Lyon v. Brown University

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Lyon v. Brown University

38 A. 1000, 20 R.I. 337, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 47

DecidedJanuary 1, 1898

StatusPublished

This text of 38 A. 1000 (Lyon v. Brown University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lyon v. Brown University, 38 A. 1000, 20 R.I. 337, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 47 (R.I. 1898).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The defendant, John Gano Benedict, in his *338 brief upon the reargument of this cause, relies particularly upon the words in the third and subsequent clauses of the will, “applicable to the payment of the legacies in this” . . . “clause of my will contained,” &c., as limiting these clauses to personal estate and the proceeds of real estate, and so distinguishing the case at bar from Pond v. Allen, 15 R. I. 171. We do not see the force of this argument. The obvious meaning of the words is simply “in case my estate remaining after the payment of preceding gifts is insufficient to pay the legatees under this clause in full, then these legacies shall abate.” The words, “applicable to the payment of the legacies in this clause,” &c., mean “the residue not herein-before disposed of,” which residue the testatrix has just made applicable to the legacies now given. As we have before observed, there were created by this will successive residues, each becoming “applicable” to successive classes of legacies when the prior ones had been satisfied.

Samuel T. Douglas, for complainant. Edwin P. Allen, PEenry J. Spooner, John C. B. Woods, John C. Pegram, William C. Baker, for respondents.

The relation of the clause containing the power of sale to the other clauses of the will we have fully considered in the former opinion. The decision in the case of Pond v. Allen we consider decisive of the case at bar.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Per Curiam.

The defendant, John Gano Benedict, in his *338 brief upon the reargument of this cause, relies particularly upon the words in the third and subsequent clauses of the will, “applicable to the payment of the legacies in this” . . . “clause of my will contained,” &c., as limiting these clauses to personal estate and the proceeds of real estate, and so distinguishing the case at bar from Pond v. Allen, 15 R. I. 171. We do not see the force of this argument. The obvious meaning of the words is simply “in case my estate remaining after the payment of preceding gifts is insufficient to pay the legatees under this clause in full, then these legacies shall abate.” The words, “applicable to the payment of the legacies in this clause,” &c., mean “the residue not herein-before disposed of,” which residue the testatrix has just made applicable to the legacies now given. As we have before observed, there were created by this will successive residues, each becoming “applicable” to successive classes of legacies when the prior ones had been satisfied.

Samuel T. Douglas, for complainant. Edwin P. Allen, PEenry J. Spooner, John C. B. Woods, John C. Pegram, William C. Baker, for respondents.

The relation of the clause containing the power of sale to the other clauses of the will we have fully considered in the former opinion. The decision in the case of Pond v. Allen we consider decisive of the case at bar.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

38 A. 1000, 20 R.I. 337, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lyon-v-brown-university-ri-1898.