Lyon v. Bird

80 A. 450, 79 N.J. Eq. 157, 9 Buchanan 157, 1911 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 3
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJune 23, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 80 A. 450 (Lyon v. Bird) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lyon v. Bird, 80 A. 450, 79 N.J. Eq. 157, 9 Buchanan 157, 1911 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 3 (N.J. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

Walker, Vice-Ordinary.

On May 16th, 1910, Mrs. Adaline E. Bird, surviving trustee of Theodore S. Bird, deceased, filed a principal and income account extending from June, 1906, to April, 1910. To this account Adelaide Lyon, one of the beneficiaries of the estate, filed eighteen exceptions, which were dealt with by the Hunterdon county orphans court, and exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15 were dismissed; 16, 17 and 18 were stricken out as repetitional of 8, 9 and 10; 8 was sustained in part and dismissed in part; 11 was sustained to the extent of allowing five [159]*159per cent, commissions to M. E. Dilts for collecting rents and five per cent, commissions to A. C. Hulsizer for collecting interest on mortgages, both as being commissions allowed by law to the trustee for collecting and disbursing the income of the estate, and was further sustained as to items improperly charged to the estate, being for services and expenses of Mr. Hulsizer, amounting to $458.60.

The respondent, Mrs. Bird, trustee, in her answer asks that this finding against her be reversed. Cottnsel for the appellant claims that the answer does not formally present that issue, and that the question of disallowing the $458.60 item is not properly presented and cannot be adjudicated. Assuming that it is in shape for consideration, I will dispose of it by holding that the orphans court was right in allowing the exception to that extent and in disallowing the executrix a credit for the sum mentioned, and that part of the decree will be affirmed.

Only exceptions 11 and 12 are involved in this appeal. Originally, there were three executors, one being Mrs. Bird. The other two died, one May 8th, 1907, the other August 31st, 1907. The surviving trustee, Mrs. Bird, has done practically nothing with reference to the administration of the estate, almost everything having been done for her.

On May 15th, 1906, the three executors named in the will filed their account showing the corpus of the estate which had come to their hands to be $81,629.48. On this amount the orphans court allowed them a commission of five per cent., amounting to $4,275, thus reducing the principal to $69,691.93. Under the will of the testator certain specific legacies were bequeathed to the widow and to the relatives of the deceased of the value of $131.01, and also pecuniary legacies amounting to $5,000; and all the remainder of the estate (real and personal) was devised and bequeathed to the executors, in trust, to collect the interest on securities and the rents from real estate, and to divide the net annual income into two parts, one to go to the testator’s widow and the other to his daughter during then-joint lives, and on the death of each to divide the one-half among the children of the deceased life tenant, but not until the youngest child should attain the age of thirty years. The trust will [160]*160undoubtedly last for many years to come, and if Mrs. Bird, the surviving trustee, should die in the lifetime of the daughter, a trustee, one or more, in succession to her, will have to be appointed and paid commissions on the principal of the estate, and so, too, if, at the mother’s death after the daughter’s decease, any of the remaindermen should be under thirty years of age.

The executors settled their account in eleven months after their assumption of the administration of the estate. Of the $8.1,629.48, upon which the allowance was made, $72,417.62 was the amount of the inventory and appraisement, of which they became possessed upon proving the will and qualifying as executors and trustees, and the difference, $9,211.86, came from the payment of installments on lands of the testator contracted to be sold.

True it is that tiróse occupying the dual capacity of executors and trustees under a will are entitled to commissions on the corpus of the estate in each capacity (Pitney v. Everson, 42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 361), yet, as sections 128, 129 of the Orphans Court act (P. L. 1898 p. 762) provide that the allowance of commissions'to executors, administrators, guardians or trustees shall be made with reference to tlreir actual pains, trouble and risk in settling- an estate, rather than in respect to the quantum of the estate, and that such commissions on any estate where the receipts exceed the sum of $50,000 shall be determined by the orphans court on the final settlement of their accounts, according to the actual services rendered, not to exceed five per centum on all sums which come into their hands, it seems to me that the allowance of the full five per cent, commissions to these executors by the Hunterdon county orphans court was excessive and unwarranted. The account was the final account of the executors, and, at that time, it was proper for the orphans court to make them an allowance of commissions on the principal, but, something like one per cent, on the amount of the inventory, and, possibly, two or two and one-half per cent, on the principal which augmented the amount of the inventory, would have been a fairly reasonable allowance in view of the fact that the executors closed their account ■ within a year and then transferred the securities to themselves as trustees; in fact they got [161]*161them as trustees under the will, but were obliged to convert enough as executors to satisiy the legacies, which were practically inconsiderable.

If trustees administer an estate for a quarter of a century, investing and reinvesting, perhaps over and over again, the securities of the estate, and, in the end, are entitled to no more than five per cent., upon what theory can the maximum allowance to these executors, whose duties with reference to the corpus of the estate were more or less perfunctory, be possibly justified ?

This court held (In re Hibllers Estate, 78 N. J. Eg. (8 Buch.) 217) that where one was named executor and trustee and his duties as executor were inconsiderable compared with his duties as trustee, in determining his compensation, the principal fund should be deemed as having passed to him at once as trustee, and an allowance on the corpus should be held to have been an allowance to him as trustee, though the accounts were filed as executor. In that case the trustee had filed several accounts as “executor,” arid had been allowed three per cent, commissions on the corpus of a very large estate, besides five per cent, on the income. After managing the estate for twenty-two years he resigned and asked to be relieved from the trust and applied for an allowance of two per cent, on the corpus as trustee. As the trust had probably eleven years to run as to one portion and sixteen years as to another, the applicant ivas denied further commissions on the corpus, so that the court would be in a position thereafter to allow commissions to the new trustee on the corpus of the estate not exceeding two per cent., making in the end five per cent., if so much should be earned.

The executors in their account in this case charged themselves with income collected $6,955.60, and showed disbursements of all that sum except $285.66; among which disbursements were about $3,500 of income divided between the life tenants (which in reality was executing their office of trustees) and $347.78 of commissions, being five per cent, commissions on the income. This was in April, 1906, and here ended the executors’ duties as such, and the corpus of the estate passed to them as trustees, and that, too, by devise and bequest in that behalf in the will [162]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Estate Bernice P. Bishop
36 Haw. 403 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1943)
In Re Linn
199 A. 396 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1938)
In Re McMillin
185 A. 913 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1936)
In re the Estate of Foster
176 A. 156 (Bergen County Surrogate's Court, 1934)
In Re Larrabee
130 A. 195 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1925)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
80 A. 450, 79 N.J. Eq. 157, 9 Buchanan 157, 1911 N.J. Prerog. Ct. LEXIS 3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lyon-v-bird-njsuperctappdiv-1911.