1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTWYONE LYNCH, Case No. 21-cv-09897-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION 9 v. FOR JOINDER; SCHEDULING FURTHER DISPOSITIVE MOTION 10 A. KUSTER, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 11, 12 Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a California parolee proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because various claims are 15 unrelated and improperly joined. Plaintiff filed an opposition. Defendants filed a reply brief.1 16 For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 17 IN PART. Further dispositive motions are scheduled. 18 DISCUSSION 19 The federal rules on joinder of claims are straightforward. “A party asserting a claim, 20 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as 21 many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Claims against multiple 22 Defendants may be joined if the claims against them “aris[e] out of the same transaction, 23 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and [] any question of law or fact common to 24 all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. at 20(a)(2). The upshot of these rules is that “multiple 25 claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with 26 unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 27 1 "Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits." Id. "A buckshot 2 complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person – say, a suit complaining that A 3 defrauded plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his 4 copyright, all in different transactions – should be rejected if filed by a prisoner." Id. 5 Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Martinez and Marquez retaliated against him for 6 because he filed an administrative grievance against Martinez. Although Plaintiff alleges that 7 Martinez and Marquez retaliated against him indifferent ways, these claims arise from the same 8 transaction or occurrence (Plaintiff’s grievance against Martinez that triggered the retaliation) and 9 involve common questions of law (the legal standard for retaliation) and fact (the same triggering 10 grievance). Therefore, these claims are properly joined into a single action Rules 18 and 20. 11 Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendant Kuster for inciting violence against Plaintiff 12 and against both Defendants Kuster and Mowery for retaliating against Plaintiff for filing an 13 administrative grievance against Kuster. Although the retaliation claim against Kuster and 14 Mowery involves the same legal standard as the retaliation claim against Marquez and Martinez, 15 they do not all arise from the same transaction or occurrence. The retaliation claim against Kuster 16 and Mowery arises from an administrative grievance Plaintiff filed against Kuster, whereas the 17 retaliation claim against Martinez and Marquez arises from a different administrative grievance, 18 i.e. a grievance against Martinez. Therefore, the retaliation claim against Kuster and Mowery is 19 not properly joined in this action. Similarly, the inciting violence claim against Kuster is not 20 properly joined because it does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the retaliation 21 claims against Marquez and Martinez. Consequently, these claims will be dismissed without 22 prejudice to Plaintiff bringing them in a new action. 23 Plaintiff claims that Kregg and Paulson refused to allow Plaintiff a single-cell. This claim 24 was found cognizable, when liberally construed, insofar as Martinez’s allegedly releasing 25 information about Plaintiff’s sexual offense conviction put Plaintiff in danger from having a 26 cellmate. This claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the asserted adverse 27 actions that Martinez took in retaliation against Plaintiff. Namely, Plaintiff claims that Martinez 1 which endangered him. This will also be a common question of fact in the two claims. Therefore, 2 the claim that Kregg and Paulson endangered him by denying him a single cell is properly joined 3 in the same case as the retaliation claim against Martinez. 4 In his opposition, Plaintiff describes a claim that he wanted a single cell because of the 5 retaliation and “harassment” by the other Defendants. The Court did not, and does not, find such a 6 claim cognizable because, as explained in the Order of Service, he cannot recover for emotional 7 distress because there was no alleged physical injury. Moreover, there is no constitutional 8 authority that denial of a single-cell, without more, violates the constitution. The only way in 9 which the single-cell claim here alleges a constitutional violation is that Plaintiff alleges that 10 denying the single-cell endangered Plaintiff, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to safety 11 from other inmates, because Martinez had disseminated information to the rest of the inmates that 12 Plaintiff had a conviction for a sexual offense, which meant that a cellmate would be more likely 13 to harm him. If Kregg and Paulson knew about this danger when they denied him a single cell, 14 that would be a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, 17 1. The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. The claims against Defendants 18 Kuster and Mowery are DISMISSED without prejudice to bringing them in a separate case. 19 Defendant Kuster’s motion to join the other Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 20 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case: 21 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, the remaining defendants, 22 including those who have been ordered served above, shall file a motion for summary judgment or 23 other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by 24 summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary judgment motion 25 is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff. 26 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the 27 court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date of service of the motion. 1 pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. 2 || Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date of service 4 || of the opposition. 5 d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 6 || hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 7 e. Along with his motion, defendants shall file proof that they served plaintiff the 8 || Rand warning at the same time they served him with their motion. Failure to do so will result in 9 the summary dismissal of their motion. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: March 28, 2023 12 □□ / 4 AERFYIEN S. HITE | United States’District Judge
2 16
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If Defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANTWYONE LYNCH, Case No. 21-cv-09897-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION 9 v. FOR JOINDER; SCHEDULING FURTHER DISPOSITIVE MOTION 10 A. KUSTER, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 11, 12 Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a California parolee proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because various claims are 15 unrelated and improperly joined. Plaintiff filed an opposition. Defendants filed a reply brief.1 16 For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 17 IN PART. Further dispositive motions are scheduled. 18 DISCUSSION 19 The federal rules on joinder of claims are straightforward. “A party asserting a claim, 20 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as 21 many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Claims against multiple 22 Defendants may be joined if the claims against them “aris[e] out of the same transaction, 23 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and [] any question of law or fact common to 24 all defendants will arise in the action.” Id. at 20(a)(2). The upshot of these rules is that “multiple 25 claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with 26 unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 27 1 "Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits." Id. "A buckshot 2 complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person – say, a suit complaining that A 3 defrauded plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his 4 copyright, all in different transactions – should be rejected if filed by a prisoner." Id. 5 Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Martinez and Marquez retaliated against him for 6 because he filed an administrative grievance against Martinez. Although Plaintiff alleges that 7 Martinez and Marquez retaliated against him indifferent ways, these claims arise from the same 8 transaction or occurrence (Plaintiff’s grievance against Martinez that triggered the retaliation) and 9 involve common questions of law (the legal standard for retaliation) and fact (the same triggering 10 grievance). Therefore, these claims are properly joined into a single action Rules 18 and 20. 11 Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendant Kuster for inciting violence against Plaintiff 12 and against both Defendants Kuster and Mowery for retaliating against Plaintiff for filing an 13 administrative grievance against Kuster. Although the retaliation claim against Kuster and 14 Mowery involves the same legal standard as the retaliation claim against Marquez and Martinez, 15 they do not all arise from the same transaction or occurrence. The retaliation claim against Kuster 16 and Mowery arises from an administrative grievance Plaintiff filed against Kuster, whereas the 17 retaliation claim against Martinez and Marquez arises from a different administrative grievance, 18 i.e. a grievance against Martinez. Therefore, the retaliation claim against Kuster and Mowery is 19 not properly joined in this action. Similarly, the inciting violence claim against Kuster is not 20 properly joined because it does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the retaliation 21 claims against Marquez and Martinez. Consequently, these claims will be dismissed without 22 prejudice to Plaintiff bringing them in a new action. 23 Plaintiff claims that Kregg and Paulson refused to allow Plaintiff a single-cell. This claim 24 was found cognizable, when liberally construed, insofar as Martinez’s allegedly releasing 25 information about Plaintiff’s sexual offense conviction put Plaintiff in danger from having a 26 cellmate. This claim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the asserted adverse 27 actions that Martinez took in retaliation against Plaintiff. Namely, Plaintiff claims that Martinez 1 which endangered him. This will also be a common question of fact in the two claims. Therefore, 2 the claim that Kregg and Paulson endangered him by denying him a single cell is properly joined 3 in the same case as the retaliation claim against Martinez. 4 In his opposition, Plaintiff describes a claim that he wanted a single cell because of the 5 retaliation and “harassment” by the other Defendants. The Court did not, and does not, find such a 6 claim cognizable because, as explained in the Order of Service, he cannot recover for emotional 7 distress because there was no alleged physical injury. Moreover, there is no constitutional 8 authority that denial of a single-cell, without more, violates the constitution. The only way in 9 which the single-cell claim here alleges a constitutional violation is that Plaintiff alleges that 10 denying the single-cell endangered Plaintiff, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to safety 11 from other inmates, because Martinez had disseminated information to the rest of the inmates that 12 Plaintiff had a conviction for a sexual offense, which meant that a cellmate would be more likely 13 to harm him. If Kregg and Paulson knew about this danger when they denied him a single cell, 14 that would be a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For the foregoing reasons, 17 1. The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. The claims against Defendants 18 Kuster and Mowery are DISMISSED without prejudice to bringing them in a separate case. 19 Defendant Kuster’s motion to join the other Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 20 2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case: 21 a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, the remaining defendants, 22 including those who have been ordered served above, shall file a motion for summary judgment or 23 other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by 24 summary judgment, they shall so inform the court prior to the date the summary judgment motion 25 is due. All papers filed with the court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff. 26 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the 27 court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date of service of the motion. 1 pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. 2 || Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date of service 4 || of the opposition. 5 d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 6 || hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 7 e. Along with his motion, defendants shall file proof that they served plaintiff the 8 || Rand warning at the same time they served him with their motion. Failure to do so will result in 9 the summary dismissal of their motion. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: March 28, 2023 12 □□ / 4 AERFYIEN S. HITE | United States’District Judge
2 16
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) 2 If Defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. 3 A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if 4 granted, end your case. 5 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 6 Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- 7 that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 8 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your 9 case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly 10 supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your 11 complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to 12 interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts 13 shown in Defendant's declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of 14 material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, 15 if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be 16 dismissed and there will be no trial. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27