Lynda B. Gauthier v. Foster Homes, LLC, and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 20, 2019
• Docket: 53,143-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered November 20, 2019. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 53,143-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

LYNDA B. GAUTHIER Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

FOSTER HOMES, LLC, AND Defendant-Appellee STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 596,211-B

Honorable Craig O. Marcotte, Judge

CHARLES ELLIOTT & ASSOC., LLC Counsel for Appellant By: Charles D. Elliott

MAYER, SMITH & ROBERTS, L.L.P. Counsel for Appellee, By: Caldwell Roberts, Jr. Foster Homes, LLC

Before PITMAN, GARRETT, and STEPHENS, JJ. PITMAN, J.

Plaintiff Lynda B. Gauthier appeals the judgment of the trial court

granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant Foster

Homes, LLC, and dismissing her suit against it. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

FACTS

Plaintiff is a 67-year-old woman who is a multiple myeloma cancer

survivor. On December 6, 2015, her home on Flournoy Lucas Road in

Shreveport caught fire and was rendered uninhabitable. She contacted her

homeowner’s insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”),

whose policy included loss of use coverage. She expressed her wish to

remain on her property during the home restoration process, so her agent

informed her that Defendant could provide her with temporary housing on

her property. She contacted Defendant, and a mobile home was delivered to

her.

The mobile home was set up on her lot around January 8, 2016.

Although there is some question as to whether Plaintiff requested a handicap

ramp to be placed beside the mobile home, Defendant installed a ramp to the

left of the front door, parallel to the home. The ramp was virtually useless

since the door to the mobile home opened outward, from right to left, instead

of opening inward. There were stairs which led straight up to the door, with

a handrail on the right side. There was no handrail on the left side of the

stairs, presumably because the ramp was located there. The stairs ended at

the door in a landing, but the landing was shallow so that when the door

opened outward, there was very little room left on the landing for a person to

stand while opening the door. On January 22, 2016, as Plaintiff entered the home, she opened the

door and tried to navigate the stairs and door. When she opened the door,

she fell backward four feet off the landing, hitting the ground on her left side

and on her head. She had an excruciating headache all day and night; the

next morning she contacted her son and told him what had happened. He

took her to the emergency room at Christus Schumpert Hospital in

Shreveport where she was found to be almost unresponsive. A CAT scan

was performed, and she was diagnosed with a life-threatening acute subdural

hematoma and was transferred to University Health for emergency brain

surgery. She spent several days recovering in the intensive care unit and

several weeks in the hospital, including time at in-patient rehabilitation.

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant and her insurer, State Farm,

alleging that, as lessor, Defendant was strictly liable to her and that the

outward opening door and limited landing created a dangerous situation and

an unreasonable risk of harm. State Farm filed a peremptory exception of

no cause of action, which was granted, and it was dismissed from the suit.

Defendant responded that Plaintiff was at fault and that the condition of

which she complained did not present an unreasonable risk of harm pursuant

to La. C.C. art. 2317. Further, Defendant claimed that it did not have care,

custody or control of any unreasonably dangerous condition and did not

have actual or constructive knowledge of any unreasonably dangerous

condition as required by La. C.C. art. 2317.1.

Plaintiff hired new counsel, who retained the services of engineering

expert Philip Beard, who inspected the landing, steps, ramp and handrail.

Beard prepared a report, signed an affidavit stating his findings and was

deposed concerning those findings. His affidavit, prepared prior to his 2 deposition, states that the landing was 39 inches wide and 38 inches deep.

He determined that, with the door being opened to 45 degrees, from right to

left, there were only 16.56 inches left on the landing for a person to stand

while opening the door. He drew diagrams with the measurements of the

position of the door and the depth of the landing and concluded that “the

small distance between Mrs. Gauthier and the landing edge created an

unreasonable risk of harm and increased the likelihood of a misstep.” He

also opined that if a handrail had been on the left side, instead of the right,

Plaintiff might have been able to reach back and grab it; however, because it

was on the right, she was unable to stop her fall.

In his deposition, when questioned about which building codes were

applicable to mobile homes, Beard replied that he used the International

Residential Code (“IRC”) and the International Building Code and opined

that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) might apply, but was

unsure, stating, “That’s an interesting question and I’m not sure I can give

you an answer. . . without further research.” He was asked about the IRC

section which was copied and attached to his report, specifically

Section R311.1 dealing with egress, which stated that every landing shall

have a minimum dimension of 36 inches measured in the direction of travel.

He confirmed that the section required a landing of at least 36 inches. He

was asked whether, had there not been a ramp attached to the stairs, would

the landing and staircase have complied with the IRC, and he answered,

“With respect to the thirty-six by thirty-six inch dimension, yes, that’s

correct.” Other questions were posed regarding the position of the ramp, the

slope of the ramp and its relation to the landing. He testified that had the

ramp been installed on the right side of the door, its use would have caused a 3 noncompliance with the IRC code. He agreed that if the ramp were used as

part of the landing, the slope of the ramp would violate Section R311.1.

After further discovery was completed, Defendant filed a motion for

summary judgment alleging Plaintiff admitted in deposition that the ramp

had nothing to do with the accident since she had entered the home by

walking up the steps at the time the incident occurred. Defendant also

claimed that Plaintiff’s liability expert, Beard, testified in his deposition that

the size of the landing was inadequate, but admitted that it did not violate

any applicable building codes in the IRC. Defendant further claimed that

because the size of the landing complied with applicable building codes, no

reasonable juror could find that the landing presented an unreasonable risk

of harm. It also claimed that where a condition is open and obvious and

apparent to all, no legal duty is owed and summary judgment is appropriate.

In response, Plaintiff noted that, in deposition, Defendant’s owner,

Paul Malloy, testified that Plaintiff wanted a handicap ramp and that he

believed the ADA applied to this commercial housing unit. He also testified

that his company had provided her with a platform that was large enough for

her to get in and out of the house.

Plaintiff also noted that Beard’s affidavit, report and deposition found

that the landing, ramp and door created an unreasonable risk of harm.

Further, Beard opined that it might not have been so obvious to a person on

the landing that it was too short for someone to open the door outward

without having to step off and onto the stairs. He further stated in his report

that the relationship of the door swing to the available maneuvering area for

opening the door was subtle and not obvious and resulted in Plaintiff’s fall

from the landing as she moved backward in her attempt to open the door. 4 A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment and the trial

court found that the landing met the requirements of the IRC and that the

defect, if any, was open and obvious to anyone who had been in and out of

the mobile home in the time period it had been on Plaintiff’s property and

she had been using it. For those reasons, and “based on case law,” the

summary judgment was granted. On April 18, 2019, the trial court signed a

judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant and

dismissed it from the lawsuit, with prejudice, at Plaintiff’s cost. Plaintiff

appeals that judgment.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that this matter was before the trial court on a motion

for summary judgment and the issue was the reasonableness of the

configuration of the door, stairs, ramp and handrail. She asserts that

summary judgment is rarely appropriate for the disposition of issues

requiring a determination of the reasonableness of acts and conduct of

parties under all the facts and circumstances of the case. She contends that

this case clearly requires a determination of whether the method of entry into

the mobile home was reasonable; and, therefore, the trial court erred when it

overreached and made that determination.

Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred when it made a factual

determination that ignored expert testimony which reported that the stair

setup was unreasonably dangerous. She claims that the lessor is strictly

liable for the condition of the mobile home and that it should be free of vices

and defects. Defendant was in charge of placing the steps, ramp, landing

and handrail. Her expert testified that the location of the handrail rendering

5 it useless in helping her when she fell and the door opening outward instead

of inward were causes of the accident.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court ignored evidence in the record

which conveyed the dangerous nature of the entry into the mobile home, i.e.,

the testimony of her son and her expert. There was photographic evidence

depicting exactly how precarious the landing is; and this evidence, at the

very least, created a genuine issue of material fact which needed to be

determined after a trial on the merits. She contends that the trial court’s role

in summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to

determine the truth of the matter, but, rather, to determine whether there is a

triable issue of material fact.

Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in making a factual

determination, without evidence, that the dangerous condition was “open

and obvious” to her because it opined that as she walked up the stairs, she

should have been aware that there was no handrail on the left hand side.

Plaintiff also claims that the trial court erred when it conflated “open

and obvious” with her knowledge that there was an unreasonably dangerous

condition. She argues that the trial court combined the issues of whether the

condition of the property was open and obvious with whether it was

unreasonably dangerous and decided that because she knew there was a

missing handrail, she should have been aware that the condition was

unreasonably dangerous and, supposedly, should have exercised greater

caution. She contends that she had moved into the temporary housing only a

few weeks prior to the accident. There was no evidence presented about the

number of times she had entered or exited the house. Further, there was no

evidence that she was aware of the danger that she might fall and hit her 6 head. In fact, her expert witness testified that the landing/door/

stairs/ramp/handrail were not an obvious danger. She contends that factual

inferences should be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff asserts that there are

many genuine issues of material fact concerning this case and summary

judgment is, therefore, inappropriate.

Defendant argues that the case was appropriate for summary judgment

because no reasonable juror could conclude that the landing presented an

unreasonable risk of harm. It asserts that the landing was a standard size that

met the requirements of the building code and that any danger associated

with any part of the entryway is open and obvious to all. It claims that if the

danger is open and obvious to all, it cannot constitute an unreasonably

dangerous condition sufficient for the imposition of liability. It contends

that the standard for summary judgment was met and should not be reversed

on de novo review.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) concerns proof on motions for summary

judgment and states as follows:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.

Todd v. Angel, 48,687 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14) 132 So. 3d 453, writ denied,

14-0613 (La. 5/16/14), 139 So. 3d 1027. A fact is material if it potentially 7 ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success or

determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Id. A genuine issue of material

fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable

persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that

issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

To recover for damages caused by a defective thing, a plaintiff must

prove that the thing was in defendant’s custody, that the thing contained a

defect, that this defective condition caused damage and that defendant knew

or should have known of the defect. La. C.C. art. 2317.1. A “defect” in a

thing, for which one having custody of the thing may be liable for damages

caused, is a condition or imperfection that poses an unreasonable risk of

injury to persons exercising ordinary care and prudence. Todd, supra. The

determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable risk of harm is a

matter wed to the facts and must be determined in light of facts and

surrounding circumstances of each particular case. Id., citing Wynn v. Luck,

47,314 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/12), 106 So. 3d 111.

That an accident occurred as a result of a defect does not elevate the

condition of the thing to an unreasonably dangerous defect. Todd, supra.

The degree to which a danger may be observed by a potential victim is a

factor considered in the determination of whether a condition is

unreasonably dangerous. Id. In determining whether a defect or

unreasonable risk of harm is present, the court must find the defect to be of

such a nature as to constitute a dangerous condition which would reasonably

be expected to cause injury to a prudent person using ordinary care under the

circumstances. Id. If the facts of a particular premises liability case show

that the complained of condition should be obvious to all, the condition may 8 not be unreasonably dangerous and the defendant may owe no duty to the

plaintiff. Id.

In Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14),

171 So. 3d 851, the court stated that under Louisiana law, a defendant

generally does not have a duty to protect against that which is obvious and

apparent. For an alleged hazard to be considered obvious and apparent, the

hazard should be one that is open and obvious to everyone who may

potentially encounter it. Id., citing Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State

Buildings, 12-1238 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So. 3d 175; Hutchinson v. Knights of

Columbus, Council No. 5747, 03-1533 (La. 2/20/04) 866 So. 2d 228.

IRC Section R311.3,1 concerning floors and landings at exterior

doors, states as follows:

There shall be a landing or floor on each side of each exterior door. The width of each landing shall not be less than the door served. Every landing shall have a dimension of not less than 36 inches (914 mm) measured in the direction of travel.

Beard testified that the landing in question measured 38 inches by

39 inches, therefore complying with the requirement of the IRC. We find

any suggestion by Plaintiff that the ADA applies to the situation at bar to be

without merit since her expert could not definitively say whether it does.

There is no genuine issue of material fact that the landing complies with the

safety requirements required by the IRC.

Further, we find that neither the placement of the ramp nor the lack of

handrail on the left side of the stairs creates a genuine issue of material fact

with regard to the dangerous nature of the landing. Common sense dictates

that a door that opens from right to left will be opened with the left hand so

1 This quotation of Section R311.3 was from the 2015 version of the IRC. 9 that it will swing open and allow entry. The handrail is located on the right

side, and if a person has to step backward after opening the door, the

handrail on the right side is there for support. The alleged defect in this case

does not constitute a dangerous condition which would reasonably be

expected to cause injury to a prudent person using ordinary care under the

circumstances. A review of the diagrams submitted with Beard’s report

supports this theory. Therefore, no genuine issues of material fact exist

concerning the condition of the landing or handrail.

The summary judgment evidence shows that the complained-of

condition should have been obvious to all. Plaintiff had been living in the

home for at least two weeks prior to her accident. Although the number of

times Plaintiff had entered or left the home via the stairs was not presented

to the court, she had used the entry numerous times and should have been

aware of the configuration of the stairs, railing and door. This was a

condition that was open and obvious to anyone. Therefore, we find no

genuine issue of material fact with regard to the open and obvious nature of

the landing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment granting the motion for

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Foster Homes, LLC, and against

Plaintiff Lynda B. Gauthier is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to

Plaintiff Lynda B. Gauthier.

AFFIRMED.