M. Dinger & Dinger Investments Three LLC v. Borough of Whitehall ZHB, & Borough of Whitehall

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 8, 2025
Docket110 C.D. 2025
StatusUnpublished

This text of M. Dinger & Dinger Investments Three LLC v. Borough of Whitehall ZHB, & Borough of Whitehall (M. Dinger & Dinger Investments Three LLC v. Borough of Whitehall ZHB, & Borough of Whitehall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M. Dinger & Dinger Investments Three LLC v. Borough of Whitehall ZHB, & Borough of Whitehall, (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael Dinger and Dinger : Investments Three LLC, : Appellants : : v. : No. 110 C.D. 2025 : Argued: November 6, 2025 Borough of Whitehall Zoning : Hearing Board, and Borough of : Whitehall :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: December 8, 2025

Michael Dinger and Dinger Investments Three LLC (together, Dinger), appeal the December 27, 2024 Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), which affirmed and dismissed Dinger’s appeal of the April 16, 2024 Decision of the Borough of Whitehall Zoning Hearing Board (Board). In the Decision, the Board affirmed the Borough of Whitehall’s (Borough) denial of Dinger’s request for a permit to install a “Limited Amusement Arcade” as an accessory use to a laundromat owned and operated by Dinger under Chapter 180 of the Code of the Borough (Zoning Ordinance).1 Dinger argues the trial court and

1 BOROUGH OF WHITEHALL, ALLEGHENY CNTY., PA., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 180.1- 180.146.2 (2025). The Zoning Ordinance defines Limited Amusement Arcade as “[a]n accessory (Footnote continued on next page…) Board erred because Dinger’s request satisfied Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 of the Zoning Ordinance, which provides that a Limited Amusement Arcade may be permitted as an accessory use where it does not occupy more than 25% of the gross square footage of the primary use. After review, the Court affirms the trial court’s Order because the Board did not err in concluding that a Limited Amusement Arcade is not permitted as an accessory use to a laundromat under the Zoning Ordinance.

I. BACKGROUND Dinger owns and operates a laundromat on a leased property in the C-3 Commercial District of the Borough. On January 17, 2024, Dinger submitted a Zoning Permit Application to the Borough seeking to install a Limited Amusement Arcade in the laundromat as an accessory use pursuant to Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 of the Zoning Ordinance. The Borough denied the Application, reasoning “Limited Amusement Arcades are not permitted in [l]aundromats” under the Zoning

use to an establishment where three (3) or less Amusement Devices are installed and are incidental to the principal use of the establishment.” Id. § 180.4.2 (capitalization removed). An Amusement Device is defined as follows:

Any mechanical, electrical, or electromechanical device, machine or apparatus whatsoever for the playing of games of skill and amusement, which devices or apparatus are commonly known as “pinball machines[,”] “claw machines,” “video games[,”] and “arcade games[,”] or upon which games are played, after the insertion therein of a coin or other disc, slug, or token or for which fees are paid to an attendant. The term does not include casino-style or other games of chance in which the outcome[] is determined by factors unpredictable by the player or games in which the player may not control the outcome of the game through skill. This definition is not intended to and does not include merchandise vending machines or coin-operated mechanical or electrical musical devices commonly know[n] as “jukeboxes.”

Id.

2 Ordinance. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 23a (italics removed).) Dinger appealed the denial to the Board, which held a hearing on March 19, 2024. On April 16, 2024, the Board affirmed the Borough. The Board reasoned that Section 180.81.4.1 of the Zoning Ordinance unambiguously restricts Limited Amusement Arcades as an accessory use to five of the ten primary uses permitted in the C-3 Commercial District. Because a laundromat is not one of the five listed primary uses in Section 180.81.4.1, the Board concluded that Limited Amusement Arcades may not be installed in laundromats as an accessory use. The Board further concluded that Dinger’s reliance on Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 of the Zoning Ordinance was misplaced because, contrary to Dinger’s interpretation, that provision does not expand the primary uses to which Limited Amusement Arcades may be accessory. Rather, the Board explained, Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 “is merely one of seven [] specific requirements applicable to Limited Amusement Arcades in all of the principal uses expressly permitted by [Section 180.81.4.1 of the] Zoning Ordinance” and “merely limits the size of the Limited Amusement Arcade to ensure that it is supplemental to the permitted primary use.” (Decision ¶¶ 16, 18.) According to the Board, Dinger’s contrary interpretation would render Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 “mere surplusage” because “it would permit a Limited Amusement Arcade in every use permitted in the [C-3] Commercial District.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Therefore, the Board concluded the Borough properly denied the Application. Dinger timely appealed the Board’s Decision to the trial court, which affirmed the Board and dismissed Dinger’s appeal without taking additional evidence. Agreeing with the Board that the Zoning Ordinance is not ambiguous, the trial court opined that Limited Amusement Arcades are only permitted as an accessory use to the five primary uses listed in Section 180.81.4.1. The trial court also agreed with

3 the Board that Section 180.81.4.2.1.1 of the Zoning Ordinance “merely limits the size of the Limited Amusement Arcade to ensure that it is supplemental to the permitted primary use and does not expand the principal uses in which Limited Amusement Arcades may be placed” and Dinger’s interpretation would render the provision “mere surplusage.” (Trial Court’s Opinion at 5-6.) The trial court thus explained that “[i]t is not relevant that the laundromat’s proposed floor plan would comply with the spacing requirements or that the Amusement Devices would be supplemental to the primary use” because “[a] principal use’s inclusion into that category of five is a prerequisite to then be subject to the seven specific regulations in [Section] 180.81.4.2.” (Id. at 6-7.) Because a laundromat is not one of the five primary uses listed in Section 180.81.4.1 of the Zoning Ordinance, the trial court concluded that the Board did not err in affirming the denial of Dinger’s Application. Dinger now appeals the trial court’s Order to this Court.2

II. DISCUSSION The overarching issue presented to the Court is whether a Limited Amusement Arcade is a permitted accessory use to a laundromat under the Zoning Ordinance. To address this issue, the Court must interpret the Zoning Ordinance, which is “a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”3 Weiler v. Stroud Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 300 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa.

2 “Where, as here, the trial court did not take any additional evidence, appellate review of the decision of a zoning hearing board is limited to determining whether the board abused its discretion or committed legal error.” Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Exeter Twp., 962 A.2d 653, 659 (Pa. 2009). 3 The Court remains “bound by the facts as found by the Board that are supported by substantial evidence,” which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 207 A.3d 886, 898-99 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).

4 Cmwlth. 2023). Nonetheless, “a zoning board’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance is to be given great weight as representing the construction of a statute by the agency charged with its execution and application.” Plum Borough v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Borough of Plum, 310 A.3d 815, 823 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citation omitted).

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Related

Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Board
962 A.2d 653 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.
207 A.3d 886 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2019)

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M. Dinger & Dinger Investments Three LLC v. Borough of Whitehall ZHB, & Borough of Whitehall, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/m-dinger-dinger-investments-three-llc-v-borough-of-whitehall-zhb-pacommwct-2025.