MA

15 I. & N. Dec. 70
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1974
DocketID 2314
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 15 I. & N. Dec. 70 (MA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MA, 15 I. & N. Dec. 70 (bia 1974).

Opinion

Interim Decision #2314

MATTER OF MA

In Visa Petition Proceedings A-19855000

Decided by Board August 13, 1974 Petitioner sought classification for the beneficiary as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident, under section 203(0(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In order to so qualify beneficiary must show that he is unmarried. However, beneficiary who was in Korea had married another Korean, who resided in Argentina by proxy, and this marriage was reported in the family register on June 25, 1968. One argument was that this marriage was not valid, however, the district director found it valid. Ben- eficiary attempted to divorce his wife by singing a Statement of Divorce at the Korean Consulate in Honolulu, Hawaii, which was transmitted by the Korean Consul General to the Family Registration Office in Seoul, Korea, where it was recorded on September 4, 1971 in the beneficiary's family register. This divorce will not be recognized for immi- gration purposes because neither party was personally present in Korea at the time the divorce was sought, nor did it appear that either party was domiciled in Korea at that time, or at ary time during their married life Thus, since the divorce is not valid for immigration purposes, beneficiary cannot qualify as the unmarried son of a lawful permanent resident, and he is not eligible for second preference classification. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Elmer E. Poston, Esquire 770 Kapidani Boulevard Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

The alien beneficiary is a native and citizen of the Republic of Korea. His family register has been submitted in support of the petitioner's application. The family register indicates that the beneficiary is the son of the petitioner, that he was married to Kum Son Pak, and that the marriage was reported on June 25, 1968. Counsel for the petitioner asserts in his brief that, despite the entry in the family register, the beneficiary was not actually married, because the customary ceremony did not take place before the entry was made. In fact, he says it was a proxy marriage, since at the time of the marriage the beneficiary's "wife" was in Argentina, where she had been living since :.965. The customary Korean ceremony was held in Argen- tina on February 3, 1970. Counsel asserts that because this marriage was not performed or recorded in accordance with Argentine law, and because it was not subsequently reported in Korea, the marriage was 70 Interim Decision #2314 invalid. The District Director concluded that the marriage was indeed valid because it was reported in the family register on June 25, 1968. The validity of a marriage, for immigration purposes, is governed by the law of the place of celebration, Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934); Matter of Levine, 13 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of P—, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610 (A.G. 1952). We have received a memoran- dum from the Far Eastern Law Division of the Law Library of the Library of Congress entitled Valid Marriage under 'the Law of the Republic of Korea. See Appendix A. We do not see anything in the Korean law which directs that a ceremony other than the witnessed signing of the marriage agreement precede notification of the Family Registrar. Subsequent notification is all that is required for the agree- ment to take effect. Whether or not this was a proxy marriage is irrelevant to the issues in this case. We find that the marriage was valid according to Korean law. Therefore, for the beneficiary to be eligible for the benefit which the petitioner seeks on his behalf, the beneficiary's divorce from Kum Son Pak must also be valid. CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THE BENEFICIARY'S DIVORCE Li eases where a marriage follows a divorce, we look at the prior divorce in light of the law of the state of celebration of the subsequent marriage for the purpose of determining whether or not that state will recognize the validity of the divorce, Loughran v. Loughran, supra; Matter of Levine, supra; Matter of 13—, supra. In this case, however, there is no subsequent marriage. Consequently we must decide whether or not the divorce in question should be recognized on the basis of comity without any one state's law as a reference point. Certainly, the law of the state granting the divorce must be complied with, regardless of any additional requirements we may impose; for if the divorce is invalid there, it is invalid everywhere. According to the brief of counsel for the petitioner, Kum Son Pak, whose immigration status is not in the record, and the beneficiary, who was in the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor, went to the Korean' Consulate in Honolulu, Hawaii on July 6," 1971. There, they and two witnesses signed a Statement of Divorce. This document was transmit- ted by the Consul General to the Census (or Family) Registration Office in Seoul, Korea, where it was received and evidently recorded on September 4, 1971 in the beneficiary's family register. We have consulted another memorandum Prepared by the Far East- ern Law Division of the Law Library of the Library of Congress, this one entitled Divorce by Mutual Consent Between Korean Citizens Abroad. See Appendix B. As is pointed out in this memorandum, the cited law is silent on the question of its applicability to a divorce by mutual consent when both parties, Korean nationals, are abroad. How- 71 Interim Decision #2314

ever, the Family Registration Practice Manual of 1970, which was compiled by three government officials in charge of family registration affairs in the Court Administration Office, indicates that Article 814 of the Civil Cc de and Article 39 of the Family Registration Law "are construed to be applicable to a divorce by mutual consent between Korean citizens residing in a foreign country . . ." (Appendix B, infra at _ ) Thus it seems to us that, according to Korean law and practice, this divorce would be recognized as valid in the -Republic of Korea, where it became effective when registered on September 4, 1971. Having eztablished that the divorce was valid where obtained, we nevertheless find that it is invalid in the United States for purposes of the immigration law. Neither party to this divorce was physically present in Korea at the time the divorce was sought. Nor does it appear that either was domiciled there at that time or at any time during their married life. Kum Son Pak had not lived in Korea for six years, and her family was in Argentina. The beneficiary had not, been in Korea since, 1970. The present visa petition, filed in his behalf shortly after the divorce became final, evidences his intent to live in the United States. In the few American cases in which state courts have recognized foreign divorces obtained by absentee nondomiciliaries of the divorcing jurisdiction, Oettgen v. Oettgen, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 168, 196 Misc. 937 (1949); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 46 N.Y.S. 270 (1943 Sup.); Hansen v. Hansen, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 655, 255 App. Div. 1016 (1938), certain other important contacts with the divorcing jurisdiction were established. They are: (1) the parties were married in the jurisdiction where, they were sub- sequently divorced; (2) they lived in that jurisdiction as husband and wife for a period of time; (3) although they were not personally before the divorcing court .or even within the jurisdiction at the time of the divorce, both parties had notice of the action and either appeared by counsel or consented to personal jurisdiction; and (4) in the Hansen and Oettgen cases, and doubtless in Gonzalez as well, both parties to the divorce were citizens of the country granting the divorce. In the present case, both parties to the, divorce were citizens of Korea. They both participated in and consented to the divorce. We have found that they were married in Korea.

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