M. M. v. B. J.

347 Or. App. 336

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: A185596
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

336 February 19, 2026 No. 122

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

M. M., Petitioner-Respondent, v. B. J., Respondent-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 24PO05789; A185596

Francis G. Troy II, Judge. Argued and submitted November 17, 2025. Laura Graser argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Diane D. Nguyen argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Nic Arete and Legal Aid Services of Oregon. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. ORTEGA, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 336 (2026) 337

ORTEGA, P. J. In this appeal of a Family Abuse Protection Act (FAPA) restraining order, respondent advances two discrete legal theories in contending that the trial court’s continu- ance of the order was erroneous as a matter of law. First, he argues that the heightened standard articulated in State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999), for speech-based contacts applies and that the evidence is legally insuffi- cient under Rangel to continue the FAPA order under ORS 107.716(3)(a). Second, and alternatively, respondent posits that, even if Rangel is inapplicable, the evidence is legally insufficient for the trial court to find the elements necessary to continue the FAPA order. Respondent’s arguments under Rangel are unpreserved, and we do not consider them; on the merits, the trial court properly found each of the ele- ments necessary to continue the FAPA order. Therefore, we affirm. As respondent’s counsel conceded at oral argu- ment, his Rangel arguments were not preserved below, so we proceed to his arguments on the merits, which are not well-taken. Oregon’s FAPA statute permits the trial court to continue a petitioner’s restraining order after a contested hearing if the court finds that three elements have been met by a preponderance of the evidence: (A) the respondent com- mitted at least one incident of “abuse,” as defined by ORS 107.705(1), within 180 days prior to filing the petition; (B) “[t]he petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s physi- cal safety”; and (C) “[t]he respondent represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the petitioner or the petition- er’s child.” ORS 107.716(3)(a) (FAPA continuation elements); ORS 107.710(1) (specifying 180-day time limitation). Respondent challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings of each of the three elements required under ORS 107.716(3)(a). Respondent does not request, nor does this case warrant, de novo review. ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (court exercises discretion to conduct de novo review only in exceptional cases). Therefore, we review the trial court’s conclusions supporting a FAPA 338 M. M. v. B. J.

order for legal error and are bound by the trial court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by any evidence in the record. J. V.-B. v. Burns, 284 Or App 366, 367, 392 P3d 386 (2017). A detailed recitation of the facts is not necessary to this memorandum disposition, which includes only that con- text required to understand our ruling, which involved an incident between the parties at a daycare drop-off for their joint child that alarmed bystanders. Despite acknowledging the correct standard of review, respondent provides an argument that requires reweighing the evidence while blaming the victim for any consequences for his behavior. He sets out the evidence as he believes it should be interpreted and argues that his “expla- nation for why he was [at the daycare on the relevant day] makes more sense and does not require a different view of the facts.” He mischaracterizes and provides his own analysis of the relevance of the bystanders’ behavior, and then sug- gests that petitioner’s fear was based merely on a recent rev- elation about the abusive history she had with respondent, implying that the reality of that abuse is irrelevant. He also downplays that abuse by blaming petitioner for seeking out the relationship when she was 15 years old, which is irrele- vant to the issue of whether respondent abused petitioner on the date in question. Respondent’s arguments fail under applicable law and in light of our standard of review; indeed, we question whether the arguments are made in good faith. Suffice it to say that the predicate incident is enough, on its own, to meet the elements required under the FAPA statute. That con- clusion is bolstered by the parties’ history under the total- ity of the circumstances. Based on petitioner’s testimony, bystanders’ testimony, and other evidence in the record regarding the daycare incident, the trial court found facts sufficient to support its conclusion that all elements of the FAPA restraining order had been met by a preponderance of the evidence, including that the incident rose to the level of abuse as defined in ORS 107.705(1), that petitioner rea- sonably feared for her physical safety, and that respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner. The trial court Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 336 (2026) 339

explicitly credited petitioner’s testimony as supported by the testimony of the two bystander witnesses and implicitly rejected respondent’s testimony contradicting petitioner’s view of events as less credible than petitioner’s account. The trial court’s findings were well supported by evidence and the applicable law. Affirmed.