M., individually and as parent to D.M. v. Jara
This text of M., individually and as parent to D.M. v. Jara (M., individually and as parent to D.M. v. Jara) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6
7 * * * 8 9 C.M., individually and as parent to D.M., et al., Case No. 2:20-1562-JCM-DJA
10 Plaintiffs, ORDER
11 v.
12 JESUS JARA, et al.,
13 Defendants.
14 15 Presently before the court is plaintiffs C.M., individually and as parent to D.M., et al.’s 16 emergency ex parte motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 6). 17 I. Background 18 This matter arises from changes made by the Clark County School District (“CCSD”) in 19 light of the COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF No. 2). After several board meetings and hearings, 20 CCSD opted to reopen public schools only “in a digital format.” (Id.). As of August 24, 2020, 21 students and teachers have not been allowed to return to school for in-person learning. 22 Plaintiffs filed their instant suit on August 21, 2020. (ECF No. 1). Their amended class 23 action complaint brings fourteen causes of action—including for violations of Section 504 of the 24 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 25 1400, 1414, and Nevada Open Meeting Laws, N.R.S. 241—against defendants CCSD 26 superintendent Jesus Jara, CCSD region superintendent Dustin Mancl, CCSD, and an assortment 27 of fictitious individuals and entities. (ECF No. 2). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that CCSD has 1 made its decisions without appropriate public comments and procedures as required by state law. 2 (Id.). Plaintiffs in this action are “the parents and guardians of special needs and general 3 education students.” (ECF No. 6). 4 Plaintiffs now move for a temporary restraining order that broadly 1) “enjoin[s] Clark 5 County School District’s ongoing violation of the IDEA Act and Section 504 of the 6 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, namely, the ‘stay-put’ provision of the IDEA Act, with a preliminary 7 injunction unwinding all modifications to special need student’s individualized education plans”; 8 2) “unwind[s] and enjoin[s] compliance or enforcement of any and all policies, procedures, or 9 rules, regulations, or any requirement issued, enacted, implemented or adopted by CCSD in the 10 series of unlawful meetings held by CCSD since April 1, 2020”; 3) “requir[es] Defendants to 11 return CCSD to the state of affairs predating the Pandemic and unlawful meetings”; and 4) 12 “requir[es] CCSD to preserve all personal and public communications including text messages, 13 instant messages, emails, and any other communications on public and personal cell phones, 14 computers, networks and digital platforms, including but not limited to accounting and budgetary 15 data, reasonably related to this matter, to ensure no evidence is spoiled, destroyed or altered in 16 this matter.” (ECF No. 6). 17 II. Legal Standard 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may issue a temporary restraining 19 order (“TRO”) when the movant alleges “specific facts in an affidavit” that immediate and 20 irreparable harm will occur before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 65(b)(1)(A). TROs and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies meant to “preserve 22 the status quo” and “prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment.” Estes v. Gaston, No. 23 2:12-cv-1853-JCM-VCF, 2012 WL 5839490, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2012); see also Sierra On- 24 Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). The standard for 25 granting a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard for granting a preliminary injunction. 26 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 The court considers the following elements in determining whether to grant preliminary 1 preliminary relief is not granted; (3) balance of hardships; and (4) advancement of the public 2 interest. Winter v. N.R.D.C., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stanley v. Univ. of S. California, 13 F.3d 3 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994). 4 The movant must satisfy all four elements; however, “a stronger showing of one element 5 may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 6 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). This “sliding scale” approach dictates that when the balance of 7 hardships weighs heavily in the movant’s favor, he needs only to demonstrate “serious questions 8 going to the merits.” Id. at 1135. 9 III. Discussion 10 This court denies plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order, (ECF No. 6), but 11 sets a briefing schedule and hearing for plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 12 8). 13 At this juncture, plaintiffs’ ex parte briefing on irreparable harm and a balance of 14 hardships fails to persuade this court that a TRO is appropriate. (ECF No. 6). Any prospective 15 decisions made by CCSD on this matter can be unwound and enjoined as appropriate after this 16 issue is fully briefed. Furthermore, any injuries to the development of plaintiff students with 17 disabilities has been ongoing since the beginning of this semester. This court does not find that 18 an immediate injunction is appropriate without further briefing. This is particularly the case 19 where plaintiffs’ requests would place an immense hardship on defendants—especially their 20 request for the total unwinding of “all policies, procedures, or rules, regulations, or any 21 requirement issued, enacted, implemented or adopted by CCSD in the series of unlawful 22 meetings held by CCSD since April 1, 2020.” (Id.). Finally, this court denies plaintiffs’ request 23 to order defendants to not destroy documents. (Id.). This amounts to an order to “follow the 24 law,” where defendants are already obligated to preserve information and documents pertinent to 25 this litigation. 26 Thus, plaintiffs’ motion for TRO is denied. However, recognizing the potential merit of 27 plaintiffs’ position, this court sets a briefing schedule and hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for 1 A preliminary injunction hearing is hereby set for November 20, 2020 at 11:30 am. 2|| Defendants may respond to plaintiffs request for preliminary injunction by November 16, 2020, || and plaintiffs may thereafter reply by November 19, 2020. 4|| IV. Conclusion 5 Accordingly, 6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the plaintiffs’ motion for 7 || temporary restraining order (ECF No. 6) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall appear in-person for a preliminary Q || injunction hearing (ECF No. 8) on November 20, 2020, at 11:30am, in courtroom 6A. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants shall file any response to plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 8) on or before November 16, 2020, at 5:00 pm. Any reply shall be filed on or before November 18, 2020, at 5:00 pm. 13 DATED THIS 10" day of November 2020. " iius ¢. Malian 15 JAMES C. MAHAN. 16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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