Mabry v. Commissioner
This text of 1985 T.C. Memo. 328 (Mabry v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
"KORNER,
The case was submitted to the Court under the provisions of Rule 122 on a set of fully stipulated facts and joint exhibits, which are incorporated herein by this reference and form the basis of our findings of fact herein.
Petitioners Ted L. Mabry and Marie E. Mabry, husband and wife, were residents of Medford, Oregon, at the time of filing their petition herein. Their joint income tax returns for the years 1978 and 1979 were duly and timely filed with the Ogden Service Center.
Petitioner Ted L. Mabry (hereinafter "petitioner") was employed by the City of Oakland, California, as a fireman, and served on active duty until June 16, 1959. On that date, he suffered a heart attack, which occurred in the actual performance of his duties as a fire fighter. Effective July 1, 1960, petitioner was retired for disability by reason*306 of this heart attack, by action of the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement Board, which found his disability to be service connected.
As the result of the above action of the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement Board, petitioner became qualified for and began receiving disability retirement pay in lieu of temporary or permandent worken's compensation. Said retirement allowance, effective July 1, 1960, was computed under the provisions of section 2610(a) of the Charter of the City of Oakland. 2 Pursuant to said provisions, petitioner began receiving a retirement allowance equal to 75 percent of his pay in the year preceding his disability retirement.
*307 Petitioner continued receiving the above disability retirement pay through the month of September 1960. On September 27, 1960, petitioner became 55 years old, and at that point had completed 22 years of service as an Oakland fire fighter, including the time during which he received disability retirement pay (computed in accordance with section 2609 of the city Charter). At that time, petitioner became eligible for regular retirement for service. Pursuant to section 2610(a) of the Charter of the City of Oakland, the City then began computing petitioner's retirement allowance under the provisions of section 2608 of said Charter 3 beginning October 1, 1960.
*308 As the result of the above change, petitioner's retirement allowance was reduced from 75 percent of his salary in the year preceding his retirement to 50 percent of said compensation, in accordance with the provisions of section 2608(c) of the Charter of the City of Oakland. 4 From that date until the time of trial, petitioner has continued to receive a retirement allowance pursuant to the latter provision.
At the time he was placed on disability retirement on July 1, 1960, petitioner had paid contributions to the Fire Department Pension Fund in the total amount of $4,646.56.
In 1978 petitioner received a retirement allowance from the City of Oakland in the amount of $10,504, and he received a retirement allowance of $11,618 in the year 1979. Petitioner excluded these amounts from his reported income in his joint income tax returns for those years. In periodic statements furnished to him concerning his retirement pay and deductions therefrom, as well as in annual Forms W2P furnished to him, the City of Oakland consistently referred to petitioner's retirement payments as being for disability.
Upon audit, respondent determined that the payments*309 received by petitioner in 1978 and 1979 were not excludable from gross income as disability payments, but were fully taxable.
In contending for nontaxability, petitioners urge that the change in retirement benefits made by the City of Oakland, effective October 1, 1960 was simply a change in computing the amount of petitioner's payment and had nothing to do with the nature of said payment which remained, as always, a retirement payment on account of disability.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that a change both in the nature and the amount of the payment took place on October 1, 1960 in that, prior to that time, petitioner's payments were based only on disability, and without reference to age or length of service, whereas, subsequent to that time, petitioner's retirement payments were based on age and length of service, thus rendering them ineligible for exclusion under
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1985 T.C. Memo. 328, 50 T.C.M. 336, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mabry-v-commissioner-tax-1985.