M. Tovar v. WCAB (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd.)

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMay 1, 2018
Docket1441 and 1469 C.D. 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of M. Tovar v. WCAB (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd.) (M. Tovar v. WCAB (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M. Tovar v. WCAB (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd.), (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Martha Tovar, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 1441 C.D. 2017 : Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital : Asset Research Ltd.), : Respondent :

Oasis Outsourcing/Capital : Asset Research LTD, : Petitioner : : v. : No. 1469 C.D. 2017 : Submitted: March 16, 2018 Workers’ Compensation Appeal : Board (Tovar), : Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: May 1, 2018

In these consolidated appeals, Martha Tovar (Claimant) petitions for review from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the decision of a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ). The WCJ granted the claim petition filed by Claimant. The WCJ also awarded attorney fees in Claimant’s favor and against Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd. (collectively, Employer) for unreasonable contest. Claimant’s sole reason for seeking review of the Board’s order is to request the lifting of the supersedeas imposed by the Board during the pendency of Employer’s appeal to the Board.

Employer cross-petitions for review of the Board’s order. Employer contends the WCJ improperly closed the record without waiting for Employer’s medical evidence. Employer also argues the WCJ should have consolidated the claim petition with Employer’s later-filed termination petition, which would have allowed Employer another opportunity to submit medical evidence. Employer further asserts the WCJ’s finding of an unreasonable contest was erroneous because it arose from the absence of Employer’s improperly-excluded medical evidence.

Upon review, we affirm the Board’s order. We dismiss Claimant’s petition for review as moot.

I. Background In December 2014, Claimant sustained a work injury. Employer accepted the injury, described as “head and both knees contusion and strain,” through a medical-only Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable, which subsequently converted to a Notice of Compensation Payable. Bd. Op., 9/19/17, at 1. In August 2015, Claimant filed a claim petition, alleging her work injury caused a disability beginning in July 2015. Id.

Claimant testified at a hearing in September 2015. At that time, neither party had yet obtained a medical examination of Claimant. WCJ’s Hr’g, Notes of Testimony, 9/11/15 (N.T.), at 5-6. The WCJ gave Employer 45 days and Claimant

2 90 days to schedule their medical examinations. Id. The certified record contains no other scheduling information or orders.

Claimant subsequently obtained a deposition of her medical expert, Barry A. Ruht, M.D., dated March 14, 2016. Certified Record (C.R.), Item #13. Claimant submitted Dr. Ruht’s deposition into the record on April 1, 2016. Bd. Op. at 2.

The certified record contains no medical or other evidence from Employer.

In November 2016, the WCJ issued a decision granting the claim petition. The WCJ observed that Employer submitted no evidence and filed no brief in relation to the claim petition. WCJ’s Op., 11/18/16, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 6. The WCJ concluded:

It is noted that [Employer] presented no evidence and called no witnesses in this matter. It is further noted that the injury was previously acknowledged by [Employer] in the form of a medical only Temporary Notice of Compensation Payable. Accordingly, there is no dispute that the injury happened and there appears to be no dispute as to the disability of [Claimant]. Accordingly, it is found as fact and concluded as a matter of law that [Employer] had no reasonable basis for the contest of this matter.

WCJ’s Op., Conclusion of Law (C.L.) No. 7. Based on his findings and conclusions, the WCJ granted Claimant’s request for an award of unreasonable contest attorney fees. C.L. Nos. 8-9.

3 Employer appealed the WCJ’s decision to the Board. In its online appeal, Employer contended it obtained a medical examination of Claimant in January 2016. C.R., Item #6. However, Employer did not assert that it submitted any medical evidence in the claim petition proceeding. Rather, Employer stated it “subsequently” filed a termination petition and requested consolidation with the claim petition, which request the WCJ denied. Id. at 2. Employer asserted, as the sole basis for its appeal to the Board, that the WCJ erred in refusing to consolidate the two petitions, thereby preventing Employer from submitting medical evidence in opposition to the claim petition. Id.

In January 2017, the Board granted Employer’s petition for supersedeas in relation to payment of the award of attorney fees, pending an oral argument on the issue. After holding oral argument, the Board issued a second order in June 2017 keeping the supersedeas in place.1

1 Claimant included a copy of the January 2017 supersedeas order in her reproduced record on appeal. However, the order is not part of the certified record. We will not consider it based solely on its insertion in the reproduced record. McElroy v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ryder Dedicated Logistics) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2034 C.D. 2006, filed Jan. 31, 2008), 2009 WL 9401380 (unreported) (documents included in the reproduced record, but not contained in the certified record, could not be considered). However, the June 2017 supersedeas order refers to the January 2017 order. Accordingly, we may acknowledge the issuance of the January 2017 order, provided the June 2017 order is part of the record. The June 2017 order likewise is not in the certified record, but both parties attached it to their docketing statements filed in this Court in relation to their cross-petitions for review. Thus, they apparently agree the order is part of the record. Consequently, this Court will treat it as such for purposes of this appeal. See Pa. R.A.P. 1951(b) (parties may supplement the record by stipulation); Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. 2003) (treating material in the reproduced record as part of the certified record, on agreement of the parties); In re Luongo, 823 A.2d 942 (Pa. Super. 2003) (recognizing the raising of an issue not documented in the certified record, where the parties agreed and other facts of record indicated the issue was raised). We therefore acknowledge the issuance of the January 2017 order as well.

4 In September 2017, the Board issued an opinion and order affirming the WCJ’s decision. In its opinion, the Board observed that pursuant to 34 Pa. Code §131.63, Employer’s medical evidence was due within 90 days after Claimant submitted her medical evidence in April 2016. Bd. Op. at 2. However, by the time the WCJ issued his decision in November 2016, Employer still had not deposed its medical expert, despite having obtained an independent medical examination by that expert in January 2016. Id. at 3. The Board therefore concluded the WCJ acted within his discretion in closing the record. Id.

The Board also observed that Employer did not file its termination petition until almost a year after the filing of the claim petition. Id. at 3. Moreover, Employer did not file the termination petition until after the deadline passed for Employer’s submission of medical evidence in opposition to the claim petition. Id. at 3, 4 n.1. Further, the Board observed that the two petitions involved different issues concerning Claimant’s work injury. Id. at 4. Therefore, the Board concluded the WCJ acted within his discretion in refusing to consolidate the claim and termination petitions. Id. Accordingly, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.

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M. Tovar v. WCAB (Oasis Outsourcing/Capital Asset Research Ltd.), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/m-tovar-v-wcab-oasis-outsourcingcapital-asset-research-ltd-pacommwct-2018.