MacArthur Mining Co. v. United States

167 Ct. Cl. 143, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 120, 1964 WL 8592
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 17, 1964
DocketCong. No. 19-58
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 167 Ct. Cl. 143 (MacArthur Mining Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MacArthur Mining Co. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 143, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 120, 1964 WL 8592 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Dureee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court: 1

This Congressional Reference case arises from the wartime metal and mineral needs which resulted in a declaration of national policy with respect to the War Metals and Minerals Mining Program promulgated by President Roosevelt on April 24,1943.

The statement of policy is set forth in a letter written to the President by Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board on April 17,1943.

This letter, which is set forth in full in Finding 11, was .adopted by President Roosevelt in his promulgation of the National Policy. Of immediate interest is paragraph 5 of 'that letter which reads:

5. It is national policy that labor, materials, transportation, and time to get into production, rather than money cost, are to be considered the controlling factors in deciding whether or not to increase production, but that the price paid shall bear a reasonable relation to the costs of production and the earning of a fair return over the costs. [Emphasis added.]

[145]*145In the opinion of the Solicitor General, the promulgation of this national policy was “an authoritative statement of the policy of the Executive, to be applied by the executive agencies of the Government to the full extent of their legal powers.”2 (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff, a mine operator in the “Tri-State District” (Missouri, Oklahoma and Kansas) alleges that the Premium Price Quota Committee, which administered the Premium Price Plan {infra) failed to implement the national policy in that the premium prices paid plaintiff were unrealistic, and did not provide a “fair return” over costs.

Pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30,1942, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C. App. § 902, the Premium Price Plan for lead and zinc had been put into effect as of February 1, 1942, more than a full year prior to the promulgation of the national policy. The Premium Price Plan provided for the payment of premium prices for over-quota production of copper, lead and zinc. Kegulations under which individual mine quotas were established are set forth in Finding 16. The Premium Price Quota Committee was set up to administer the program.

In early 1943 the Committee determined that a 55-cent per rock-ton profit margin for mines located in the “TriState District” was fair. Plaintiff contested this determination but allegedly “relying on the representations of the President’s published order,” continued operations. In mid-1944 the Premium Price Quota Committee raised plaintiff’s premium payments, but did so only prospectively. Plaintiff now complains that the committee’s action in failing to raise plaintiff’s premium payments either at an earlier date or retroactively, constituted arbitrary and capricious action, which was both illegal and inequitable, and a direct violation of the announced national policy which was binding on the committee and which mandated premiums sufficient to guarantee plaintiff a “fair return.”

Before approaching the merits of this case, it might be best to discuss two points raised by defendant. First, we are told that the claim is time-barred since it was referred to [146]*146us more than sis years after the claim accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. But this is a Congressional Reference case referred to us by the Senate (and filed prior to the decision in (Glidden v. Zdanoh, 370 U.S.C. 530 (1962), which raises doubts about the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 1492), and while the statute of limitations bars any legal recovery in this court, we are not barred from forwarding a recommendation on the merits of the claim to Congress. Ann Arbor Construction Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 244, 126 F. Supp. 161 (1954); Zadeh v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 650, 111 F. Supp. 248 (1953).

Second, defendant argues that exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this claim resided in the Emergency Court of Appeals. But while the Emergency Court of Appeals did have “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under Section 2 * * *” of the Emergency Price Control Act, plaintiff is alleging a claim against the United States founded upon the violation of a binding Executive Department statement of national policy. While this court may have had jurisdiction over such a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (3), claims founded on “any regulation of an executive department,” or 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (4), claims founded upon “any * * * implied contract with the United States,” we need only point out once again that this case is now here before us pursuant to a Senate referral resolution.

The questions now awaiting resolution are: first, was the promulgation of this national policy an executive act manda-. torily binding on the executive branch of our Government? and second, if it were binding, did the Quota Committee fail to carry out the mandate in determining the premium prices here involved ?

We have often held, in a multitude of circumstances, that executive regulations promulgated under proper authority ' may have the force and effect of law, and are binding at least on the issuing authority and its components. Cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Barnes v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 321 (1963); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). Newman v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 784 (1958).

[147]*147But was this statement of national policy the enunciation -or promulgation of a regulation ? As we have already noted, the Solicitor General’s office concluded that the pronouncement was binding upon the executive agencies “to the full extent of their legal powers.” From the face of their pronouncement it is apparent that the success of the policy could only be achieved by encouraging the operation of marginal mines. This Could only be brought about by the assurance that a “fair return” could be earned by mine operators such as plaintiff. The assurance of that “fair return” was given. We think, therefore, that the Quota Committee was bound to set premium prices that would allow a “fair return.” This conclusion is not contra to our holding in either Victoria Mines, Inc. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 277, 126 F. Supp. 205 (1954), or De Soto Lead and Zinc Company v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 640 (1959).

In Victoria Mines, supra, we were asked to construe Section 17(a) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 which provided for the payment of “fair compensation” to any person who “* * * arranged to furnish or furnished to a contracting agency or to a war contractor any materials, services, or facilities related to the prosecution of the war without a formal contract * * *.” We held that plaintiff there had failed to prove that any facilities had been furnished to defendant.

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167 Ct. Cl. 143, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 120, 1964 WL 8592, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/macarthur-mining-co-v-united-states-cc-1964.