Maas & Waldstein Co. v. United States

283 U.S. 583, 51 S. Ct. 606, 75 L. Ed. 1285, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 168, 1 C.B. 433, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1465, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 745
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMay 25, 1931
Docket263
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 283 U.S. 583 (Maas & Waldstein Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Maas & Waldstein Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 583, 51 S. Ct. 606, 75 L. Ed. 1285, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 168, 1 C.B. 433, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1465, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 745 (1931).

Opinion

Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner seeks to recover interest on an overpayment made June 20,1918, on account of income and excess profits taxes assessed for the year 1917, which was refunded during 1922. The Court of Claims denied relief and we are asked to reverse this action.

The Revenue Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300, 303, 304, 307, laid an income tax; also a tax upon excess profits equal to designated percentages of the net income, after making deductions therefrom as stated in i§ 203. The amount of such deductions depended upon invested capital, prewar operations, etc.

The provisions of that Act here specially applicable follow—

Sec. 205. (a) That if the Secretary of the Treasury, upon complaint finds either (1) that during the prewar period a domestic corporation or partnership, or a citizen or resident of the United States, had no net income from the trade or business, or (2) that during the prewar period the percentage, which the net income was of the invested capital, was low as compared with the percentage, which *585 the net income during such period of representative corporations, partnerships, and individuals, engaged in a like or similar trade or business, was of their invested capital, then the deduction shall be . . .”

“Sec. 210. That if the Secretary of the Treasury is unable in any case satisfactorily to determine the invested capital, the amount of the deduction shall be the sum of (1) an amount equal to the same proportion of the net income of the trade or business received during the taxable year as the proportion which the average deduction (determined in the same manner as provided in section two hundred and three, without including the $3,000 or $6,000 therein referred to) for the same calendar year of representative corporations, partnerships, and individuals, engaged in a like or similar trade or business, bears to the total net income of the trade or business received by such corporations, partnerships, and individuals, plus . . .”

Article 52, Treasury Department Regulations 41, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1917 states—“ Section 210 provides for exceptional cases in which the invested capital can not be satisfactorily determined.. In such cases the taxpayer may submit to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue evidence in support of a claim for assessment under the provisions of section 210.”

Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 316—

“Sec. 1324 (a). That upon the allowance of a claim for the refund of or credit for internal revenue taxes paid, interest shall be allowed and paid upon the total amount of such refund or credit at the rate of one-half of 1 per centum per month to the date of such allowance, as follows: (1) if such amount was paid under a specific protest setting forth in detail the basis of and reasons for such protest, from the time when such tax was paid. . . .”

The petitioner, a domestic corporation, on March 28, 1918, filed its income and excess profits tax return for the year 1917. From this it appeared that, reckoned *586 according to the rule commonly applicable, the tax amounted to $1,508,400.25. With the return petitioner sent a written communication, addressed to the Commissioner, copied in the margin. * This expressed the opinion “ that our tax is proportionately larger than that of-other representative concerns in the same line of business ” and that this disproportion arises from causes pf the nature of those specified in Article 52, of Regulations No. 41.” And finally: “ Upon the above statement, which we are prepared to support and amplify if required, we request assessment in the manner provided for in Article 52, referring also to Articles 18 and 24, Regulations No. 41.”

*587 On. June 20,1918, payment was made of the full amount of the tax reckoned upon the March 28 return. This was accompanied by a letter stating “ we filed a request dated March 28th for assessment in the manner provided for in Article 52, referring also to Articles 18 and 24, Regulations 41. Understanding that these questions will be passed upon at a later date, we shall be pleased to be advised that a hearing will be granted to us.” At this time no provision of law permitted recovery of interest upon refunded overpayments.

*588 December 30, 1921, petitioner filed a formal claim for the refund of excess payment of income and excess-profits tax for 1917.

The petitioner now claims that the contents of its letter of March 28, 1918, reiterated in the later one, were suffir cient to meet the requirements of § 1324 (a), Act of 1921—that what was there written amounted to a specific protest setting forth in detail the basis of and reasons for such protest,” within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Claims held otherwise; and while its opinion cannot be wholly approved, the judgment is correct and must be affirmed.

The general purpose of the petitioner’s communications to the Commissioner was to induce the latter to set on foot an investigation of the Company’s affairs to the end that, after ascertaining the circumstances and in the exercise of a proper discretion, he might make an assessment duly proportioned to those imposed upon others engaged in like business. There was no challenge of the Commissioner’s right then to demand payment according to the general rule—no claim that in view of the facts then before him this would amount to an unlawful imposition. Considering the circumstances disclosed, the Commissioner did nothing unjust or contrary to law when he demanded payment; and if he had concluded to take no further proceedings, the petitioner could have recovered nothing. Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551.

In Girard Trust Company v. United States, 270 U. S. 163, 170, 173, this Court pointed out that the Act of 1921 is remedial and was passed with the general purpose to “ require the Government to recoup the taxpayer unjustly dealt with by paying interest during the whole time the money was detained.” Also, we there said—“A protest is for the purpose of inviting attention of the taxing *589 officers to the illegality of the collection, so that they may take remedial measures at once.”

We are unable to conclude that the petitioner’s action amounted to a precise objection to an unauthorized exaction within the fair intendment of the statute. Meticulous compliance by the taxpayer with the prescribed conditions must appear before he can recover. Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 245, 249.

- Affirmed.

*

Maas & Waldstein Co.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re the Estate of Tubbs
900 P.2d 865 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1995)
Diplacido v. Commissioner
1993 T.C. Memo. 169 (U.S. Tax Court, 1993)
Radin v. United States
702 F. Supp. 38 (D. Connecticut, 1988)
WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. United States
138 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. New York, 1955)
French v. Smyth
110 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. California, 1952)
Nemours Corp. v. United States
188 F.2d 745 (Third Circuit, 1951)
Vica Co. v. Commissioner
159 F.2d 148 (Ninth Circuit, 1947)
United States v. Standard Oil Co.
158 F.2d 126 (Sixth Circuit, 1946)
Nebel v. . Nebel
28 S.E.2d 207 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1943)
Lee Wilson & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
111 F.2d 313 (Eighth Circuit, 1940)
United States v. Gutzler
105 F.2d 188 (Ninth Circuit, 1939)
Clark v. United States
30 F. Supp. 599 (D. New Jersey, 1939)
First Nat. Bank of Birmingham v. United States
25 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Alabama, 1939)
Bladine v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank
63 F.2d 317 (Eighth Circuit, 1933)
Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States
60 F.2d 944 (Eighth Circuit, 1932)
Taber v. United States
59 F.2d 568 (Eighth Circuit, 1932)
Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. United States
57 F.2d 914 (Court of Claims, 1932)
Chestnut & Smith, Inc. v. United States
55 F.2d 1012 (Court of Claims, 1932)
Jackson Iron & Steel Co. v. Commissioner
54 F.2d 861 (Sixth Circuit, 1931)
H. Lissner Co. v. United States
52 F.2d 1058 (Court of Claims, 1931)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
283 U.S. 583, 51 S. Ct. 606, 75 L. Ed. 1285, 1931 U.S. LEXIS 168, 1 C.B. 433, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1465, 2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 745, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/maas-waldstein-co-v-united-states-scotus-1931.