Macboyle v. Parma

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: September 1, 2004
• Docket: 03-3784
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. No. 03-3784 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0290P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0290p.06 Dobeck, OFFICE OF THE LAW DIRECTOR, Parma, Ohio, for Appellees. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT OPINION _________________ _________________

TAHLER MACBOYLE , X KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff appeals an order - granting summary judgment to Defendants City of Parma and Plaintiff-Appellant, individual Parma Police Officers1 in this § 1983 action based - - No. 03-3784 on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest. v. - Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it upheld the > validity of a release-dismissal agreement in granting the , motion for summary judgment. Finding the release met the CITY OF PARMA, et al., - Defendants-Appellees. - requirements of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), we affirm. N Appeal from the United States District Court BACKGROUND for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. No. 02-01487—James Gwin, District Judge. This § 1983 case stems from the arrest of Plaintiff Tahler MacBoyle on the night of July 29, 2000. Plaintiff sued Argued: August 5, 2004 Defendants City of Parma and several Parma Police Officers for using excessive force and causing permanent injuries, in Decided and Filed: September 1, 2004 carrying out that arrest. Plaintiff claims that the Parma Police Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Before: KENNEDY, SUTTON, and COOK, Circuit rights, and that City of Parma is liable for malicious Judges. prosecution, negligence, and failure to train.

_________________ On July 29, 2000, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Parma Police Department dispatched Defendants Pinc and Ciryak to COUNSEL the home of Kimberly Guder, 6511 State Road, apartment 204, in Parma, Ohio, to investigate a noise disturbance. ARGUED: Brent L. English, LAW OFFICE OF BRENT L. Ms. Guder was hosting a surprise party for her boyfriend, ENGLISH, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael P. Paul Kopin, who had recently turned nineteen. Ms. Guder Maloney, LAW OFFICE, Westlake, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brent L. English, LAW OFFICE OF BRENT 1 L. ENGLISH, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael P. Patrolmen Edward Pinc, Ken neth C hihil, Da niel Heinz, Daniel Maloney, LAW OFFICE, Westlake, Ohio, Timothy G. Ciryak, Christopher Dillenbeck, Victor Beleske, Wayne K resak, and Joseph Duganier; and Sergeants James Blair and Gary Kuchta.

1 No. 03-3784 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. 3 4 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. No. 03-3784

invited about thirty people to the party, including Mr. Kopin’s identification, and, instead, continued with loud vulgarities mother, Shirley Kopin, and Ms. Kopin’s boyfriend, Plaintiff and demanded that the officer produce a search warrant. MacBoyle. Plaintiff was thirty-four at the time of the party. Plaintiff claims that another guest, Mr. Kopin, and not he, Ms. Kopin and Plaintiff both attended the party and were at used profanities and that Defendants confused the two of the apartment when the police officers arrived. Several guests them. Defendants claim that at one point during the had brought alcohol to the party, and the party goers were discussion, Plaintiff moved toward Defendant Pinc. consuming alcohol. According to Defendants, when they Defendant Pinc put his hand up to stop Plaintiff from arrived at the apartment complex, they observed a female and approaching and called for backup police officers. One of male noticing them and running to the second floor of the those officers, Defendant Chihil, went to the apartment’s apartment complex. As the Defendants approached the balcony and instructed the individuals to return into the apartment, a male with keys to the apartment2 let the police apartment for identification purposes. Defendants claim that officers into Ms. Guder’s apartment. The officers believed Plaintiff began walking toward the balcony, that they advised they entered the apartment with consent. At the time of the him to remain inside the apartment three times, and that he entry, Plaintiff was on the apartment’s balcony with Ms. refused to obey their instructions. Plaintiff, on the other hand, Kopin and Ms. Guder. claims that, at this point, he decided to call the Mayor’s office. Plaintiff also says that the officers, using more Inside the apartment, the police officers observed fifteen to profanity, instructed him to get off the phone, and when he twenty individuals. Many of those individuals in the refused, one of the officers grabbed the phone and threw it possession of alcoholic beverages appeared to be underage. across the room. Plaintiff further says that an officer struck When the officers requested the name of the apartment’s him on the head with a flashlight and that the officers owner, no one responded. When the officers began continued their assault on him by throwing him on to a table requesting identification from the individuals present, no one and then to the floor, and then running him out of the responded. During this period, several individuals, including apartment head first into the apartment’s metal door. Plaintiff, entered the living room. Defendants claim that Plaintiff began using vulgarities and demanding to know who Plaintiff was charged with obstructing official business, let the officers in. Plaintiff claims that it was the police resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. Mr. Kopin and two officers who used vulgarities while questioning the party other guests were also charged with various offenses. The goers and that he, Plaintiff, was attempting to diffuse the cases were consolidated for trial. While his criminal case was situation by politely asking the police officers why they were pending, Defendant, on advice of his counsel, entered into a in the apartment. Plaintiff further claims that he asked the release-dismissal agreement with all Defendants (the “Release police officers to leave only when they failed to respond to his Agreement”). Pursuant to the Release Agreement, Plaintiff inquiries, and that the police offices declined to leave. waived all rights to sue Defendants. The City agreed to dismiss the charges of resisting arrest and obstructing official Defendant Pinc asked Plaintiff for identification. business and to amend the disorderly conduct charge.3 Defendants claim that Plaintiff refused to give any Notwithstanding the Release Agreement, Plaintiff filed the

2 3 Apparently, the male was a party guest to whom Ms. Guder had Plaintiff later pleaded no contest to minor misdemeanor disorderly given the keys so he could get back inside the apartment. conduct. No. 03-3784 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. 5 6 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. No. 03-3784

instant action. Defendants argued, and the district court seeking such an agreement, as well as the degree to which found, that the Release Agreement prevents Plaintiff from enforcing the agreement would serve the public interest.’” bringing this action. MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002) (citing Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 974). ANALYSIS The district court conducted the three-factor Rumery The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of release- analysis and concluded that the Release Agreement should be dismissal agreements whereby a criminal defendant releases upheld. his right to file a civil rights action in return for a prosecutor’s dismissal of pending criminal charges, as long as the With respect to the voluntariness prong, the district court agreement meets certain criteria. See generally Town of stated: Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). The enforcement of such an agreement is appropriate if a court decides that (1) it Plaintiff MacBoyle was thirty-four years old and was entered into voluntarily; (2) there is no evidence of represented by an attorney when he signed the Release prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) the enforcement furthers Agreement. He is a college graduate who has been the public interest. Id. at 398. The burden of proof in this employed since 1989 and takes part in continuing analysis “falls upon the party in the § 1983 action who seeks professional education seminars. Plaintiff MacBoyle was to invoke the agreement as a defense.” Coughlen v. Coots, not incarcerated when he signed the Release Agreement, 5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1993). We derived the rationale for and there is no evidence that MacBoyle did not have this allocation of the burden of proof from Justice O’Connor’s ample time to consider the agreement before signing it. concurrence in Rumery: In fact, Plaintiff MacBoyle claims that he signed the release out of concern for Shirley Kopin, Paul Kopin and Permitting such releases may tempt public officials to Kim Guder, who also had all the criminal charges bring frivolous criminal charges in order to deter besides minor misdemeanor criminal conduct dismissed meritorious civil complaints. The risk and expense of a as a result of Plaintiff’s and their releases. Plaintiff criminal trial can easily intimidate even an innocent MacBoyle’s signing of the Release Agreement was person whose civil and constitutional rights have been undeniably voluntary. violated. The coercive power of criminal process may be twisted to serve the end of suppressing complaints MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 7- against official abuse, to the detriment not only of the 8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). Plaintiff presents a number of victim of such abuse, but also of society as a whole. objections to this conclusion. Because these objections lack any merit, we conclude, without unnecessary discussion, that Rumery, 480 U.S. at 400 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) the district court properly found that Plaintiff voluntarily (quoted in Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 973). As the district court signed the Release Agreement. We emphasize that the fact correctly noted, a court may not, in conducting its Rumery that Plaintiff signed the release out of concern for the others analysis, “prejudge the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and will look charged in the event does not affect the voluntariness of his for ‘the existence of substantial evidence of police act. misconduct in a particular case . . . since [such evidence] could be probative of the motives of the prosecutor for No. 03-3784 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. 7 8 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. No. 03-3784

With respect to the prosecutorial misconduct prong, the prosecution witnesses does not amount to ‘substantial district court stated: evidence’ of police misconduct such that an inference of prosecutorial misconduct under Coughlen arises.” Burke v. . . . Plaintiff MacBoyle offers no real evidence of Johnson, 167 F.3d 276, 286 (6th Cir. 1999). If the prosecutorial misconduct. Plaintiff MacBoyle does not discrepancy among the prosecution witnesses is not sufficient claim that any of the charges against him were in any to constitute prosecutorial misconduct, then certainly a way trumped up. In fact, given the police officers [sic] discrepancy between the prosecution witnesses and Plaintiff’s version of the incident, the criminal charges seem witnesses is not enough to rise to the level of prosecutorial reasonable. MacBoyle claims that the prosecutor misconduct. Accordingly, we find that the district court changed his mind from dismissing all the charges to properly found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct. wanting the Plaintiff and the other indicted party goers to plead to one charge of minor misdemeanor disorderly With respect to the public interest prong, the district court conduct. Plaintiff MacBoyle also says that the found that: prosecutor should not have conditioned the dismissal on all the indicted party goers signing the release. This . . . enforcing the Release Agreement serves public Court finds that such evidence, even if true, does not rise interest in that such agreements enable parties to resolve to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. There is no rule issues ami[c]ably themselves, weed out unmeritorious against a prosecutor changing his mind. Plaintiff claims and charges, and conserve[] precious judicial MacBoyle does not claim that he accepted an earlier resources. The evidence shows that Plaintiff MacBoyle offer whereby all claims were dismissed, and then the agreed to the Release Agreement voluntarily without any prosecutor changed his mind and forced him to accept prosecutorial misconduct. Public interest mandates another offer. Rather, Plaintiff claims that the prosecutor holding parties to the agreements they enter into on their contemplating dismissing all charges, thought better of own volition. Nullifying the Release Agreements would it, and changed his mind. Such activity is not provide a disincentive to prosecutors from agreeing to misconduct. Linking the agreements was also not release-dismissal agreements in the future. Therefore the misconduct. All the charges against the party goers were public interest is served by enforcing the Release reasonable in light of the police officers [sic] description Agreement. of the incident. MacBoyle was free to not sign the Release Agreement if he chose not to. MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 8- 9 ( N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). The district court’s recital of MacBoyle v. City of Parma, No. 1:02-CV-1487, slip op. at 8 factors would apply to every release-dismissal agreement. It (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2002). The district court’s decision on is true of all such agreements that they “enable parties to this point was, thus, a legal one. Plaintiff has presented us resolve issues ami[c]ably themselves, weed out unmeritorious with no legal authority to conclude that what the prosecutor claims and charges, and conserve[] precious judicial did in this case amounted to misconduct. Plaintiff simply resources.” It is also true that nullifying such agreements contends that the presence of conflicting testimony amounts “would provide a disincentive to prosecutors from agreeing” to “substantial evidence” of prosecutorial misconduct under to them in the future. However, in the absence of a Coughlen. However, we have already held that the mere determination by the district court that Plaintiff’s claims were “existence of discrepancies among the accounts of “unmeritorious,” a finding that the Release Agreement in this No. 03-3784 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. 9 10 MacBoyle v. City of Parma, et al. No. 03-3784

case would not adversely affect relevant public interests under the following circumstances: (1) the failure of a state requires some further analysis. trial court to reach a decision on the merits of a criminal case (7-1 vote to acquit)5; (2) the conflicting and adversarial As we noted in an earlier opinion, this element is the “least positions taken by the parties on the proof; (3) the connection well-defined element of a Rumery analysis.” Coughlen, between the civil rights action and the criminal charges; 5 F.3d at 975. We explained that “this standard can be (4) the lack of prosecutorial overreaching; (5) the nature of satisfied if the prosecutor demonstrates that obtaining the charges brought. Our case is very similar with respect to release was motivated by an independent, legitimate criminal factors (2) through (5). We do have an absence of an justice objective” and that this “does not appear to create a apparent, albeit legally nonexistent, acquittal. However, this particularly difficult hurdle for the prosecutor to clear.” Id. difference weakens the position of Plaintiff in the instant case. (noting that “the reason proffered by the prosecutor for the The Hill plaintiff was likely to be believed and thus acquitted release-dismissal agreement in this case–‘to aid in the in a retrial, and nevertheless lost in his attempt to void the disposition of its heavy case load’–would probably suffice release-dismissal agreement. Plaintiff in the instant case has under ordinary circumstances.”) In Coughlen, we also merely asserted his innocence. The record reflects that the provided a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which testimony of the parties was in direct conflict as to what had “[r]elease dismissal agreements [] can be legitimate criminal indeed occurred. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff in this justice tools . . .” Id. (offering as examples, situations where case has an even weaker argument than the Hill plaintiff and (1) “police misconduct is alleged, but the prosecutor is we make an independent determination that enforcing the genuinely unable to ascertain the truth surrounding the agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public allegation”; (2) “the cost of prosecution would outweigh the interests. benefit accruing to the public from a conviction; [3] the strength of evidence of criminal conduct is doubtful even CONCLUSION though charges were filed in good faith . . .”; (4) “criminal charges are not the product of prosecutorial misconduct and For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s both sides benefit substantially from a balanced settlement in order granting summary judgment to all Defendants. the sense that both avoid exposure to potential liabilities and expenses.”) The district court’s failure to make adequate findings of fact, however, does not warrant a remand. We have, in the past, determined whether the public interest prong was satisfied even in the absence of a district court finding when there was sufficient evidence in the record to do so. Hill v. Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 579 (6th Cir. 1993).4 We will do so in this case. In Hill, a panel made an independent finding 5 The trial court declared a mistrial in the first trial because it was discovered that a police report had been improperly placed in the jury 4 room. Apparently, there either was an eight-person jury or the alternate W e continue to re mind the district courts to make such findings to jurors had not been excused when the mistrial was ordered. In any case, make it easier for this Court to evaluate the district court’s decision. the release-dismissal agreem ent was signed in anticipation o f a retrial.