2026 IL App (3d) 260007 Nos. 3-26-0007, 3-26-0008, 3-26-0009 (cons.)
Opinion filed February 17, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________
M.D., a Minor, by David L. Fox, Department ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Children and Family Services Guardianship ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Administrator, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) (Appeal No. 3-26-0008) ) Circuit No. 25-CH-35 MOMENCE COMMUNITY UNIFIED ) SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 and SHANNON ) ANDERSON, in His Official Capacity as ) Superintendent, ) The Honorable ) Scott N. Sliwinski, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
A.S., a Minor, by David L. Fox, Department ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Children and Family Services Guardianship ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Administrator, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) (Appeal No. 3-26-0009) ) Circuit No. 25-CH-37 MOMENCE COMMUNITY UNIFIED ) SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 and SHANNON ) ANDERSON, in His Official Capacity of ) Superintendent, ) The Honorable ) Scott N. Sliwinski, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________ M.W., a Minor, by David L. Fox, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Department of Children and Family Services ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, Guardianship Administrator, ) Kankakee County, Illinois. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) (Appeal No. 3-26-0007) ) Circuit No. 25-CH-55 MOMENCE COMMUNITY UNIFIED ) SCHOOL DISTRICT 1 and SHANNON ) ANDERSON, in His Official Capacity of ) Superintendent, ) The Honorable ) Scott N. Sliwinski, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Hettel and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment and opinion. __________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 The three cases in this consolidated appeal involve minors ranging in age from 13 to 15
who are residing in a nonprofit shelter in Momence, Illinois, while in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The minors’ repeated attempts to enroll in
public schools within Momence Community Unified School District 1 were denied. Consequently,
the minors filed separate complaints seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory
damage, and immediate enrollment in the Momence public schools. They also filed emergency
motions seeking temporary restraining orders (TROs) and preliminary injunctions. After a hearing,
the trial court denied the minors’ requests for TROs and preliminary injunctions. The minors then
sought interlocutory appeals from those denials, which we consolidated for decision. We now
reverse the trial court’s orders in each case and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
2 ¶3 The three plaintiffs, M.W., M.D., and A.S., were minors in the legal custody of DCFS who
were housed in a nonprofit shelter located in Momence, Illinois, called Aunt Bobbie’s (the shelter).
M.W., age 14, was placed in the shelter on October 24, 2025; M.D., age 15, had been at the shelter
since July 15, 2025; A.S., age 13, had resided at the shelter since July 5, 2025.
¶4 On July 21, 2025, DCFS’s education adviser for Will and Kankakee Counties notified
defendants Momence Community Unified School District 1 and its superintendent, Shannon
Anderson, (together, the District) that it intended to offer online learning only for shelter residents
with safety concerns and that the shelter was not yet set up for online school. In the same e-mail,
DCFS’s education adviser informed the District that online learning would be unavailable for some
new DCFS shelter residents, and she would be enrolling those students in the District’s public
schools. The District responded the same day, restating its prior objection in a letter dated February
5, 2025, to providing minor residents of the shelter with in-person education.
¶5 DCFS had determined that enrollment in District schools was in the minor students’ best
interests. After two of the minors in this appeal sent a letter demanding immediate enrollment in
District schools, the District’s counsel replied on August 26, 2025, expressly stating that the
District would not enroll those residents, or any other temporary residents at the shelter, in its
schools.
¶6 All subsequent attempts to enroll the three minor plaintiffs in District schools were also
rebuffed, with the District repeatedly restating its refusal to enroll any minor residing in the shelter.
Through counsel, the three minor plaintiffs filed complaints against the District on November 1,
2025, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and immediate enrollment
in District schools. That same day, the minors filed separate emergency motions for TROs and
preliminary injunctions mandating their immediate enrollment.
3 ¶7 After a December 22, 2025, hearing, the trial court denied each of the emergency motions
on January 2, 2026. The minors filed separate interlocutory appeals as of right pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), and we consolidate those appeals for decision.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, the minors contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions because
they established the essential elements for issuance of a TRO. In support, they raise three
arguments, asserting that the trial court erroneously found that (1) the denial of enrollment
maintained the status quo, (2) they had not raised a fair question regarding imposition of
irreparable harm if they were denied enrollment in public school, and (3) no showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits could be made in the absence of a best interest determination.
This court reviews the denial of a TRO for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. McHenry County
Sheriff v. McHenry County Department of Health, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 22. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court failed to use conscientious judgment or when, “considering
all the circumstances, the court acted unreasonably and ignored recognized principles of law,
which resulted in substantial prejudice.” People v. Couch, 387 Ill. App. 3d 437, 444 (2008). In
reviewing whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we may also consider the relevant
substantive issues. McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 33.
¶ 10 Issuance of a temporary restraining order is intended to preserve the status quo pending a
determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. County of Boone v. Plote
Construction, Inc., 2017 IL App (2d) 160184, ¶ 28. The elements of proof to establish a TRO and
a preliminary injunction are the same. Id. The status quo is typically defined as “ ‘the last actual,
peaceable, uncontested status which [preceded] the pending controversy.’ ” Steel City Bank v.
Village of Orland Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d 412, 417 (1991) (quoting Martin v. Eggert, 174 Ill. App.
4 3d 71, 77 (1988)). Usually, that means the court should “keep[ ] everything at rest. Sometimes, the
condition of rest is exactly what will inflict the irreparable injury,” however, justifying the issuance
of a temporary mandatory injunction. Brooks v. La Salle National Bank, 11 Ill. App. 3d 791, 799
(1973).
¶ 11 To obtain a TRO, a party must show (1) a clearly ascertained right requiring protection,
(2) irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, (3) no adequate remedy at law, and (4) a
likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying claim. McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App
(2d) 200339, ¶ 27. “[T]he party need not make out its entire case; rather, it need only demonstrate
the existence of a fair question on the elements and persuade the trial court to preserve the status
quo until the case can be decided on the merits.” Id.
¶ 12 A. Maintaining the Status Quo
¶ 13 The minors argue that it was error for the trial court to find that maintaining the status quo
meant barring them from in-person education in the District’s public schools. In Kalbfleisch v.
Columbia Community Unit School No. 4, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1117 (2009), the court adopted
the view that, while maintaining the status quo often requires “keeping all actions at rest, ***
sometimes it happens that the status quo is not a condition of rest but, rather, is one of action and
the condition of rest is exactly what will inflict the irreparable harm.” This is such a case.
¶ 14 In Kalbfleisch, the court considered whether a preliminary injunction permitting a public
school student to attend classes with a service dog improperly altered the status quo because the
student had not previously attended school with a service animal. Id. The court affirmed the award
of injunctive relief, explaining that a preliminary injunction is intended to avoid “ ‘a threatened
wrong or the further perpetration of an injurious act,’ ” namely a violation of the student’s statutory
5 right to attend classes with a service dog. Id. at 1118 (quoting Kolstad v. Rankin, 179 Ill. App. 3d
1022, 1034 (1989)).
“To hold that the status quo was [the student] not attending school with his service dog
because the service dog never attended school last year would leave [the student] with no
avenue to prevent suffering irreparable harm—the purpose behind issuing a preliminary
injunction in the first place. E.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill. App. 3d 844, 849 (1991); Davis
[v. East St. Louis & Interurban Water Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 801, 804-05 (1971)] (‘The
prevention of this irreparable injury is the keystone to the granting of injunctive relief
***[.]’). In effect, to hold otherwise would be to hold that despite finding that [the student]
has raised a fair question regarding his legal right to attend school and take a service
animal with him under the service animal statute, the status quo was the school district
likely infringing upon [the student’s] claimed legal right. A probable violation of law
should never be the status quo. [Citation.] ‘The function of a preliminary injunction is not
merely to contain ongoing damage but to prevent prospective damage.’ [County of
Du Page v.] Gavrilos, 359 Ill. App. 3d [629, 638 (2005)].” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1118-
19.
¶ 15 Similarly, here the Education for Homeless Children Act (Act) (105 ILCS 45/1-20 (West
2024)) gives the minors the statutory right to attend public school. Section 1-20 of the Act states:
“If the parents or guardians of a homeless child or youth choose to enroll the child in a school other
than the school of origin, that school immediately shall enroll the homeless child or youth ***.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. The District’s contention that the shelter had previously asserted that
residents would not attend local schools does nothing to alter the minors’ statutory right to attend
public school as expressly granted in section 1-20.
6 ¶ 16 The students here, like the one in Kalbfleisch, met the requirement of showing that a TRO
is necessary to maintain the status quo based on their assertion that the District violated their
statutory right under the Act to attend public school. The “last peaceable uncontested status”
preceding the pending proceedings was the minors asserting their statutory rights to a public
education. See Steel City Bank, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 417 (defining the “status quo”). As in
Kalbfleisch, to hold that maintaining the status quo required upholding the District’s refusal to
enroll those students simply because they had not previously asserted the right to attend public
school in Momence would leave them with “no avenue to prevent suffering irreparable harm—the
purpose behind issuing a preliminary injunction in the first place.” Kalbfleisch, 396 Ill. App. 3d at
1118. Similar to the student in Kalbfleisch, the minors here need do nothing more than assert their
statutory rights to show that injunctive relief is needed to maintain the status quo. See id.
¶ 17 B. Irreparable Harm
¶ 18 The minors next argue that the trial court erred by finding that they had not raised a fair
question about suffering irreparable harm if the District continued to deny their enrollment in
public school. For the reasons explained in Kalbfleisch, we agree.
¶ 19 In Kalbfleisch, the court determined that the complaining student had “raised a fair question
regarding the existence of his right to take [a service dog] with him to school under the service
animal statute.” Id. at 1116. Contrary to the school district’s contention, the student did not have
to prove that the dog was a service animal; he had only to “raise a fair question regarding the
existence of his claimed right.” Id. at 1115. After reviewing the service animal statute, the court
determined that the student had successfully raised a fair question about whether the statute applied
to him. Id. It also concluded that the alleged infringement of the student’s statutory right to use the
service animal could result in deterioration of the student’s behavior, which was sufficient to
7 establish irreparable harm. Id. at 1116. The argument that the harm to the student was “self-
inflicted” because he would have been permitted to attend school without his service dog was
rejected by the appellate court. Recognizing that the student had alleged a fair question about his
statutory right to attend school with his service animal, the court stated, “The school district cannot
deny Carter access to school with his service dog and then claim that his harm is self-inflicted.”
Id.
¶ 20 Here, the school district did not bar the minors from bringing a service animal to school; it
barred the students themselves from exercising their alleged statutory right to enroll in public
school. In the absence of any showing of safety concerns occasioned by their enrollment, or some
other exceptional circumstances, the risk of irreparable harm resulting from the denial of their
public school attendance is manifest. The statute does not authorize the substitution of online or
off-site education for in-school public education. The infringement of the minors’ right to receive
a public education supports the conclusion that they will suffer irreparable harm in that they
“cannot be adequately compensated therefor in damages or *** damages cannot be measured by
any certain pecuniary standard” if they are barred from enrolling in school. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. Accordingly, we hold that the minors have raised a fair question about whether
they will suffer irreparable harm if the District continues to bar them from enrollment in public
school. That is all that is necessary to make a showing of irreparable harm sufficient to obtain
temporary injunctive relief.
¶ 21 C. Determination of Best Interests
¶ 22 Finally, the minors argue that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that they could
not show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim in the absence of a best interest
determination as required in the federal statute known as Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (20
8 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2024)). The purpose of the ESSA is “to provide all children significant
opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and high-quality education, and to close educational
achievement gaps.” Id. § 6301. Section 6311 of the ESSA states:
“(1) Descriptions
Each State plan shall describe—
***
(E) the steps a State educational agency will take to ensure
collaboration with the State agency responsible for administering the State
plans under parts B and E of title IV of the Social Security Act [(42 U.S.C.
§§ 621, 670 (2024)] to ensure the educational stability of children in foster
care, including assurances that—
(i) any such child enrolls or remains in such child’s school
of origin, unless a determination is made that it is not in such child’s
best interest to attend the school of origin, which decision shall be
based on all factors relating to the child’s best interest, including
consideration of the appropriateness of the current educational
setting and the proximity to the school in which the child is enrolled
at the time of placement;
(ii) when a determination is made that it is not in such child’s
best interest to remain in the school of origin, the child is
immediately enrolled in a new school, even if the child is unable to
produce records normally required for enrollment;
9 (iii) the enrolling school shall immediately contact the
school last attended by any such child to obtain relevant academic
and other records ***[.]” (Emphases added.) 20 U.S.C.
§ 6311(g)(1)(E)(i), (ii), (iii).
¶ 23 Subsection 6311(g)(1)(E)(ii) of the ESSA is consistent with section 1-20 of the Act, which
states: “If the parents or guardians of a homeless child or youth choose to enroll the child in a
school other than the school of origin, that school immediately shall enroll the homeless child or
youth.” (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 45/1-20 (West 2024). Moreover, section 1-10 of the Act
gives the guardian of a homeless child a choice of schools, offering “the option of either:
(1) continuing the child’s education in the school of origin for as long as the child remains
homeless ***; or (2) enrolling the child in any school that nonhomeless students who live in the
attendance area in which the child or youth is actually living are eligible to attend.” Id. § 1-10. In
this instance, the minors’ guardian, the DCFS guardianship administrator, determined that it is in
their best interests to enroll in a public school in Momence, where they resided, and, consequently,
sought to enroll them in a District school.
¶ 24 The District argues, however, that the Garden of Prayer Youth Center (GOP), which
operates the shelter where the minors reside, previously asserted that no residents would be
enrolled in District schools because their stay was often temporary. Instead, remote learning would
be offered through their school of origin or GOP. The District specifically cites statements made
by GOP during 2022 hearings on its request for a special use permit to operate the shelter as well
as a later supplemental hearing before the Kankakee County Planning, Zoning and Agriculture
Committee. During the latter hearing, a GOP official stated that many of the children in the shelter
would take advantage of Illinois’s online education option because they would reside there for less
10 than six months. The official added that “a lot of them we will keep them in the districts where
they are from since their stint with us will be so short and it will retraumatize them as a child to
put them in a whole new school, go to that school for 14 days, and then we pull them out of that
school and send them to another district when they get permanently placed.” Because those
statements did not account for the individual circumstances of any particular minor residing at the
shelter, we are not persuaded by the District’s argument that GOP’s broad statements of intention
are relevant here. Each of the minors residing in the shelter has an individual statutory right to a
public education that cannot be shunted aside by mere broad statements of institutional intent.
¶ 25 The District also contends that officials from the District, GOP, and DCFS met and
determined that new shelter residents would receive the best interest determination (BID) meeting
to review their specific circumstances. The District notes the lack of evidence showing that a BID
meeting has been held for any of the minor plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the record shows that a GOP
caseworker and placement supervisor stated that each minor was expected to reside at the shelter
for “the foreseeable future” and asserted that the best interests of each child required that they be
immediately enrolled in a local public school. In addition, the minors’ legal guardian, the DCFS
guardianship administrator, determined that their best interests were to be enrolled in a local public
school, a conclusion that led to the filing of the instant lawsuit.
¶ 26 Reading the relevant sections of the Act and the ESSA in harmony, as we must, we find
that they do not support the conclusion that the minors cannot be enrolled in District public schools
without a BID meeting. Instead, the clear intent of both statutes is to provide educational options
to the minors’ guardians to ensure a fair and equitable education. Indeed, the ESSA specifically
states its intent “to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a fair, equitable, and
high-quality education, and to close educational achievement gaps.” 20 U.S.C. § 6301. Requiring
11 a BID meeting before a minor may be enrolled in the guardian’s school of choice would create
unnecessary delay in the children’s education that would undermine the goals of fairness and
equity in learning for all children, regardless of their circumstances.
¶ 27 The District is tasked with providing educational opportunities for local students. That duty
may not be deferred indefinitely simply because a BID meeting has not yet been held. Delays in
those meetings could result from a myriad of causes unrelated to the minors themselves yet they
would disrupt the minors’ ability to obtain the public education to which they are rightfully
entitled. Any unnecessary delay would be contrary to both the spirit and letter of the Act and the
ESSA. The minors have the right to a public education; any speculation that private online learning
supplements and instructors would suffice (absent extraordinary circumstances) fails to supplant
that statutory entitlement. The children’s guardians have already determined that immediate
enrollment in public school is in their best interests. It is difficult to envision how the District’s
refusal to enroll the minors, in apparent contradiction of the applicable statutory provisions, better
reflects their best interests.
¶ 28 We also note that the instant appeal involves the denial of only a TRO, i.e., temporary
injunctive relief. A final determination of whether the District must enroll the minors remains
pending before the trial court. In light of the express provisions of the applicable statutes, however,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the minors did not show a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we conclude that, when “considering all the circumstances, the
[trial] court acted unreasonably and ignored recognized principles of law, which resulted in
substantial prejudice” to the minors. Couch, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 444. The minors established a fair
12 question regarding their likelihood of success and preservation of the status quo until the merits of
the underlying cases are decided. See McHenry County Sheriff, 2020 IL App (2d) 200339, ¶ 27
(explaining the requirements for issuing a TRO). Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of their
request for injunctive relief was an abuse of discretion. We reverse the denials of the three minors’
TRO requests by the circuit court of Kankakee County and remand the causes to that court for
further proceedings.
¶ 31 Reversed and remanded.
13 M.D. v. Momence Community Unified School District 1, 2026 IL App (3d) 260007
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, Nos. 25- CH-35, 25-CH-37, 25-CH-55; the Hon. Scott N. Sliwinski, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jon Yeh and Kathryn Liss, of Prairie State Legal Services, Inc., for of Joliet, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Caroline Roselli and Aidan C. Falk, of Robbins Schwartz, Ltd., for of Chicago, for appellees. Appellee: