Lynch v. Postlethwaite

5 Mart. 69
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Lynch v. Postlethwaite. Read the opinion of the Court — 5 Mart. 293
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided July 15, 1819·Published

Opinion

Martin, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. Our attention in the decision of this cause is first claimed by several bills of exceptions.

1. The contract between the parties having feeen produced by the plaintiff’s counsel sub* [209]*209r:be<l and st$}ed by the defendant, and at Hfyfcd by a subscribing witness, and proof '.made the .0,⅜⅞#»*1⅛1¾ of both the defendant and latter being shewn to reside out of ⅛⅜⅜-8⅛¾⅝,: the defendant’s counsel objected to its and the district court overruling ⅞⅛11 of exceptions was taken.

We are of opinion that the district court was correct. The witness being out of the jnrisdic-of the state, his attendance in court could not lie compelled, neither could it be before a commissioner. His testimony, thus affording the best evidence of the execution of the instrument, was not, in the power of the plaintiff, who therefore was for this very reason dispensed fr m producing it. The defendant’s signature, as it was not formally denied, was properly proven by a witness acquainted w ith his handwriting. Clarke’s ex.’s vs. Cochrane, 4 Martin, 360.

2. The next bill of exceptions is to the opinion of the district cour* in ordering the. reading of a report of certain individuals, appointed by the parlies, offered by the plaintiff, for the sole purpose of lessening the credit due to the deposition of one of these indi iduals, examined as a witness for the defendant.

[210]*210It appears to us that this report,^dtiioiig| was not sworn to, was properly admitted J the purpose of shewing a discrcpajcy ⅛6⅜⅜⅛⅜¾ the statement to which the witniM'®fe| and that in ilie report which he ha&^pSSi /by his signaiure. It is in every «1⅝⅜8^[⅛1⅛⅛⅛.> to prove dect»rations made by «f'Svitness trarv to vvnat lie swears : but the usd'"®-⅝¾⅞1 ' evidence must always be restricted to what was the avowed object of the plaintiff, who otiered it, viz. to lessen tue credit of the w ituess.

3. The third bill was taken to the opinion of the court in sustaining an objec ión of the plainuft’s counsel to the following question put by the defendant to Commodore Patterson, a witness introduced by the former, for the purpose of establishing the soundness of the Vesuvius. “ if y on liau contracted for the purchase of a steam boat, in ail respects sound and in good order, and a boat had been tendered to you, under this contract, with one third of her important timbers, including her lower tuttocks, rotten, would you deem such a boat answering the description in the contract, or being in all respects sound and in good order ?”

"VYe. are not apprized, by any thing on the record, of the nature of the objection to which the district court judged this question liable, and [211]*211iwe believe it ought to have been answered ; al-%hongh it might perhaps, which we do not-de-termiri'ej^UítVe^heen modified, so as to answer the ⅝⅜ by limiting the supposed, case -o that of .^te^tjjljoatingood order; instead of extending ⅜'& was done, to tiiat of a boat sound and in good order. As this bill, however, was taken by' the defendant, and the aiost favorable answer could not avail , him, the stipulation being for a boat in good order, and not for one sound S|iand in good order, we think it useless to remand the case on this account.

4. A fourth bill was taken by the defendant’s counset on the refusal to swear Charles K. Lawrence, in chief ; this gendeman having on his voire dire declared, that about the 24th of Xo-ve,nber, 1818, he purchased ten shares in the Natchez Steam Boat Company, andexpeced to pay his proportion of the price of the Vesuvius, if this court declared it to have been purchased by that company.

The interest, which this witness has in the present action, was sufficient to repel him. But it was contended that he acquired it, by his own act, after the contract now sued upon was entered into, and consequently that he could no*, by so doing, deprive the defendant of the rigid which he bad to his testimony. The record does not [212]*212shew wbether|he fact, which he was called uponjl to establish, ivas/an revi or to his acquisition of T the Starrs; although the;''circumstance <f its * date being particularly set forth, raises some-presumption that such is the case. But the bilT'\^ -of exceptions is one of the defendant’s, whose duty it was, if any particular circumstance en-ilied him to the testimony, notwithstanding the interest of the witness, to have made it clearly appear, in order to take the case out of the general rule. This we cannot presume, and are consequently hound to conclude that the d'-drict. c nr! correctly refused to swear, the..witness' in' chief, as the bill does not enable us to say that it erred. We do not, however, wish to he understood-to determine that a wi ness who has ac / ¿red an interest by his own act, since the party vvho offers him had a right to his test! tony, may be sworn : a question which admits of considerable doubt. Phillips on Evidence, ⅛⅛. ¡03.

5. T¡ e last hill is on the refusal to per nit the d lant to offer in evide ce what Samuel A. Bower, a itness introduced by him, ad iieard ti e o»**rk of the stea m boat say. It s.difficult to tea on wual ground he could have been permitted so relate this. Hearsay is not evi seuce.

The plea in abatement appears to us to havo.H-[213]*213been correctly over idJ^TThe. dt was; ie contract. KTISk. i'* •• stock! aoftt. oit¿é^Sjlj|j$jf0 pftadfilgs to be Phe Nitáhez Steam Boat Company, and, scribed tiife contract. According to the ¿I law of England which is shewn to prevail,in the state of Mississippi, aii the members of ¿⅛ ⅜ unincorporated company are, bptfj|d,.'.as member of ordinary partnerships^iiE&i^l, 6. «’11⅜ have been en ered ⅛ iff contract is clearly shewn into by the authorised agents of the c acting Within the powers delegated to them; and cases are cited ill which a partner orUgent, contracting under his own seal, as the defendant j|did in this case, becomes personally bopnd.

The nature, validity and effects of this contract must be enquired into, according to the laws of the country, in which it was celebrated, even when the delivery of the tiling, or the fact stipulated for, is to take place abroad, i GaVison, 875. Were we to test this case by the laws of this state, still the, defendant wuld he found under a liability, as a member of the company, upon a contract entered into with ids consent. But he shews that, in the state of Mississippi, his plea would prevail on the principle recognised in the use of Rice vs. Shute, viz. that a [214]*214partners the sued sluoe, may abate the suit naming his co partners.

&K Here hits sqjMibt for and to be administered cases of solidary obligations Jjwhich are the joint and several obligations of the common-law, existing hetweefni partners) the creditor may sue either of hil debtors alone, and is not bound, even on the plea of ^ latter, to bring all or any of .the rest of the co-debtors in court. But it is contended that the act of the legislative council, 1805,'St>, requires, that the petition should contain, the names and residences of all the parties, and that the seventy and odd persons, named by the defendant in his answer, were parties to the contract, and their names not being in the petition, the suit must abate.

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Lynch v. Postlethwaite, 5 Mart. 69 (La. 1819).

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