TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-17-00104-CV
M. C., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 428TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 15-2494, HONORABLE WILLIAM HENRY, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final order, following a bench trial, terminating the parental
rights of M.C. to her one-year-old son, J.C. In a single issue on appeal, M.C. asserts that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the district court’s finding that termination
of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We will affirm the district court’s order.
BACKGROUND
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) brought
suit to terminate M.C.’s parental rights based on allegations that M.C. had, among other grounds for
termination, endangered her child’s well-being by engaging in criminal activity and associating with
others who had engaged in criminal activity, including illegal drug use and domestic violence. The
matter was initially heard by an associate judge, who recommended termination of M.C.’s parental rights. M.C. then exercised her right to a de novo hearing before the district court,1 during which
a transcript of the proceedings before the associate judge was admitted into evidence and additional
testimony was heard. The evidence considered by the district court, which we discuss in more detail
below, included the testimony of M.C.; Amy Robles, a caseworker for Child Protective Services
(CPS); B.V., the child’s great-grandmother and current placement; and Jennifer Bevel, a licensed
professional counselor who had provided counseling services to M.C. during the case. Following
the hearing, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the
parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child and that M.C. had committed the
following statutory grounds for termination: (1) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the
child; and (2) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the
actions necessary for M.C. to obtain the return of the child. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Because the natural right between a parent and [her] child is one of constitutional
dimensions, termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized.”2 “In parental termination cases,
due process requires application of the clear and convincing standard of proof.”3 Clear and
convincing evidence is a heightened burden of proof that requires “the measure or degree of proof
1 See Tex. Fam. Code § 201.015. 2 In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014) (citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex. 1980)). 3 Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002)).
2 that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established.”4 On appeal, we apply a standard of review that reflects
this burden.5
“In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that its finding was true.”6 “To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s
conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in
the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.”7 “A
corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder
could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”8 However, “[t]his does not mean that a
court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding.”9 The reviewing court must
consider “undisputed facts that do not support the finding.”10 “If, after conducting its legal
sufficiency review of the record evidence, a court determines that no reasonable factfinder could
4 Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; see K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 112. 5 See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-66. 6 Id. at 266. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id.
3 form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must
conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.”11
“[A] proper factual sufficiency review requires the court of appeals to determine
whether ‘the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction
about the truth of the State’s allegations.’”12 “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence
that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually
insufficient.”13 “And in making this determination, the reviewing court must undertake ‘an exacting
review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’”14
However, “while parental rights are of a constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute.”15
“Consequently, despite the heightened standard of review,” the reviewing court “must nevertheless
still provide due deference to the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe
witness testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of
witnesses.”16
11 Id. 12 In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502-03 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). 13 J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. 14 A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26). 15 Id. 16 Id. (citing In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86-87 (Tex. 2005)).
4 ANALYSIS
In her sole issue on appeal, M.C. asserts that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the district court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the
best interest of J.C. When deciding the best-interest issue, we consider the well-established Holley
v. Adams factors, which include the child’s wishes, the child’s emotional and physical needs now
and in the future, emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the future, the parenting
abilities of the party seeking custody, programs available to help that party, plans for the children by
the party seeking custody, the stability of the proposed placement, the parent’s conduct indicating
that the parent-child relationship is improper, and any excuses for the parent’s conduct.17 The
Department need not prove all of the Holley factors as a “condition precedent” to termination, and
the absence of some factors does not bar the factfinder from finding by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in a child’s best interest.18 The need for permanence is the paramount
consideration when determining the children’s present and future physical and emotional needs.19
Moreover, a parent’s statutorily offensive conduct is often intertwined with the best-interest
determination.20
17 See 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 18 C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 19 In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Dupree v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ)). 20 Horvatich v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 78 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; Leal v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 25 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)).
5 Here, the evidence considered by the district court on the best-interest issue included
evidence tending to show that this case was not the first time that M.C. had been involved with the
Department. M.C. testified that she had four children prior to J.C., all of whom had been the subject
of prior CPS proceedings. According to M.C., CPS became involved with her first child after the
child’s “paternal great-grandmother called CPS on me and my family saying that my daughter was
sleeping in a basket on the floor, and CPS showed up the day I was discharged from the hospital
from giving birth.” M.C. also claimed that CPS became involved with her next three children after
M.C. “got in a verbal altercation” with her grandmother.21 M.C. denied that CPS’s involvement was
due to more serious matters, such as drug issues or health concerns. M.C. acknowledged that she
had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to three of her other children, but she claimed that
she “did that out of emotional distress” and did not believe that terminating her parental rights to
those children had been in their best interest. M.C. similarly expressed the belief that terminating
her rights to J.C. would not be in that child’s best interest.
According to the Department’s permanency report, a copy of which was admitted into
evidence, the case involving J.C. began in October 2015, when law enforcement went to B.V.’s
house, where M.C. was residing at the time, to execute an outstanding warrant for M.C. Deputy
Ryan Gonzalez of the Hays County Sheriff’s Office testified that while officers were at the residence,
they encountered J.T., the father of J.C., who also had an outstanding warrant. Gonzalez testified
that J.T. was arrested and placed in a patrol car but that he escaped from the patrol car and evaded
21 The record does not reflect whether this was the same person who had earlier reported M.C. to CPS.
6 apprehension until the next day, when officers returned to the residence and found J.T. in M.C.’s
bedroom, “lying in the bed covered in blankets.” J.T. was again arrested, and M.C. was also arrested
at that time for the offense of hindering apprehension of a fugitive. The Department subsequently
took custody of J.C., who had been present at the residence when his parents were arrested.
J.C. was initially placed with M.C.’s mother, M.K. However, that placement ended
after M.K. had allowed M.C. to have unsupervised access to J.C. while the case was ongoing.
During a time when M.C. had access to the child, M.C. was again arrested, this time in a hotel room
where drugs were found. Specifically, according to the Department’s permanency report,
[M.C.] was arrested in July 2016 with [J.C.] in her care. [M.C.] was called by law enforcement to report to a hotel room that was registered in her name. The hotel room was being investigated after a welfare check was completed and law enforcement found drugs in the room with an infant present and [an]other woman. [M.C.] stated that she had rented out the room for a friend she met; she stated she was not aware of the drugs. At this time, [M.C.] had [J.C.] unsupervised and was with a paramour the Department was not aware of. [M.C.] was arrested for outstanding warrants.
Subsequently, M.C. pleaded no contest to the offenses of hindering apprehension and public
lewdness (an offense that predated the events of this case) and was placed on deferred-adjudication
community supervision for 24 months for each offense. Copies of the deferred-adjudication orders
were admitted into evidence.
The district court also considered evidence tending to show that M.C. had a history
of mental illness. M.C. testified that at the time of the trial, she suffered from depression, bipolar
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and multiple-personality disorder. When asked
what steps she had taken to “address these disorders,” M.C. testified, “I meditate every day. I do
7 yoga. I try to release endorphins so that I don’t have to be on medication constantly.” At the initial
trial, M.C. testified that she did not take any medication for those illnesses, although she later
testified at the de novo hearing that she was taking lithium to treat her depression. M.C. also
admitted that she had “tried to harm herself” on one occasion.
Jennifer Bevel, a licensed professional counselor, had worked with M.C. during the
case “on stress management and maintaining her sobriety.” Bevel testified that M.C. had informed
her that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder but that M.C. “is not currently on medication”
for that illness because “she’s not able to afford it.” Bevel acknowledged that her counseling
sessions with M.C. had not been “extensive” and were focused not on parenting skills but on
“avoid[ing] temptation” from alcohol and “how [M.C.] manages her stress and taking care of herself,
eating well and getting enough sleep at night.”
M.C. admitted during her testimony that she had tested positive for cocaine and
marihuana while this case was ongoing, although she denied using those drugs and claimed that the
tests were wrong. M.C. also agreed with the Department’s statement that she had admitted to Amy
Robles, the CPS caseworker, that she was “around people who smoke marihuana all the time.” M.C.
explained, “I was homeless for the majority of this case, and I was staying with people that weren’t
savory. That’s why I was staying in and out of hotels because even though I couldn’t afford it, I
would rather max out my credit cards than stay in an environment that I could not handle.” M.C.
added, “I slept in people’s cars, and I couched [at M.K.’s house] for a while. I stayed in hotels when
I had money.”
8 Most recently, M.C. lived with Imra Khan, her fiancé at the time of the initial trial
and her husband at the time of the de novo hearing. M.C. testified that Khan had mental-health
issues similar to her own, including symptoms of anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder.
Additionally, Khan testified that he was charged in 2009 with the offenses of aggravated robbery and
assault causing bodily injury to a family member, and had served five years’ imprisonment for the
aggravated-robbery offense. When asked how she felt “knowing that your fiancé has something in
his background potentially that involves domestic violence, and you want to take your son home to
that residence where he is the primary provider,” M.C. testified, “Everybody has a past. I have a
past. I’m not a bad mother.” M.C. also testified that she had been in other relationships where
domestic violence had been an issue, and she acknowledged that two of the fathers of her children
were currently in prison, with one having been convicted of murder.
Khan further testified that he was charged in 2016 for the offenses of possession of
marihuana and possession of a controlled substance, specifically cocaine. Khan claimed that he did
not use drugs with M.C. and that M.C. had never seen him use drugs because, according to Khan,
“I hide that from her.” M.C. testified that, although she was initially concerned with Khan’s cocaine
use, it did not currently concern her and that she planned to “[e]ventually” leave J.C. in Khan’s care
while she was at work, after Khan had completed a drug-rehabilitation program. Until then, M.C.
explained, she would have other family members take care of J.C., including her grandmother,
mother-in-law, and sisters-in-law.
M.C. also testified to her perception that her home was ready for J.C.’s return. She
explained, “I have baby proofed it. I coupon, so he has a stockpile of diapers that when my grandma
9 needs them she’ll call and ask if she can pick up some Pampers or food and stuff like that. He has
his playpen set up. He has a play corner that I have set up for him.” M.C. added that she also had
a crib for J.C. set up in her bedroom.
J.C. was currently placed with B.V., his great-grandmother and M.C.’s grandmother,
who also had custody of three of M.C.’s other children. B.V. testified that she wanted to adopt J.C.
and also intended to adopt two of his siblings. When asked how the children were doing at her
home, B.V. testified, “Very good.” She added that J.C. was “very happy” and interacts with his
siblings well. According to B.V., “He plays with them, and he loves the attention and they give him
a lot of attention.” B.V. also testified that one of the reasons that she took care of the children was
because she did not “want them in foster care. I want them together. I want them raised together.”
However, when she was asked whether she believed that it would be “best” for J.C. if M.C.’s
parental rights were terminated, B.V. did not provide a direct answer. Instead, she testified as
follows:
It’s hard. It is hard for me to explain something like that because I know that, like I said, she is a good mother. When she is on her medications, she does everything, but honestly you just can’t tear a child away from his mother. She’s already had three taken away from her even though, you know—and I know it’s hard for her, and I feel for her, but I don’t know how to explain this.
Amy Robles, the CPS caseworker assigned to this case, testified that J.C. was doing
“wonderful” in his current placement and that he was a “very, very healthy little boy” who was
“happy” and “bonded to his placement.” When asked if she had “any concerns about the care [J.C.]
was receiving from [B.V.],” Robles testified, “None.” Robles also testified that B.V. was “a great
10 mom. She’s hands on, very attentive. She makes sure every—all of his needs are met. He’s always
well dressed. He’s doing very, very well.” She added that B.V. was “very good with all of the
children. She has a lot of patience, and just I commend her on her ability to have that many kids.”
When asked if she had concerns “about the number of children in [B.V.]’s home,” Robles testified,
“I don’t have any concerns because she has a tight family and they’re all very supportive, so
everyone helps everyone out. And you can tell that they’re a very loving family, so there really isn't
any—there doesn’t seem to be any conflict or anything, so they’re just very helpful with one
another.” At the de novo hearing, Robles provided additional testimony as to J.C.’s current
placement. She testified that the home was a “very safe place” and that J.C. had lived there for “the
“majority of his young life.” Robles also testified that “[J.C.] and his siblings are extremely bonded;
they play well together. He’s happy. He’s very healthy. He’s just—he’s thriving. He’s doing
extremely well. He’s—he’s just a happy, well-rounded little boy.”
Robles further testified that M.C.’s behavior continued to cause her concern.
Specifically, Robles explained, M.C. “is around people that are using drugs, and we don’t know
what’s going on because she is not being truthful about her drug use.” Robles added, “[S]he hasn’t
had a stable housing situation. . . . It’s just been very unstable for lack of a better word.” Robles’s
other concerns included M.C.’s “choice in men,” her “continuing relationships that are not healthy,”
and her “mental health . . . not taking medication to assist with her diagnosis.” At the de novo
hearing, Robles also testified that M.C. “was very angry most of the time. She had no—no filter.
. . . [W]hen we had conversations face-to-face she—she could not control her anger, and it was
basically demonstrating to me that she did not learn anything from her anger management” class.
11 Robles added that M.C. “was not successful in her completion” of individual therapy and had failed
to follow up with her doctor regarding mental health recommendations and treatments.
In summary, the undisputed evidence tended to show that M.C.: (1) had a history of
engaging in criminal activity; (2) had ongoing mental-health issues and had failed to follow the
recommendations of her doctor to treat those issues; (3) had tested positive for illegal drug use while
the case was ongoing and had admitted that she was “around people who smoke marihuana all the
time”; (4) had been in relationships with men, including her current husband, who had engaged in
domestic violence, illegal drug use, and other criminal activities; and (5) had a history of unstable
living arrangements, including, by M.C.’s own admission, being homeless “for the majority of this
case.” The undisputed evidence also tended to show that J.C., in his current placement, was healthy,
happy, loved, and bonded with his siblings. Viewing the above and other evidence in the light most
favorable to the district court’s finding, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to prove
that termination of M.C.’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.
After giving due consideration to the disputed evidence in the case, we reach the same
conclusion regarding the factual sufficiency of the evidence. The disputed evidence consisted of
M.C.’s claim that terminating her parental rights was not in the best interest of J.C., M.C.’s denial
that she was using drugs while the case was ongoing (despite acknowledging the positive drug tests),
and B.V.’s testimony as to what she believed to be in the child’s best interest, including her claim
that, “[w]hen she is on her medications,” M.C. is “a very good mother.” However, the district court,
as factfinder, was free to disbelieve M.C.’s self-serving claims and to view B.V.’s testimony
commending the parenting abilities of her granddaughter with skepticism, particularly in light of
12 M.C.’s prior history with CPS, Robles’s extensive testimony detailing her ongoing concerns with
M.C.’s behavior, and M.C.’s own testimony in which she acknowledged her untreated mental-health
issues, past homelessness, and relationships with violent men. In light of the entire record, we
cannot say that the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor
of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or
conviction that termination of M.C.’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.
We overrule M.C.’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s termination order.
____________________________________
Bob Pemberton, Justice
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Goodwin
Affirmed
Filed: August 1, 2017