Thompson, C. J.
The petitioner, Gladys M. Lynch, was married to Francis L. Lynch on November 27, 1939. Two sons, J erry F. Lynch, the elder, and Richard R. Lynch, were the only issue of this marriage. A divorce was granted to the petitioner, as plaintiff in the action, on April 9, 1953, in the District Court of Wright County. On April 8, 1953, the parties entered into a stipulation, the material part of which provided: “Item I. That the care, custody and control of Richard R. Lynch shall be awarded to the Plaintiff (Gladys M. Lynch) and it is provided that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion and that the Defendant (Francis L. Lynch) shall have the right of visitation at all reasonable hours and that the Defendant shall pay monthly support money of $40.00 per month commencing with the date of decree.” Other provisions of the stipulation concerned the custody of J erry F. Lynch and a property settlement between the parties, none of which is material heré. All of the provisions of the stipulation were incorporated in the decree. Richard was about five years old at this time, and was in his seventh year when the contempt proceedings were instituted.
The record shows that the petitioner was at the time of the divorce, and apparently still is, a Protestant, while Francis L. Lynch has at all material times been a Roman Catholic. On June 17, 1955, Francis L. Lynch filed his “Information for Contempt” setting out Item I of the stipulation, as made a part of the decree, and alleging that prior to the divorce Richard had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church and reared as a member of that [71]*71church. Violation of the decree by the petitioner in that she “has not reared and is not rearing said minor child in the Roman Catholic religion or in accordance with the teachings and practice of said religion, and she has announced her purpose and determination not to observe, perform or comply with said provisions of said decree; and has announced her purpose and intention not to observe or recognize as binding on her, said provision” was pleaded. Upon hearing, the respondent found the petitioner guilty of contempt because of failure to obey the quoted portion of the decree; but it was provided that the hearing be continued for two weeks from the date of entry of the judgment of contempt for the purpose of passing sentence; and that “if plaintiff files her affidavit in this cause by that date that she is rearing the child in the Catholic faith, then she shall stand purged of contempt to this time; otherwise appropriate punishment to be inflicted.”
It appears without contradiction that the petitioner, since the divorce, has not taken Richard to a Roman Catholic Church, but that he has been attending a Congregational Church Sunday school, and has attended a Bible school summer camp, apparently conducted by the same church, for about two weeks in the summers of 1953 and 1955. Mrs. Lynch did not take him to Sunday school, but sent him with her “former sister-in-law”; she “saw that he got there.” The father’s right of visitation was not denied him, and twice he took the boy to the Roman Catholic Church. The father says, and the mother denies, that she stated she would not raise the boy in the Roman Catholic faith. The petitioner, as a witness, said that she refused to sign the first stipulation presented to her because it obligated her to raise Richard as a Roman Catholic, “because it would be too inconvenient to do so * # She testified it was her understanding “when he got old enough to make a choice that I wouldn’t interfere in any way. That is the way it was stated to me before the divorce. That is the way it was stated to me by Mr. Henneberry (the husband’s attorney in the divorce action) and Mr. Kay (her own attorney).”
Although constitutional questions are present, another defect in the proceedings is deemed by a majority of this court to be so clearly apparent as to require that the writ of certiorari be sustained, before the issue of constitutionality is reached. We shall discuss this matter first.
[72]*72I. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal. While the object to be attained is often civil obedience, the punishment frequently resembles that inflicted for violation of the criminal laws. The rule is thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contempt, section 67, page 434:
“While contempts are not to be regarded in any sense as a substitute for the ordinary criminal laws of the country, they are, in their essential characteristics, to be deemed primarily criminal and punitory. * * * Proceedings for contempt are therefore commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when they arise in civil actions.”
It is well settled that a judgment may be so indefinite and uncertain as to be wholly void. 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, section 20, page 828.
In 49 C.J.S., Judgments, section 72, pages 191, 192, it is said: “A judgment must be definite and certain in itself, or capable of being made so by proper construction. It must fix clearly the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the cause, and be such as defendant may readily understand and be capable of performing * * *. Where the record entry is wholly uncertain * * * the judgment is at least erroneous, and it may be void.” (Italics added.)
This is particularly true in contempt proceedings, where the alleged contemnor is in danger of drastic punishment if the judgment does not clearly inform him what is required. The contempt proceeding is so near in its nature to criminal prosecutions that the well-known rule which commands that one cannot be convicted of a crime unless the statute is clear and definite so that he may know what he can and what he cannot do, is at least analogous.
The Supreme Court of California has said: “The rights of the parties under a mandatory judgment whereby they may be subjected to punishment as contemnors for a violation of its provisions, should not rest upon implication or conjecture, but the language declaring such rights or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal so that the parties may not be misled thereby.” Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 164, 124 P.2d 5, 8.
[73]*73This language was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592, 28 A.L.R.2d 672, 677.
To the same effect is the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 63 Nev. 249, 257, 167 P.2d 648, 651. The court there said:
“A judgment or decree may be so uncertain and indefinite as to be impossible of administration, unenforceable and void. And a judgment may be partly valid and partly void. [Citing authorities]
“It is well settled that indefiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment or decree may constitute a good defense in contempt proceedings [with further citations].”
In State v. Oppal, Ohio App., 77 N.E.2d 270, 271, the defendant had been cited for contempt for failure to execute a quitclaim deed as ordered by the court in a divorce action. The property was encumbered by a mortgage upon which the defendant was personally liable. The decree did not disclose whether she was to be held harmless from this liability upon executing the deed. The Ohio appellate court held the decree was so uncertain that its provisions could not be enforced by contempt, and reversed the judgment of guilty against the defendant. It cited 23 Ohio Jurisprudence, section 153, page 621: “ ‘Inasmuch as the judgment and its enforcement are the end and aim of the whole litigation, to satisfy this purpose the judgment must so dispose of the matters at issue between the parties that they and such other persons as may be affected, will be able to determine with reasonable certainty the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined.’ ”
In Howard S. Tierney, Inc. v. James, 269 App. Div. 348, 354, 355, 56 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13, 14, the defendant had been enjoined from soliciting, accepting or receiving insurance business from customers of the plaintiffs who had not been specifically allotted to him by arbitrators. The trial court found him in contempt for violation of this order. The New York Supreme Court reversed, saying: “The better way would have been to list in the interlocutory judgment the names of all customers, dealing with whom was enjoined, thus eliminating all doubt.” The court held the injunction void for indefiniteness, quoting: “ ‘Unless a con[74]*74tempt proceeding is based upon an order which is clear and precise, no finding of contempt may be made.’ ” Matter of Mitchell v. Sperling, 229 App. Div. 204, 205, 241 N.Y.S. 543, 545. The point is well stated in Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N.Y. 534, 539, 47 N.E. 918, 920: “But as punishment for contempt involves, or may involve, not only loss of property but liberty, it is a reasonable requirement that the mandate alleged to be violated should be clearly expressed * *
A sound expression of the rule is found in Seastrunk Rendering Co. v. Hollingsworth, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W.2d 1014, 1016, 1017: “To warrant a decree of injunction, enforceable through contempt proceedings, the acts commanded or restrained must be described in the decree with sufficient definiteness for the defendant to know in advance what he must or must not do in order to abide by the decree and escape the penalties attaching to its infringement. The vice in the decree lies in the fact that it enjoins, not specific acts or omissions, but results, evidence of the existence vel non of which must of necessity be determined by the opinion evidence of witnesses, which could not be forecast or anticipated.”
The language is appropriate in the case at bar, since we think it would at least require expert opinion to determine what steps must be taken to rear the boy in the specified religion.
In Weber v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 26 Cal.2d 144, 148, 156 P.2d 923, 925, 926, the Supreme Court of California said (quoting from Brunton v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 202, 205, 124 P.2d 831, 833) : “It is well established that ‘the acts constituting the contempt must be clearly and specifically prohibited by the terms of the injunction’, and that the ‘party bound by an injunction must be able to determine from its terms what he may and may not do; he cannot be held guilty of contempt for violating an injunction that is uncertain or ambiguous’.”
So in Ex parte Vaughn, 205 Ala. 296, 298, 87 So. 792, 793, it was held that the divorced mother was not guilty of contempt for removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court and so in effect depriving the father of visitation rights granted him by the decree, there being no specific prohibition against such removal. The Alabama Supreme Court said: “It has been held that [75]*75the charge of contempt cannot be established for failure to comply with uncertain orders or judgments.”
To the same effect are Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, 197 Ga. 603, 30 S.E.2d 107; Carroll v. Hinchley, 316 Mass. 724, 56 N.E.2d 608, 612; Johnson’s Case, 242 Mass. 489, 494, 136 N.E. 563, 565; and Garrison v. Davis, 88 Utah 358, 368, 54 P.2d 439, 444 (“If a judgment is so uncertain as not to admit of enforcement it will be declared void.”)
II. Applying the foregoing well-established principles to the instant case, and keeping in mind that we have before us a contempt proceeding in which the punishment will in all probability be a fine or imprisonment of unknown but real severity, we can only conclude that that part of the decree involved should be held void for uncertainty and indefiniteness. The pertinent language is this: “It is provided that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion * * Is this language so clear, specific and unequivocal that it can be readily understood? Are the steps which must be taken so certainly pointed out that a judgment of contempt and substantial punishment should follow if the required things are not done? The decree must meet these tests, or it is void and unenforceable.
A negative answer to the question posed.is clearly indicated. How are we to determine what must be done to rear a child in any given religion? Religion itself is a term difficult to define. In United States v. Kauten, 2 Cir., N.Y., 133 F.2d 703, 708, Judge Augustus N. Hand said: “It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the content of the term is found in the history of the human race and is incapable of compression into a few words.” In Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 122 F.2d 108, 110, is this language: “Religion includes a way of life as well as beliefs upon the nature of the world * *
Since the Roman Catholic Church is a Christian church, this reference to the Christian religion is of interest: “Without undertaking a definition, the Christian religion, in its most important ultimate aspect, recognizes, has faith in and worships a Divine Being or Spirit — one Father of all mankind—who has the power to and will forgive the transgressions of repentants and care for the immortal souls of the believers, and which belief brings earthly solace and comfort to and tends to induce right [76]*76living in such believers.” Taylor v. State, 194 Miss. 1, 34, 11 So.2d 663, 673. In this aspect, all Christian churches hold to the same basic religion.
Both Funk & Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary and Webster’s New International Dictionary give somewhat long, involved and alternative definitions of religion. But the word “religion” is often confused in terms with cultus or form of worship of the different denominations. Township of Maplewood v. Albright, 13 N.J. Misc. 46, 176 A. 194, 195; Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal.2d. 85, 82 P.2d 391, 393; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 300, 33 L. Ed. 637. So we think the parties and the court here confounded the terms. They referred to the “Roman Catholic Religion” when they meant the cultus or forms of worship of that church; perhaps what was really intended was that the child should be reared in the Christian religion in conformity to the forms, discipline, organization and dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. If nothing more than the Christian religion was intended, rearing in any Christian church would satisfy the requirements of the decree; but obviously more than this was meant.
We must turn then to the factual situation to determine whether the language imposing burdens upon the petitioner in the original decree was so clear, definite and specific that she could readily understand it and so be capable of performing what was required of her. The decree itself does not specify who shall rear the child in the stated religion; in fact the record shows he had been baptized in the Roman Catholic faith and after the divorce his father had taken him to church on a few occasions. The petitioner says her understanding of the decree was that the question should be left open until the boy reached an age where he would be capable of deciding for himself. It may be argued that since the petitioner was given the custody of the child, the major duty of complying with the portion of the decree in controversy, if it could be complied with, was upon her. The controversy at this juncture merely points up the indefiniteness and uncertainty of the controversial portion of the decree. There is some force to the petitioner’s contention that she, not being a communicant of the Roman Catholic Church, would find it inconvenient to attend its services, and difficult to [77]*77train the boy in its forms and beliefs. The decree itself is silent as to whose duty it was to do these things.
It may seem at first impression that the decree tells the petitioner sufficiently what she must do. But this impression, if indeed it be held at all, will not bear analysis. What constitutes “rearing” a child in the religion or cultus of this church, or of any church ? Must he be taken to church once a week, or once in two weeks, on Sunday? If midweek services are held, must he be taken to them? Is it required that he attend catechism class? Must he attend a parochial school if the particular denomination in question maintains suchi schools? What fast days must be observed, what Lenten observances followed? Would it be sufficient if the child be required to conform to a part of these things, and, if so, which part? Or are all of them required? The difficulty would be the same, no matter what church might be named in such a decree as the one now before us.
Further, small boys are not usually sent to church services unaccompanied. Not being highly trained, .as a rule, in the social graces and amenities, they need some adult control. Is it required that the petitioner, although not a communicant of this church, attend its services regularly with her son? The decree gives no answer.
Again, the matter of rearing a child in any religion is commonly, and we believe properly, thought to be a matter of co-operation between church and home. In order to avoid a conviction for contempt here, must the petitioner endeavor to supplement the teachings of the church, of which she is not a member, in her home ? Without this co-operation, church attendance might well result in lip service only, to the faith taught there.
The fact that the exact duties required of the petitioner are vague and uncertain is somewhat pointed up by her own testimony of what she understood she was to do. The trial court, after finding her guilty of contempt, continued the hearing for some weeks, with the provision that if by a specified date the petitioner filed her affidavit that she was rearing the boy “in the Catholic faith” she should stand purged of contempt. There is still no indication of what specific action she should take. The court apparently left it to her to determine what was meant; but [78]*78she had .already told her version, of the meaning of the doubtful clause in the decree and found it unacceptable.
Her affidavit would of course be subject to challenge, and the court would then find it necessary to determine what specific steps the petitioner must take to comply, and this determination would necessarily be based upon opinion. It must be noted that the part of the decree with which we are concerned here is not merely a prohibition against doing a certain act. It is affirmative, or mandatory, requiring the performance of unspecified acts; acts which would meet the test of rearing the child in conformity with the various forms of worship of the church. Only those learned in the theology, the discipline and the organization of the church would know what these might be; and even among them, as among experts in all lines, differences of opinion might exist. Controversies arise within churches concerning the governing rules; see Ragsdale v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N/W.2d 539; Keith v. First Baptist Church, 243 Iowa 616, 50 N.W.2d 803. Many other cases might be cited. Theologians no longer dispute the formerly much-mooted question of how many angels could dance upon the point of a pin; but there are still many areas where entire agreement is lacking, even in the same church.
If the court meant to pronounce its original decree which would be so clear and definite that all parties could understand what was meant by it and what they must do to comply, it should have spelled out an interpretation of what it would consider sufficient to show a “rearing in the Roman Catholic religion” ; whether this imposed a duty upon the petitioner to take the boy to church regularly, or to other ceremonies and forms of observance and instruction in that church, or to parochial school, or to several or all of them; and whether or not she was under any duty to instruct and encourage the child in the adoption of this faith, in their home. These questions can be answered only by the uncertainties of opinion and conclusion evidence. The petitioner, left without any real guide, is now being punished for violation of a judgment so indefinite and uncertain, in the respect in question, that it must be held to be wholly void.
III. The evidence shows that the child was being taken, at [79]*79least with the consent of the mother, to a Congregational Church Sunday school. It may be urged that, even though the decree is not clear as to what she must do, at least she should not direct or permit instruction in another church with different forms of worship. The point is without merit. If the controversial part of the decree is void for uncertainty, as we have held, it is not binding upon the petitioner and she cannot be in contempt. She can not, be held in contempt unless the provisions of the decree are clear, specific and unequivocal so that she may know what she must do to obey them. Contempt cannot be predicated upon an alleged violation of a void decree. Carter v. Utterback, 200 Iowa 82, 83, 204 N.W. 446, 447; Geneva v. Thompson, 200 Iowa 1173, 1175, 1176, 206 N.W. 132, 133; Dayton v. Patterson, 216 Iowa 1382, 1388, 250 N.W. 595, 598; Kreling v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 884, 118 P.2d 470, 471.
It is of course well settled that a void judgment may be collaterally attacked. Dayton v. Patterson, supra, page 1388 of 216 Iowa, page 598 of 250 N.W.
IV. The petitioner raised the point considered in the preceding divisions by her motion to direct; sketchily, perhaps, but we think sufficiently. The grounds of the motion were that the evidence failed to show contempt or that the conduct of the petitioner was willful; and that there was no sufficient showing that the petitioner is able to comply with the decree. The court did not directly rule upon the motion, saying it would determine it with the main case. The motion was made at the close of the informant’s evidence, and was not renewed at the close of the entire case. Generally, such renewal is required; but here it was not necessary, since the court had not ruled upon it, but had taken it under advisement, to be decided with the ease. The motion being already before the court, it was not necessary to renew it.
In argument in this court, petitioner urges that the decree does not command her to do or to refrain from doing anything, and so disobedience is impossible. Ex parte Vaughn, supra, is also cited as authority for the proposition that failure to comply with uncertain orders or judgments cannot be contempt.
Nor could the judgment of the trial court be upheld [80]*80here if petitioner had at no time raised the question of uncertainty. If, as we have pointed out, the decree is so uncertain and indefinite that it does not advise petitioner what she must do or not do, and so is void so far as a contempt proceeding is concerned, it would be a denial of justice to say she could nevertheless be punished for disobeying it. Generally, points not raised in the trial court, or not argued in this court, cannot be made the basis for reversal. But a different rule prevails where there is no jurisdiction. “Strictly speaking, lack of jurisdiction means lack of judicial power to act in the premises * * 21 C. J. S., Courts, section 15b, p.age 32. And it is the duty of a court to take notice of a lack of jurisdiction on its own motion, even though the question is not raised by the contending parties. 21 C. J. S., Courts, section 114, pages 175, 176. In 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, section 839, it is said: “This question cannot, so far as jurisdiction of the subject-matter is concerned, be waived by the parties or overlooked by the court.” We ourselves have said: “This point is not raised by the defendant, but, as it is jurisdictional, we are required to consider it, and avoid exercising authority in a case wherein we have no jurisdiction.” Quinn v. Capital Insurance Co., 82 Iowa 550, 553, 48 N.W. 935, 936. Likewise, it seems self-evident that a court attempting to enforce a void decree by contempt proceedings is acting illegally and without jurisdiction. Kreling v. Superior Court, supra, at page 887 of 18 Cal.2d, page 472 of 118 P.2d. Since we think the question was sufficiently raised both in the trial court and here, we shall not elaborate the point further.
V. While probably not decisive of the case, it may be well to point out the unfortunate effect upon the child of an attempt to enforce the vague and uncertain provisions of any decree ordering religious training. The able trial court was disturbed by this aspect of the case. It said:
“There is the matter of separating church and state; the possibility of inharmony with the mother going to> one church and the child to another; the difficulty of policing this part of the decree; the cumbersome nature of court processes compared with the sensitive nature of this subject; and so on. Surely these are good reasons for parties not placing a provision on religion in a default decree * *
[81]*81Our court is committed to the rule that the welfare of the child is generally the governing purpose in all proceedings involving custody, care and training. Chiefly for this reason, the courts have generally refused to enforce agreements between the father and mother concerning the religious training of children, but have held that the parent having custody is not bound by a previous contract. 29 Harvard Law Review 485, 492; Zollmann, American Church Law, 46 to 49; Andrews v. Salt, L.R. 8 Ch. App. 622; Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685-692 inclusive; Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N. J. Super. 90, 97 A.2d 419, 425, 427.
In the latter case, at page 104 of 26 N. J. Super., page 427 of 97 A.2d, it is said: “The parent to whom custody is awarded must logically and naturally be the one who lawfully exercises the greater control and influence over the child. The mother, who lives with the child more than six days a week, as contrasted with the father’s limited visitation of a few hours on Sunday, is the one who actually rears the child and shapes its moral, mental, emotional and physical nature. To create a basic religious conflict in the mind of the child, and between it and its custodian, would be detrimental to its welfare.”
A thorough discussion of this problem is found in Brewer v. Cary, supra, another case in which the court declined to enforce a contract concerning the religious upbringing of a child.
We are cognizant of the fact that the trial court had already decreed performance of the contract for religious rearing of the child Richard. The respondent herein, although questioning the wisdom of the provision in the original divorce decree concerning religious training, felt he was bound by it. In this we think he was in error, because of the indefiniteness of the controversial clause.
Not only do we think, as we have indicated, that the questioned provision must fail for lack of certainty, but its enforcement under such circumstances as here would do much harm, no matter what the denomination involved. The child is already the unfortunate victim of a broken home. He is only seven years of age. Controversies between his father and mother, arising from the uncertain provisions of the divorce decree as to his training will certainly subject him to many harmful prob[82]*82lems. With, constant bickering of his parents concerning compliance or noncompliance with the decree, the real sufferer would be the child.
Courts should be slow to place provisions controlling religious beliefs in decrees, even granting certainty and constitutionality and the consent of the parties.
VI. Although the constitutional questions are not determinative in view of our holdings in Divisions I, II, III, and IV, they will bear some consideration. The respondent recognized the danger of violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of Article I, section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa; but he thought that the agreement of the parties removed the disputed part of the decree from the purview of these constitutional prohibitions. He said: “* * * no one is imposing a particular faith on the parties; they have chosen to impose it on themselves.
“It is simply a case of the parents bringing the thing down on themselves; and of their involving the Court in an area into which the Court perhaps should not have been taken.”
This may be doubted. This is not a case in which the contract is merely used as a defense, as was true in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 154, 155, 60 N.W.2d 110, 115. In the case before us the court is actively enforcing the provisions of the decree. The Supreme Court of the United States has said, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d 441, and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187, that this may not be done.
In the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or "other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”
It is now well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to. the states the restrictions of the First Amendment, in particular those forbidding interference with, or pre[83]*83scription of, religions beliefs or training. People of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 648, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338; and these limitations extend to all branches of the State Governments, including the judiciary. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra; Bridges v. State of California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192.
In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, supra, at page 155 of 245 Iowa, page 115 of 60 N.W.2d, we discussed the meaning of Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and Hurd v. Hodge, supra, and concluded that they prohibited the state or any of its agencies from enforcing a contract which violated constitutional prohibitions; but we distinguished the ease then at bar on the ground that the state was not taking an affirmative part in enforcement of the alleged offending agreement. We said:
“While we must recognize an evolution of our society as disclosed by these recent decisions [Shelley v. Kraemer and Hurd v. Hodge, both supra], all of the previous decisions may be distinguished from our present case in that they disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to aid in discrimination, or other deprivation of right.”
In the instant case the respondent, as the trial court, was directly enforcing the offending provision of the contract.
The writ of certiorari is sustained, with directions to dismiss the information charging contempt.
Hays, Larson, Peterson, and Wennerstrum, JJ., concur.
Bliss, Garfield, Oliver, and Smith, JJ., dissent.