M.A. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky via the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
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Opinion
RENDERED: MARCH 28, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0570-ME
M.A. APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT, v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-AD-00011
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VIA THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; A.W.; AND M.M.A., A CHILD APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2024-CA-0573-ME
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT, v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-AD-00012
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VIA THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; A.V.; AND C.C.A., A CHILD APPELLEES
NO. 2024-CA-0574-ME
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT, v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-AD-00013
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VIA THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; A.V.; AND K.K.A., A CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: M.A. (hereinafter referred to as Mother) appeals
from orders of the McCracken Circuit Court, Family Court Division, which
terminated her parental rights to her three children.1 Mother claims that she was
1 Because this case concerns the termination of parental rights to minor children, we will not refer to the parties by their names in order to protect the privacy of the children.
-2- denied due process because she did not have an attorney during her termination of
parental rights hearing. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother’s termination of parental rights hearing was held on August
31, 2023, and Mother was represented by a court appointed attorney. At the
beginning of the hearing, Mother requested a continuance in order to obtain some
of her children’s medical records she had not yet received. The trial court denied
the motion to continue, but set another hearing date for October 26, 2023, to allow
Mother to obtain the records and present them. Mother also had an expert witness
she wanted to testify who was unavailable for the August hearing and the court
held that the expert could also testify at the new October hearing. Shortly after this
exchange, Mother informed the trial court that she did not wish for her appointed
attorney to represent her, and she stated that she wished to proceed pro se. Mother
did not ask for a new attorney or request a continuance in order to find another
attorney.
The trial court questioned Mother about her request. Ultimately the
court allowed Mother to represent herself but ordered that Mother’s attorney
remain for the hearing in order to assist Mother. The hearing then proceeded as
planned. Mother predominantly represented herself during the hearing but would
sometimes confer with her attorney. Her attorney also questioned witnesses and
-3- helped Mother present exhibits. During the second hearing in October, Mother
was represented by retained counsel. On October 30, 2023, the trial court entered
orders terminating Mother’s parental rights to her three children. This appeal
followed.
ANALYSIS
Mother argues on appeal that she was denied due process because she
was not represented by an attorney during the termination of parental rights
hearing.
The law in this Commonwealth is that the due process clause, and KRS[2] 625.080(3) and 620.100(1) require that the parental rights of a child not be terminated unless the parent has been represented by counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings. This includes all critical stages of an underlying dependency proceeding in district court. R.V. v. Com., Dept. for Health and Family Services, 242 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Ky. App. 2007).
It is logical that the parent’s right to counsel includes effective representation. However, it does not derive from the Sixth Amendment nor can RCr[3] 11.42 be invoked. We hold that if counsel’s errors were so serious that it is apparent from the record that the parent was denied a fair and meaningful opportunity to be heard so that due process was denied, this Court will consider a claim that counsel was ineffective.
2 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4- Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. App. 2008).
Appellant argues that she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be
heard because she was not represented by counsel during the August hearing, and
she needed more time to prepare her pro se defense. Appellant relies heavily on
the case of T.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, No. 2022-CA-0785-
ME, 2023 WL 1871012 (Ky. App. Feb. 10, 2023), to support her argument. In
T.T., Father was incarcerated when the Cabinet petitioned to terminate his parental
rights to his child. Father had appointed counsel and at the start of the termination
hearing, Father fired his counsel. The court dismissed Father’s counsel and Father
proceeded pro se; however, he did not have any witnesses present. There was no
discussion of a possible continuance.
After the hearing, new counsel appeared for Father and made a motion
opposing the termination. This attorney argued that Father was not made aware of
the hearing until he was taken from his jail cell to the courthouse; therefore, he did
not have an opportunity to present witnesses. The trial court did not rule on that
motion, but did enter an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father then
appealed to this Court and argued that his due process rights were violated because
he was not informed of the termination hearing, was not able to present any
witnesses, and did not meet with his appointed attorney until a few minutes before
the hearing.
-5- The Court reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights and
remanded for a new hearing. The Court held that there was no evidence in the
record that Father was given notice of the hearing prior to the day of the hearing, or
that appointed counsel contacted any witnesses on Father’s behalf. Id. at *4. The
Court acknowledged Father’s firing of his attorney is probably why the record
contained no evidence of these facts, but the Court felt it prudent to reverse and
remand in order to ensure all due process was afforded to Father and he be given a
meaningful chance to be heard. Id.
The case at hand is different from T.T. Here, Mother requested that
she be allowed to represent herself and the court allowed such; however, Mother’s
counsel was not dismissed. Counsel remained at Mother’s table and assisted
Mother in the case. Mother’s counsel questioned some witnesses, helped introduce
exhibits, and generally conferred with Mother. Mother also had witnesses and
evidence to present. This is in stark contrast to counsel in T.T. being dismissed,
Father fully acting pro se, and Father presenting no witness testimony.
Additionally, we also note that Mother did not ask for a continuance to find new
counsel and did not request new counsel be appointed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find no error and affirm. Mother was
assisted by counsel during her hearing and Mother presented evidence to the court;
-6- therefore, we believe she had a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and her due
process rights were not violated.4
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