Lynch v. Davis

92 S.E. 427, 79 W. Va. 437, 1917 W. Va. LEXIS 103
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 23, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 92 S.E. 427 (Lynch v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lynch v. Davis, 92 S.E. 427, 79 W. Va. 437, 1917 W. Va. LEXIS 103 (W. Va. 1917).

Opinion

Ritz, Judge:

In the year 1898, by the death of their mother,- Effie Lynch, Ida B. Davis, Anna L. Spindle, Ella Meek, Rufus H. Randolph and Lola M. Davis became the owners of fifty-four acres of land situate in the county of Harrison. Subsequently Rufus H. Randolph conveyed his one-sixth interest in this tract of land to his sister Effie Lynch. In the year 1895 the owners of the land decided to partition the same in kind among themselves, and to this end they secured the services of a surveyor who went upon the land and divided it into six equal parcels. The parties then assigned one of these parcels to each of the owners, except that to Effie Lynch there were assigned two of said parcels because of her said purchase of the interest of her brother. At the same time deeds were made between the parties conveying to them respectively the interests thus assigned, and these deeds were signed by all of the interested parties and acknowledged as to all of them, with the exception that the deed conveying the part thus assigned to Lola M. Davis was not aeknowledgéd, or at any rate the notary public did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment. However, subsequent to this time the parties treated the several parcels of land as owned by them in severalty. They sold parcels from it. The share of each was charged on the land books to the proper owner and the taxes paid, and ever since this partition was made the several parcels have been treated as being owned by the parties in severalty. In the year 1913 the five sisters executed to their brother Rufus IT. Randolph an oil and gas lease covering the whole of the property. The lease is by its terms the joint lease of all of the parties covering the whole tract of land, and describing it as a single parcel, and no indication is made in the lease of any holding of any part of it in sev-eralty. The lease provides that the lessee shall have the [439]*439right to explore the tract of land for oil and to take the oil therefrom, should oil be discovered, and deliver to the lessors one-eighth of any oil produced from said leased premises. In all respects this lease treats the tract of land as if it were owned by the five sisters jointly, and had never béen partitioned by them. This lease was transferred by the lessee therein named to others and a well which produced oil was drilled upon the parcel which had theretofore been assigned to Lola M. Davis. Upon the completion of this well the parties signed an order called a “division order” directing the pipe line company to deliver seven-eighths of the oil to the operator, and one-eighth of it to Effie Lynch and others, naming the other parties interested with Effie Lynch. At the same time they executed a power of attorney to a bank authorizing the bank to act for them in the sale of the one-eighth of the oil so to be delivered to them, and in the receipt thereof. At this time there was a question raised by Lola M. Dams as to the interest of the several parties in this oil, she then making the contention that she was entitled to receive all of the oil, in as much as the well from which it was produced was upon her land, and the other parties claiming that it should be divided among them in the proportion in which each of them was interested in the whole tract. It was at this time determined that the rights of the parties in this regard were fixed by the lease, and in this conclusion they were correct. On account of this dispute between the parties the bank to whom the power of attorney was executed refused to act under it, and this suit was then instituted in the Circuit Court of Harrison County for the purpose of partitioning the oil among the five interests above referred to. The defendant Lola M. Davis answered the bill and claimed that she was entitled to all of this oil, in as much as it was produced from a well drilled upon the land which had been assigned to her.

The first contention made by the plaintiffs who are seeking to have the oil divided among the interested parties, in accordance ivith the interest held by each in the whole tract of land, is that the attempt to partition the land in 1905 was ineffective in so far as the defendant Lola M. Davis was con[440]*440cerned, because the deed from themselves attempting to convey the interest to her in severalty was not acknowledged before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, or at any rate that the acknowledgment thereto was never signed by such officer. It is admitted that ever since said time the parties have held the tracts of land assigned to them in severalty. None of them have in any way interfered with the possession, control, use or ownership of the parcels assigned to the others. Under this state of facts there is no merit in the contention-of the appellants that the partition was ineffective to vest the title to the tract assigned to the defendant Lola M. Davis in her in severalty. Possession of the premises assigned to them respectively was given to each of the parties. They exercised uninterrupted ownership and control over such, premises from the time of such partition, and still continue to so treat the said land, and in view of this no deed or deeds were necessary to make this partition effective between the parties. Frederick v. Frederick, 31 W. Va. 566.

This brings us to a consideration of the only other question involved in this case, and that is, where several parties own several distinct parcels of land and join in a lease for gas and oil covering all of the several parcels so owned by them, and lease the same as one boundary, and make no provision for the payment of royalty to them separately, are each of such owners entitled to the oil produced from a well drilled on the tracts so owned by him, or do all of the parties participate in the royalty derived from the oil produced from a well, no matter upon which parcel of said land the same may be drilled? This seems to be a question of first impression in this state. We have cases which hold that where a lease like this is made the drilling of a well by the lessee upon any one of the tracts, and the production of oil therefrom, will vest in him the right to produce oil from all of the tracts so covered by such lease.

In the case of Harness v. Eastern Oil Company, 49 W. Va. 232, two tracts of land containing one hundred and fifty-two acres, and thirty-five and one-half acres, were owned by Harness and his wife respectively. They joined in a lease of [441]*441the two tracts describing them as one tract of land, containing one hundred and eighty-seven and one-half acres, more or less. A well was drilled on the tract of one hundred and fifty-two acres owned by Harness, and it was held that the drilling and production of oil from this well was sufficient to maintain the lease in force as to the thirty-five and one-half acre tract belonging to Mrs. Harness.

In the case of South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, three persons owned respectively three contiguous tracts of three hundred and twenty-nine acres, one hundred and forty-three acres, and two hundred and seventeen and five-tenths acres. They executed a single lease covering all of them and described the premises as a single tract of six hundred acres, more or less. Later, two of the lessors conveyed parts of their land to two other persons. A well was drilled on one of the three tracts, but none on the other two.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Leonard v. Barnes
404 P.2d 292 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 1965)
Stroud v. D-X Sunray Oil Co.
1962 OK 240 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1962)
Dickerson v. Ray
169 N.E.2d 341 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1960)
Sinclair Crude Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
1958 OK 110 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1958)
Central Pipe Line Co. v. Hutson
82 N.E.2d 624 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1948)
Hamilton v. McCall Drilling Co.
50 S.E.2d 482 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1948)
Pridemore v. Lucas
47 S.E.2d 839 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1946)
Robinson v. Milam
24 S.E.2d 236 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1942)
Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken
1942 OK 140 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1942)
French v. George
159 S.W.2d 566 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1942)
Walker v. West Virginia Gas Corp.
3 S.E.2d 55 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1939)
Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd
181 So. 439 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1938)
Jackson v. Kent
145 S.E. 572 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1928)
Kendall v. Hays
123 S.E. 459 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1923)
Musgrave v. Musgrave
103 S.E. 302 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1920)
Kimbley v. Luckey
1919 OK 108 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1919)
Pittsburgh & West Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom
97 S.E. 593 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1918)
Campbell v. Lynch
94 S.E. 739 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
92 S.E. 427, 79 W. Va. 437, 1917 W. Va. LEXIS 103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lynch-v-davis-wva-1917.