Lyon v. Lyon

62 Barb. 138, 1861 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 243
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 1, 1861
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 62 Barb. 138 (Lyon v. Lyon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb. 138, 1861 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 243 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1861).

Opinion

By the Court,

Mullir, J.

The court below has found that the defendant did, on the 15th of July, 1855, and on the 1st of June, 1858, after his marriage, with the plaintiff" commit adultery and have carnal connection with one Ulissa Weston, first at the house of Henry Weston, in Spofford, Onondaga county, and next at her own house in the said town.

The questions .presented by this appeal are, whether the said findings are sustained by competent, legal and sufficient evidence ?

• Thé finding of the commission of the adultery in 1858 rests exclusively on the evidence of Amos Gillett, and of the adultery in 1855, on that of Franklin Hathaway.

Gillett testifies that in 1858 he rode with the defendant, at his request, to Mrs. Weston’s; the defendant saying he could get what he wanted there. They stopped in the street, and the defendant went into the house, saying he would ■ go in and see what the chances were. He came out, put out his horse, and said they would go in. Both went in, and sat down, in the dining room, or kitchen; . conversed awhile ; and then all went into the parlor. Mrs. Weston was baking, and,she went into the kitchen: The

defendant followed her, leaving her sister and the witness in the parlor. They were absent less than half an hour ; the sister went out into the kitchen once, while Mrs. Weston and the defendant were absent; was gone two "or three minutes, and returned. The defendant came back into the parlor, and he and the witness left. On their way back, the defendant said he got what he went after ; that [140]*140he took her (Mrs. W.) into a room, a Led room, or bed ' sink. The witness inquired of him where he was when the girl went into the kitchen. He said he did not know where he could have been; he did not see her. The witness further testified that he made no discoveries; that he did not see or hear anything to excite his suspicions.

Mrs. "Weston was the sister-in-law of the defendant, and, at the time of the occurrence, was a widow keeping house, and her sister residing with her.

Hot only is there no proof of adulterous intercourse between Mrs. W. and the defendant, but there is not the slightest proof of familiarity—much less of indecent or immodest intercourse. The only evidence tending in the slightest degree to prove adultery is the declaration of the .defendant, not only utterly unsupported by a single fact tending tó corroborate him, as to the fact of adultery, but directly contradicted by the oath of Mrs. W. herself. This is giving to the declarations of a person not under oath, who by his declaration impeaches and degrades himself, greater weight than the oath of a person unimpeached, except by these declarations, and who, we are bound to presume is both truthful and respectable. I cannot think that the law will sanction such a conclusion. There is not a single act testified to which shows, or tends to show, that adultery was contemplated, much less committed. The charge rests wholly on the confessions of the defendant, and unless they are enough, standing alone, to establish the defendant's guilt, it is not proved.

The other act of adultery, in 1855, is found, not only without any evidence of its commission, but without even the confessions of the defendant to support it. Hathaway “believes” he saw the defendant and Mrs. W. alone once, in Henry Weston’s parlor. The front door of the house was open, and the door from the front hall to the parlor was also open; the curtains were up; it was in the day time, Mrs. Weston lay on the lounge; the defendant sat [141]*141by her feet; her clothes were up so as to expose one leg nearly up to the knee ; the defendant did nothing to her .clothes; did not make any motions ; he was not exposed, in any way. Mrs. W. and the defendant were the only persons in the house when the witness went in. He ■passed through the hall, from the front door to the kitchen, and saw them ás he passed the parlor door. Mrs. Weston •rose up and pushed down her clothes. The defendant, soon after the witness passed the door, went into the kitchen where the witness was. They afterwards went to the room, and the defendant told him to keep dark and say nothing. Last summer, at his shop, the defendant told the witness he had done wrong—had set a bad example before him—and cried, and hoped witness would forgive him ; and wished him to say nothing about it. The witness, at the time this occurred, was 15 years of age. This young man is contradicted by Daniel Lyon and Shepard Earl.

It will hardly do to hold that a brother-in-law may not, in open day, without concealment, or effort at.concealment, sit on the same lounge with his widowed sister-in-law without raising the presumption of adultery,- even if it should happen that she was not as careful in the arrangement of her dress as if he was an entire stranger. Met this is all the evidence of criminality, aside from the defendant’s declarations, in the case.

Ho one could hesitate, for a moment, after reading the evidence in this case, to pronounce the case totally without evidence of adultery, unless full credit is given- to the defendant’s confessions.

We are, then, next to inquire whether the defendant’s confessions can be the basis of a decree of divorce; and if so, under what circumstances. ,,

It is said in Shelford on Marriage and Divorce, 407, that to prove adultery, confessions alone cannot be received, * * for without this restriction, there would be no check [142]*142upon, the collusion and imposition that might be practiced on the court. But a confession may be received, accompanied by collateral evidence which, when taken together, form the strongest possible proof. Again, at page 410, it is said: Confession generally ranks high in the scale of evidence; what is taken pro confessa is considered as indubitable proof. The plea of guilty, by the party accused, excludes further inquiry. Habimus confitentem warn is demonstration, unless undue motives can be assigned to it. But though confessions will support charges of the highest nature, as treason, murder, &c., they are not, alone, sufficient to establish a charge of adultery. A sentence of divorce will not be given upon the sole confessions of the parties. The principle upon which the rule is founded is a fear of collusion between the husband and the wife.”

Again, at page 411, it is said: “ Confession is a species of evidence which, though not inadmissible in cases of adultery, is to be regarded with great distrust; and though it is not absolutely excluded, but is received in conjunction with other circumstances, yet it is, on all occasions, to be most accurately weighed. Confession .of adultery, when perfectly free from all taint of collusion, when confirmed by circumstances and conduct, ranks amongst the highest species of evidence.” (Doe v. Roe, 1 John. Cas. 25. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 45. Holland v. Holland, 2 Mass. 154. Baxter v. Baxter, 1 id. 346. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. Ch. 132. Betts v. Betts, 1 John. Ch. 197.)

The foundation of the rule which forbids the granting a decree of divorce on the unsupported confessions of a party is the fear of collusion and imposition on the court. When, however, the reason of the rule fails, the rule itself ceases.

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Bluebook (online)
62 Barb. 138, 1861 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lyon-v-lyon-nysupct-1861.