alleges 5 that Defendant Taunima was employed by DCS as a Case Manager, and her “actions were 6 taken in that capacity and were done in intentional or reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights 7 under federal law.” (Doc. 62 at 6). The SAC also alleges that after Ms. Macias requested a 8 professional analysis of the potential for family reunification, the juvenile court ordered 9 Dr. Al Silbermann to conduct the evaluation. (Doc. 62 at 46–47). Paragraph 194 of the 10 SAC provides in part that: Because of Dr. Silbermann’s previous work for DCS in 11 dependency cases, DCS contacted him before the examination 12 in an attempt to prejudice Silbermann against [Ms. Macias]. Defendant Taunima contacted Silbermann and provided 13 him DCS’s position and emphasized that she was mentally 14 ill and “manipulative.” Dr. Silbermann was encouraged to video the bonding evaluation. He later testified that in his 15 decades of experience, he had never been asked by DCS to 16 video his evaluation. (Doc. 62 at 46–47). Plaintiffs argue that they should be allowed to pursue claims against 17 Defendant Taunima because the SAC specifically alleges that she attempted to influence 18 Dr. Silbermann against Ms. Macias before he examined the Macias children. (Doc. 122 at 19 9). The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal because they 20 support the claims asserted against Defendant Taunima. See Schindler v. Contra Costa 21 Cnty., No. 21-CV-02984-JSW, 2023 WL 2414864, at *3. Therefore, the Court denies the 22 DCS Defendants’ request to dismiss Defendant Taunima. 23 b. Statute of Limitations 24 A statute of limitations defense is ordinarily raised in a responsive pleading, but it 25 “may be raised in a motion to dismiss if the running of the statute is apparent from the face 26 of the complaint.” Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 n.1 (9th Cir. 27 1987). Still, “‘[d]ismissal on statute of limitations grounds can be granted pursuant to 28 1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required 2 liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled,” or had 3 otherwise not yet accrued.’” ARA Inc. v. City of Glendale, No. CV-17-02512-PHX-GMS, 4 2018 WL 1411787, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2018) (quoting TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 5 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)); see Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) 6 (“Analysis under Rule 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6).” 7 (citation omitted)). The Court addresses the statute of limitations for the § 1983 claims 8 followed by the IIED claim. 9 i. Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 Claims 10 Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so “federal courts apply the 11 forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, along with the forum state’s 12 law regarding tolling . . . .” Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1198 13 (9th Cir. 2014). Arizona’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. 14 A.R.S. § 12-542. Though state law determines the limitations period, “[f]ederal law 15 determines when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run 16 for a § 1983 claim.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). “Under federal 17 law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 18 that is the basis of the action.” Id. 19 Here, the Court previously found that Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 claims accrued 20 no later than January 17, 2020, when the juvenile court denied the termination petition. 21 (Doc. 89 at 5). In their Reply, however, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider the accrual 22 date.2 Raising the same argument as before, Plaintiffs contend that the accrual date should 23 be February 21, 2020—the date that the dependency proceedings terminated. (Doc. 81 at 24 5–6; Doc. 104 at 2; Doc. 122 at 3). Plaintiffs also provide supplemental caselaw, 25 McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149 (2019), to bolster this argument. 26 In McDonough, the United States Supreme Court addressed the procedural standard

27 2 Plaintiffs also oppose Defendants’ Motions “to preserve their appellate rights 28 regarding the accrual date for Plaintiffs’ claims.” (Doc. 104 at 2; Doc. 122 at 3). 1 for bringing forward a § 1983 claim alleging unlawful criminal proceedings. More 2 specifically, the Supreme Court explained that “‘to recover damages for allegedly 3 unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 4 unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,’” a plaintiff must first prove 5 that his conviction had been invalidated in some way. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 6 2149, 2157, 204 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2019) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. 7 Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Supreme Court 8 held that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim alleging prosecution by fabricated 9 evidence do not begin to run until the preceding criminal proceedings has ended. Id. at 10 2161. 11 Here, Plaintiffs did not have to wait until the dependency proceedings terminated 12 prior to filing their claims because Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims do not involve any allegations 13 pertaining to unlawful criminal proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiffs should have brought 14 their claims forward once they knew that they were injured. The SAC specifically alleges 15 that on January 17, 2020, “[the juvenile] court found that throughout the case, DCS agents 16 and [SWHD] had failed to fulfill their statutory and constitutional obligation to make 17 reasonable efforts to reunite [Ms. Macias] with her children.” (Doc. 62 at 49). The SAC 18 clearly supports that Mr. and Ms. Macias should have known by January 17, 2020, that 19 they had been injured by the DCS Defendants and the SWHD Defendants. Thus, the Court 20 stands on its previous ruling that Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 claims accrued no later than 21 January 17, 2020. Because this action was not filed until more than two years later, on 22 February 19, 2022, the § 1983 claims by Ms. and Mr. Macias as individuals will be 23 dismissed based on the statute of limitations. 24 ii. Mr. and Ms. Macias’ IIED Claim 25 In Arizona, “[a] claim for IIED must be brought within two years of the accrual 26 date.” Mahon v. Hammond, No. 1 CA-CV 14-0539, 2016 WL 337493, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 27 Jan. 28, 2016). An IIED claim accrues when “the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of 28 reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, Rosenfeld & 1 Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 898 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. 1995); see also 2 Alexander v. City of Mesa, No. CV-14-00754-PHX-SPL, 2015 WL 13655673, at *8 (D. 3 Ariz. Sept. 30, 2015). 4 Here, too, Plaintiffs’ claim accrued no later than January 17, 2020, when they knew 5 or should have known, based on the juvenile court’s minute entry, of the DCS Defendants’ 6 and the SWHD Defendants’ mishandling of the Macias case. Again, then, Mr. and Ms. 7 Macias’ individual IIED claims are barred by the statute of limitations.3 8 c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 9 To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must plead three elements: (1) “the conduct by 10 the defendant must be ‘extreme’ and ‘outrageous;’” (2) “the defendant must either intend 11 to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will 12 result from his conduct;” and (3) “severe emotional distress must indeed occur as a result 13 of defendant’s conduct.” Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (Ariz. 2005) 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if a defendant’s conduct is unjustifiable, it does 15 not necessarily rise to the level of ‘atrocious’ and ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’ 16 that would cause an average member of the community to believe it was ‘outrageous.’” 17 Nelson v. Phx. Resort Corp., 888 P.2d 1375, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Ford v. 18 Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987)). Courts may use its discretion to determine 19 whether conduct is extreme and outrageous. See Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 619 20 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ariz. 1980). 21 Plaintiffs argue that the SWHD Defendants’ role in the Macias case was outrageous 22 for the following reasons: They imposed unreasonable restrictions on [Ms. Macias’] 23 visits with her daughters – restrictions reserved for abusive 24 parents, when there were no allegations of abuse against [Ms.

25 3 The DCS Defendants also raise an unopposed argument that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs 26 have sued the DCS Defendants in their capacity as public employees, the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ IIED claim against the DCS Defendants is one year.” (Doc. 110 27 at 10) (emphasis in original). The Court agrees. See A.R.S. § 12-821 (“All actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of 28 action accrues and not afterward.”). Macias]. See SAC ¶ 151. The SWHD Defendants affirmatively 1 sought out evidence of Munchausen’s Syndrome in an effort 2 find [sic] it. See id. ¶¶ 154-55, 189, 192, 196. Instead of fulfilling their duty to provide therapeutic services to the 3 Macias family for purposes of reuniting the family, they made 4 affirmative misrepresentations to the juvenile court and other service providers designed to present [Ms. Macias] in the worst 5 possible light and to sever [Ms. Macias’] relationship with her 6 daughters. See id. ¶¶ 154, 157-59, 161-64, 178, 184, 196. (Doc. 104 at 6–7). These allegations align with the juvenile court’s conclusion that the 7 SWHD Defendants mishandled the Macias case. (See Doc. 62 at 49, 51). And accepting 8 these allegations as true, the SWHD Defendants enforced unreasonable restrictions during 9 visitations and “repeatedly lied to the juvenile court and other service providers with the 10 goal of severing [Ms. Macias’] parental rights to her children.” (Doc. 104 at 7). While the 11 Court finds this behavior unjustifiable, it does not amount to extreme or outrageous conduct 12 capable of surviving a motion to dismiss. See Adams v. Estrada, No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0074, 13 2014 WL 265660, at *8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (finding that making false statements 14 do not rise to the high level of outrageousness required to prove an IIED claim); see Norton 15 v. Arpaio, No. CV-15-00087-PHX-SPL, 2019 WL 1409536, at *11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 16 2019) (“There is simply no evidence in the record to suggest [the defendants’] actions fall 17 at the very extreme edge of the spectrum of possible conduct.”) (citation and quotation 18 omitted); see also Douglass v. City of Mesa, No. CV-17-04686-PHX-SMB, 2020 WL 19 1033128, at *9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2020) (“Surely, attempting to protect an individual from 20 residing in an unsafe home is not extreme and outrageous conduct even if the house were 21 [sic] erroneously found unsafe.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for IIED 22 against the SWHD Defendants. 23 Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that the DCS Defendants engaged in outrageous conduct 24 when they “presented false information to the juvenile court, repeatedly, over the course 25 of three years, for the express purpose of severing [Ms. Macias’] parental rights.” (Doc. 26 122 at 7). Accordingly, for the same reasoning, Plaintiffs’ IIED claim against the DCS 27 Defendants also fail. 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 In sum, the claims against Defendants Hinckley and White are dismissed, Mr. and 3 Ms. Macias’ § 1983 and IIED claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and all 4 Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for IIED. Moreover, the SWHD Defendants’ request for 5 sanctions under Rule 11 is denied. Leave to amend a deficient complaint should be freely 6 given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend may be denied, 7 however, where amendment would be futile. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th 8 Cir. 1991). Here, the Court finds that amendment would be futile. The statute of limitations 9 defects cannot be cured, nor can the IIED claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs have already 10 amended their complaint twice. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 11 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] district court’s discretion over amendments is especially broad 12 where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his 13 complaint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that the SWHD Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the 15 Pleadings (Doc. 99) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: 16 1. The Motion is granted as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant White, 17 all of Plaintiffs’ IIED claims, and Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 claims. These 18 claims are dismissed with prejudice. 19 2. The Motion is denied as to the SWHD Defendants’ request for sanctions. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the DCS Defendants’ Motion for Partial 21 Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 110) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: 22 1. The Motion is granted as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Hinckley, 23 all of Plaintiffs’ IIED claims, and Mr. and Ms. Macias’ § 1983 claims. These 24 claims are dismissed with prejudice. 25 2. The Motion is denied as to terminating Defendant Taunima. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate Defendants 2.| White and Hinckley as parties to this action. 3 Dated this 4th day of January, 2024. 4

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