Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Securities Litigation, In re

985 F.2d 573, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 8295, 1993 WL 22707
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 29, 1993
Docket91-55899
StatusUnpublished

This text of 985 F.2d 573 (Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Securities Litigation, In re) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Securities Litigation, In re, 985 F.2d 573, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 8295, 1993 WL 22707 (9th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

985 F.2d 573

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
In re LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY SECURITIES LITIGATION.
Joseph H. LEVIT; Walter Bely; Elsie Bely; the Elsie Bely
IRA; Lucy Feder; Rosalind Jacobson; Ronald
Kassover; Hedy-Ann Kassover,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY; Bob G. Gower; Fred P.
Rullo; Dan F. Smith; Robert E. Wycoff; Atlantic Richfield
Co.; Camron Cooper; James S. Morrison; Robert M. Shea;
Joseph A. Putz; William T. Butler; Dudley C. Mecum; Paul
R. Staley; Goldman Sachs & Co.; Salomon Bros., Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-55899.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 5, 1992.
Decided Jan. 29, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV-90-0126-KN David V. Kenyon, District Judge, Presiding.

C.D.Cal.

AFFIRMED.

Before POOLE, FERNANDEZ and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

Plaintiffs allege the Defendants violated sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 77l) and section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 77j). Each of these statutes has a common requirement that the plaintiff allege a material misrepresentation or omission in a prospectus1, document or oral communication that caused him to purchase the security. Because this threshold requirement is identical in all three statutes, the following discussion is applicable to §§ 11, 12 and 10b (unless otherwise indicated.)

The Plaintiffs present three legal arguments: (1) certain statements in the prospectus gave the false impression that Lyondell's past performance would continue in the future; (2) forward-looking predictions made in the prospectus and the road-show were false or misleading; and (3) Lyondell's failure to disclose information contained in internal financial projections was an omission of a material fact. The first two issues are addressed in the present Memorandum. The question of whether Lyondell had a duty to disclose internal projections is the subject of a separate published Opinion.

As a preliminary matter, we have compiled all the contested statements cited in Plaintiffs' brief in the Appendix to this Memorandum. Reference to a contested statement will be cited according to its numerical designation in the Appendix. Plaintiffs urge us to view the overall impression created by the statements rather than treat each statement in isolation. However, in In Re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., we rejected such an "overall pattern of deception" approach, opting instead to look at each particular statement individually to determine if dismissal was appropriate. 886 F.2d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 (1990). We adopted this "in seriatim" method in In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., but added that statements cannot be analyzed in complete isolation. 948 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.1991) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) ("Some statements, although literally accurate, can become, through their context and manner of presentation, devices which mislead investors" (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we view each statement individually, but in the context of the whole.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a ruling on a question of law and as such is reviewed de novo. Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc).

The court may review the contents of the complaint, Buckey v. Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.1992), items in the record of the case or matters of general public record, Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.1988).

All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 785. "While the court generally must assume factual allegations to be true, it need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).

B. HISTORICAL STATEMENTS

Statements 1, 2, 3A, 3C, 4A, 5, and 11 pertain to Lyondell's past historical performances regarding olefins margins2, plant shutdowns3, the ethylene market4, and operating revenues5. Inasmuch as Plaintiffs do not contest the accuracy of these statements, the question is whether they give a false impression that steadily rising indicators would continue.

In Convergent, this court considered whether truthful reporting of past performance misled the market because it implied growth would continue at a "torrid pace". Id. at 513. The court held that "[t]he challenged statements [did] not imply any comparison between the rate of past and future growth. They simply report[ed] past performance and assert[ed] specific limited predictions for the future." Id.

None of Lyondell's historical statements implies a comparison between the rate of past and future growth. We therefore find these statements are not misleading.

C. FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

Lyondell made a number of forward-looking statements in its prospectus6 and in post-offering reports, road-shows and press reports.7 Plaintiffs allege that certain forward-looking predictions made in the prospectus, post-offering literature and oral presentations were untrue statements of material fact as proscribed by §§ 11, 12 and 10b.8

We can dispose of the claim concerning statements 8 and 9 on procedural grounds. These statements were challenged only in connection with Plaintiffs' § 11 complaint. (Excerpts of Record ("ER") 3:67-68.) Because statements 8 and 9 were made during the road-show, and § 11 is limited to consideration of misrepresentations in the prospectus, they cannot be considered in this appeal.

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