Lynch v. Davis

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 27, 2023
• Docket: 3:18-cv-00444
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 FRANKLIN LYNCH, Case No. 18-cv-00444-EMC

8 Petitioner, DEATH PENALTY CASE

9 v. ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 10 RON DAVIS, et al., PLEADINGS 11 Respondents. Docket No. 103

12 13 14 Petitioner is a condemned inmate at San Quentin Prison. Before the Court is Petitioner’s 15 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 103), which seeks a ruling pursuant to Federal 16 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on Claim Nine in the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas 17 Corpus (“Amended Petition”) (Docket No. 82). Respondent has filed a response (Docket No. 18 104), and Petitioner has replied (Docket No. 106). For the reasons described below, the Court 19 DENIES the motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 In 1992 an Alameda Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of, inter alia, the first-degree 22 murders of Pearl Larson, Adeline Figuerido, and Anna Constantin. (Docket No. 82 at 20); People 23 v. Lynch, 237 P.3d 416, 424, 50 Cal. 4th 693, 701 (2010). Finding true the special-circumstance 24 allegations of burglary murder, robbery murder, and multiple murder, the jury sentenced Petitioner 25 to death. Lynch, 237 P.3d at 424, 50 Cal. 4th at 702. The California Supreme Court affirmed 26 Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on August 12, 2010. Id. The state court also denied 27 Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a summary order on January 17, 2018. 1 this Court on July 30, 2019 and filed the Amended Petition on May 5, 2021. 2 Arguing that a judgment on Claim Nine will resolve the Amended Petition in his favor and 3 negate the need for further proceedings, Petitioner has filed the instant motion. Claim Nine asserts 4 that “the trial court erroneously denied Petitioner’s timely request to represent himself at trial.” 5 (Docket No. 82 at 154 (capitalization standardized).) In rejecting this claim on direct appeal, the 6 California Supreme Court “conclude[d] the trial court properly denied his [Faretta] motions on the 7 basis they were untimely.” Lynch, 237 P.3d at 430, 50 Cal. 4th at 712. 8 The parties do not dispute the relevant facts underlying Claim Nine. Petitioner was 9 arraigned on October 27, 1987. Id. The court appointed Michael Ciraolo and Michael Berger as 10 trial counsel shortly thereafter. Id. The court held a preliminary hearing over the course of eight 11 months from late-1987 through mid-1988. Id. On June 10, 1991, Petitioner filed a motion 12 pursuant to People v. Marsden, 465 P.2d 44, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970) (“Marsden motion”), in which 13 he sought to replace his trial counsel because he believed that counsel were not working with him 14 on tactical decisions, would not inform him of their strategies, and had failed to communicate with 15 him regularly. Id., 237 P.3d at 431, 50 Cal. 4th at 712. Among other complaints, Petitioner told 16 the court that he lacked confidence in his attorneys’ ability to represent his best interests. Id. The 17 trial court held a hearing on the Marsden motion on August 1, 1991. 18 While waiting for a ruling on the Marsden motion, Petitioner “personally withdrew his 19 previously-entered waiver of his right to a speedy trial and demand[ed] to be brought to trial . . . 20 within sixty days of the filing” of the September 4 withdrawal. Id., 237 P.3d at 431, 50 Cal. 4th at 21 713 (quotation marks omitted). The withdrawal moved the statutory deadline to bring Petitioner 22 to trial to November 1, 1991. Id., 237 P.3d at 432, 50 Cal. 4th at 714. At that time, the case was 23 assigned to Judge Delucchi for trial. Id., 237 P.3d at 431, 50 Cal. 4th at 713. Pretrial motions 24 began on November 12, 1991. Id., 237 P.3d at 437, 50 Cal 4th at 721. 25 Petitioner filed his first motion to represent himself, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 26 U.S. 806 (1975), on September 27, 1991 (“First Faretta Motion”). Id., 237 P.3d at 432, 50 Cal. 27 4th at 714. Judge Delucchi held a hearing on the First Faretta Motion on October 7, 1991. Id., 1 reasons for electing to represent himself, questioned the attorneys about the time they had spent 2 preparing the case, and asked Petitioner how long he might need to be prepared to proceed to trial. 3 Id., 237 P.3d at 432-34, 50 Cal. 4th at 715-18. Petitioner was unable to state with certainty the 4 amount of time he would need to prepare, and his attorneys confirmed that the discovery was 5 extensive and took a considerable amount of time to review. Id. The court then explained to 6 Petitioner that the withdrawal of his waiver of his speedy-trial rights started the statutory clock and 7 required the court to call the case to trial imminently. Id., 237 P.3d at 434, 50 Cal. 4th at 717. The 8 prosecutors expressed concern about the number and ages of their witnesses if trial were delayed. 9 Id., 237 P.3d at 435, 50 Cal. 4th at 718. The court denied the First Faretta Motion as untimely, 10 citing in particular the potential delay granting the motion would create:

11 “. . . because of the advanced age of the victims, . . . and because of the possible delay in the proceedings which might arise in the event 12 I granted Mr. Lynch his pro per status, the Court’s going to rule that this motion is not timely made. We’re on the eve of trial. The trial 13 is to begin within two weeks. There was a time waiver [sic]. The Court’s made space and time available for the trial of this case. 14 Both sides are prepared to proceed. And so it’s the Court’s feeling that it’s not timely made, so the petition to proceed in pro per will be 15 denied for the reasons I’ve stated on the record.” 16 Id, 237 P.3d. at 435, 50 Cal. 4th at 719 (quoting trial court). 17 Petitioner filed another motion to represent himself (“Second Faretta Motion”) on October 18 16, 1991. Id. At the same time, he filed an additional Marsden motion and a motion to disqualify 19 Judge Delucchi. Id. The court denied both the disqualification motion and the Second Faretta 20 Motion as untimely and held a hearing on the Marsden motion, which it denied. Id., 237 P.3d at 21 435-36, 50 Cal. 4th at 719-20. On October 23, 1991, Judge Delucchi reconsidered the 22 disqualification motion, deemed himself disqualified, and vacated the rulings in which he denied 23 the Mardsen motion and the Second Faretta Motion. Id., 237 P.3d at 436, 50 Cal. 4th at 720. 24 The case was reassigned to Judge Sarkisian, who denied both pending motions. Id., 237 25 P.3d at 437, 50 Cal. 4th at 721. Judge Sarkisian considered the transcripts of the proceedings that 26 had been held before Judge Delucchi. Id. In denying the Second Faretta Motion as untimely, the 27 court explained: defendant’s request are his prior proclivity to attempt to substitute 1 counsel, the stage of the proceedings, and in particular the disruption and the delay that might reasonably be expected to follow the 2 granting of his motion. This record indicates that many of the witnesses in this case are elderly. 3 4 Id. The court additionally noted that Petitioner had been represented by his counsel “for a number 5 of years.” Id. The court then set pretrial motions to begin on November 12, 1991. Id. 6 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the 7 Faretta motions for abuse of discretion. Id. 237 P.3d at 437, 50 Cal 4th at 722 (citing People v. 8 Windham, 560 P.2d 1187, 1191-92, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 128 (1977).). The Court set out the standard 9 for reviewing a claim for self-representation under both federal and state law:

10 A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if the defendant unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable 11 time prior to the commencement of trial, and makes his request voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. As the high court has 12 stated, however, “Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute.” Thus, a Faretta 13 motion may be denied if the defendant is not competent to represent himself, is disruptive in the courtroom or engages in misconduct 14 outside the courtroom that “seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial,” or the motion is made for the purpose of delay. 15 16 Id., 237 P.3d at 437, 50 Cal 4th at 721-22 (citations omitted). In view of the trial court’s ruling, 17 the California Supreme Court specifically focused on timeliness. Under California law, a 18 defendant makes a timely motion for self-representation “a reasonable time prior to the 19 commencement of trial.” Windham 560 P.2d at 1191, 19 Cal. 3d at 128. The Court, however, 20 noted that the United States Supreme Court had “never delineated when a motion may be denied 21 as untimely[; n]or ha[d it] fixed any definitive time before trial at which a motion for self- 22 representation is considered untimely, or articulated factors a trial court may consider in 23 determining whether a self-representation motion was filed a reasonable time before trial.” Lynch, 24 237 P.3d at 437-38, 50 Cal. 4th at 722. 25 In light of the lack of more specific guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the 26 California Supreme Court has provided some guidelines on timeliness of Faretta motions. 27 “Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely” and “motions made long before trial [are] 1 context in which the motions are made. See id., 237 P.3d at 439, 50 Cal. 4th at 724 (collecting 2 cases). “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, 3 but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exist in the case at the time the self- 4 representation motion is made.” Id. Trial courts may consider “the needs of fairness and the 5 demands of [their] calendar[s].” Id., 237 P.3d at 440, 50 Cal. 4th at 725. Further,

6 a trial court properly considers not only the time between the motion and the scheduled trial date, but also such factors as whether trial 7 counsel is ready to proceed to trial, the number of witnesses and the reluctance or availability of crucial trial witnesses, the complexity of 8 the case, any ongoing pretrial proceedings, and whether the defendant had earlier opportunities to assert his right of self- 9 representation. 10 Id., 237 P.3d at 440, 50 Cal. 4th at 726. 11 Using these standards, the California Supreme Court determined that Petitioner’s trial 12 court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he did not make either of his motions for self- 13 representation in a timely manner. Id. The California Supreme Court cited the complexity of the 14 case, which included “three counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder[,] . . . charges 15 of burglary and robbery, . . . and special circumstance allegations of burglary murder, robbery 16 murder, and multiple murder, which if found true subjected defendant to a possible death 17 sentence.” Id. The California Supreme Court noted the potential for sixty-five prosecution 18 witnesses and “voluminous” discovery. Id., 237 P.3d at 440-41, 50 Cal 4th at 726. The California 19 Supreme Court also held that the trial court properly considered the facts that many of the most 20 important witnesses were elderly, attorneys for both parties were prepared to go to trial, and 21 Petitioner had withdrawn his waiver of his right to a speedy trial. Id., 237 P.3d at 440-41, 50 Cal 22 4th at 726-27. Finally, Petitioner had acknowledged that he did not know how long it would take 23 him to prepare to go to trial, even in the face of the statutory speedy-trial deadline. Considering 24 the circumstances, the California Supreme Court concluded that “granting the motion was 25 reasonably likely to result in substantial delay and disruption of the proceedings” and affirmed the 26 trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Faretta motion. Id., 237 P.3d at 442, 50 Cal. 4th at 728. 27 /// 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that there 3 is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 4 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because the parties do not dispute the material facts on 5 Claim Nine, the Court turns to the law. A federal district court sitting in habeas review of a state- 6 court decision must abide by the strictures of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 7 of 1994 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a petitioner must demonstrate that the 8 state court’s adjudication of the merits of his claim resulted in a decision “(1) that was contrary to, 9 or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the 10 Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 11 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 12 proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state 13 court’s factual findings; a petitioner may only rebut the presumption with clear and convincing 14 evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In applying these standards, a federal court looks to the “last 15 reasoned decision” by a state court. Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 568 (9th Cir. 2010). 16 The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of Section 2254(d)(1) have 17 separate and distinct meanings. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal 18 law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States 19 Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court 20 has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). 21 A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court law if “the state court 22 identifies the correct governing principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 23 the petitioner’s case. Id. at 414. Additionally, a state court’s decision may be an “unreasonable 24 application” of Federal law if it “extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a 25 new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 26 (9th Cir. 2002). 27 The Supreme Court has emphasized that “an unreasonable application of federal law is 1 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 2 because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 3 applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be 4 objectively unreasonable.” Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). To be objectively 5 unreasonable, a state court’s error must be “so lacking in justification that [it is] well understood 6 and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 7 Harrington, 563 U.S. at 103. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 8 federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state 9 court’s decision.” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).Additionally, 10 “[h]oldings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only 11 definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. While Circuit law may be 12 ‘persuasive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an 13 unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding 14 on the state courts and only these holdings need be reasonably applied.” Rowland v. Chappell, 15 902 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 16 United States Supreme Court decisions discussing the right to represent oneself after 17 Faretta are scarce. Faretta is “[t]he only Supreme Court decision to discuss the timeliness of a 18 request to proceed pro se.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1997). “[A]fter 19 Moore, we know that Faretta clearly established some timing element, but we still do not know 20 the precise contours of that element. At most, we know that Faretta requests made ‘weeks before 21 trial’ are timely. Because the Supreme Court has not clearly established when a Faretta request is 22 untimely, other courts are free to do so as long as their standards comport with the Supreme 23 Court’s holding that a request ‘weeks before trial’ is timely.” Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 24 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, absent a specific delineation of timeliness by the Supreme Court, 25 the Faretta decision does not “preclude a consideration of factors other than the number of weeks 26 before trial a self-representation motion was made.” Faultry v. Allison, 623 F. App’x 315, 316 27 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 2 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). Specifically, Petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 3 being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 4 understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 5 disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. The Supreme Court has explained that “evaluating 6 whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more 7 general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 8 determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004). “If Supreme Court cases 9 ‘give no clear answer to the question presented,’ the state court’s decision cannot be an 10 unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Ponce v. Felker, 606 F.3d 596, 604 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008)). 12 Although Petitioner made his first Faretta motion five weeks before the statutory deadline 13 for trial to begin, within the “weeks before trial” standard established by Faretta, Lynch, 237 P.3d 14 at 432, 50 Cal. 4th at 714, the Supreme Court has not specified the number of weeks which would 15 make the motion timely per se. Nor does Faretta preclude consideration of factors other than the 16 number of weeks before trial. The California Supreme Court did just that. Id., 237 P.3d at 435, 50 17 Cal. 4th at 719. Among the circumstances the California Supreme Court considered were the facts 18 that Petitioner had been awaiting trial for around four years, the age and availability of several key 19 witnesses, the preparedness of Petitioner’s counsel, and Petitioner’s inability to state how much 20 time he needed to review the voluminous discovery and prepare for trial. Id., 237 P.3d at 440-41, 21 50 Cal. 4th at 726-27. This Court cannot conclude that this determination was an objectively 22 unreasonable application of Faretta, given the lack of specific benchmarks in Faretta or any other 23 U.S. Supreme Court decision precluding consideration of such circumstances. 24 Both the Ninth Circuit and this Court have found no Faretta violations after considering a 25 variety of circumstances. See Mitchell v. CSP Corcoran, No. 16-17057, 2021 WL 5984976, at *1 26 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Mitchell v. Madden, 142 S. Ct. 2883 (2022) 27 (finding reasonable state court’s conclusion “that Mitchell’s request to represent himself would be 1 additional weeks for trial preparation in a case that involved lengthy past continuances, where the 2 trial court had already convened approximately 1,000 jurors, and where elderly witnesses were set 3 to testify”); Randle v. California, 142 F. App’x 977 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding state court’s 4 application of factors identified in Windham not unreasonable application of clearly established 5 federal law); Martinelli v. Neuschmid, No. 19-CV-05461-JD, 2020 WL 6290376, at *6–7 (N.D. 6 Cal. Oct. 27, 2020) (finding denial of Faretta motion not unreasonable where state court 7 considered circumstances surrounding request, including number of witnesses and length of time 8 petitioner needed to prepare); Oliver v. Gower, No. 15-03556 BLF (PR), 2017 WL 11568171, at 9 *12-13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017) (ruling denial of Faretta motion “a little over a month before 10 trial” was not unreasonable where state court also considered circumstances including “significant 11 defense investigation,” preparedness of defense counsel, and potential unavailability of key 12 witnesses). The Supreme Court has emphasized that state courts must be granted “deference” and 13 “latitude” in matters where Supreme Court precedent establishes only a general standard, as 14 opposed to a specific legal rule. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. “The ‘weeks before trial’ standard 15 of Faretta is a general one,” Kincaid v. Runnels, 450 F. App’x 649, 650–51 (9th Cir. 2011); it 16 leaves interpretive ruling on that rendered by the California Supreme Court here. 17 This Court cannot conclude that the California Supreme Court’s determination that 18 Petitioner’s Faretta motions were untimely was “an error well understood and comprehended in 19 existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103; 20 see Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is logical to conclude that if a case 21 presents an issue close enough for reasonable minds to differ, then a state court’s decision 22 resolving the issue, even if incorrect, would not be objectively unreasonable.”) The California 23 Supreme Court’s determination of the timeliness of Petitioner’s Faretta motion was not 24 objectively unreasonable. For these reasons, Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is 25 denied. 26 /// 27 /// 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 3 103) is DENIED. The parties shall confer upon a briefing schedule for the claims in the Amended 4 Petition and present a Joint Case Management Statement within thirty (30) days of the date of this 5 order. 6 This order disposes of Docket No. 103. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: July 27, 2023 11 12 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27