M S v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 5, 2024
• Docket: 24A-JV-00715
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED M.S., Dec 05 2024, 8:58 am

Appellant-Respondent, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner

December 5, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-JV-715 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Stephen R. Creason, Judge The Honorable Pauline A. Beeson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D16-2312-JD-10924

Opinion by Chief Judge Altice Judge Vaidik and Senior Judge Crone concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JV-715 | December 5, 2024 Page 1 of 5 Altice, Chief Judge.

Case Summary [1] M.S. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for dangerous possession of

a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor. Specifically, M.S. claims that the

adjudication must be set aside because the State failed to prove an alleged

element of the offense, i.e., that he was in possession of the firearm without his

parent’s permission.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 19, 2023, Fishers Police Department Detective Joseph Ryder

was monitoring seventeen-year-old M.S.’s Instagram account and conducting

surveillance outside of M.S.’s Indianapolis residence. Detective Ryder

suspected that M.S. may have been involved in a shooting and marijuana sales.

At some point, M.S. started posting a live video on Instagram, where Detective

Ryder observed M.S. holding a pistol magazine in a bedroom at the house he

was surveilling. M.S. spoke on the video about going to someone’s house with

a “button,” which Detective Ryder knew is a term for a machine gun

conversion device.

[4] Detective Ryder obtained a search warrant for the residence to search for

firearms. When Detective Ryder and other officers arrived to execute the

warrant, M.S. answered the door and was detained while the search was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JV-715 | December 5, 2024 Page 2 of 5 conducted. The officers seized a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson handgun under

a mattress in M.S.’s room, an empty magazine, a bag of raw marijuana, and

some THC brownie mix. M.S. admitted to police officers that he had

purchased the .40-caliber pistol from someone a week earlier for $200.

[5] On December 21, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging that M.S. was a

delinquent child for possessing a firearm and marijuana. At the conclusion of

the State’s case during the adjudication hearing on February 28, 2024, M.S.’s

counsel moved to dismiss the firearm charge because the State failed to prove

that M.S. possessed the gun “without the permission of a parent or guardian,”

pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-47-10-1. Transcript at 58. The juvenile court denied

the motion, determining that the “without permission language” in I.C. § 35-

47-10-1 is an affirmative defense to the charged offense and was not an element

that the State was obligated to prove. The juvenile court then adjudicated M.S.

a delinquent child for dangerously possessing a firearm. The State dismissed

the marijuana charge, and the juvenile court placed M.S. on probation and

ordered him to complete a course on gun violence prevention.

[6] M.S. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [7] We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Tyms-Bey v. State, 69

N.E.3d 488, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. When interpreting a

statute, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words therein, presume

that the legislature “intended for the statutory language to be applied in a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JV-715 | December 5, 2024 Page 3 of 5 logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals,” and

avoid interpretations that lead to “irrational and disharmonizing results.” Spells

v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. 2024) (citations omitted). The ultimate goal

is to “determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id.

[8] I.C. § 35-47-10-5, the statute under which M.S. was adjudicated delinquent,

provides that “a child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a

firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this

chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor.”

I.C. § 35-47-10-1 of this chapter enumerates exemptions from culpability. More

particularly—and relevant here—are I.C. § 35-47-10-1(b)(7)(A) and (B), which

provide that “this chapter does not apply to . . . a child who is (A) at the child’s

residence; and (B) has the permission of the child’s parent, an adult family

member of the child, or the child’s legal guardian to possess a firearm.”

[9] Here, M.S. argues that the State failed to disprove that he fell within one of the

exemptions or exceptions to I.C. § 35-47-10-5. Notwithstanding M.S.’s

contention, our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in A.W. v. State, 229

N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2024), explaining that “the statutory language—‘for any

purpose other than a [lawful] purpose’ set forth in I.C. § 35-47-10-5, —is not an

essential element the State was required to prove, but rather an affirmative

defense[.]” Id. at 1072 n.15 (citing Washington v. State, 517 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.

1987), where it was explained that possession of a valid license to carry a

firearm is an affirmative defense and the burden is on the defendant to prove

that he possessed a valid license) (emphasis in original). In other words, when a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JV-715 | December 5, 2024 Page 4 of 5 statute exempts a defendant from liability, it is the defendant’s burden to

initially prove that the exemption or exception applies. See, e.g., Page v. State,

173 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (observing that the existence of a

valid prescription is a defense to possession of a narcotic drug rather than an

element of the crime, and the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing

this defense).

[10] Here, to the extent that M.S. asserts on appeal that he had a parent’s permission

to possess the firearm, he presented no evidence at the adjudication hearing

proving that exemption. And M.S. makes no other sufficiency challenges to the

adjudication. For these reasons, we affirm M.S.’s adjudication.

[11] Judgment affirmed.

Vaidik, J. and Crone, Sr.J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Deborah B. Markisohn Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General

Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JV-715 | December 5, 2024 Page 5 of 5