LYNCH v. CORIZON, INC.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedDecember 13, 2021
Docket1:17-cv-00798
StatusUnknown

This text of LYNCH v. CORIZON, INC. (LYNCH v. CORIZON, INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
LYNCH v. CORIZON, INC., (S.D. Ind. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KIRK LYNCH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:17-cv-00798-JMS-DML ) CORIZON, INC., et al. ) ) Defendants. )

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Directing Entry of Final Judgment Plaintiff Kirk Lynch filed this lawsuit when he was an inmate at New Castle Correctional Facility ("NCCF") alleging that medical providers at that prison violated his Eighth Amendment rights through their deliberate indifference to several medical needs, including pain, anxiety and depression, headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, gout, cardiovascular problems, high cholesterol, asthma, gastrointestinal issues, hernia, and impacted intestines. Mr. Lynch further claims that this deliberate indifference was a result of a policy and practice of Corizon, LLC,1 the company contracted to provide medical care to Indiana inmates at that time. The defendants move for summary judgment, and Mr. Lynch has not responded. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted. I. Summary Judgment Standard A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

1 Mr. Lynch named Corizon, Inc. and Corizon, LLC as defendants in this action. But the defendants assert, and Mr. Lynch does not dispute, that they should be treated as the same entity. On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir.

2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and is not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The plaintiff failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, facts alleged

in the motion are deemed admitted so long as support for them exists in the record. See S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 ("A party opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief and any evidence . . . that the party relies on to oppose the motion. The response must . . . identif[y] the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment."); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local rules results in an admission"); Brasic v. Heinemanns, Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 285-286 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment where the nonmovant failed to properly offer evidence disputing the movant's version of the facts). This does not alter the summary judgment standard, but it does "[r]educe[] the pool" from which facts and inferences relative to the motion may be drawn. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, "[e]ven where a non‐movant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the movant 'still ha[s] to show that summary judgment [i]s proper given the undisputed facts.'" Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)). II. Facts Consistent with the standard set forth above, the following facts, unopposed by the plaintiff and supported by admissible evidence, are accepted as true. A. The Parties At the times relevant to the complaint, Dr. Ippel worked at NCCF as a doctor. Dkt. 161-3 ¶ 3. He started working at NCCF in November of 2015. Id. Dr. Fakhry Rafiq2 worked at a doctor at NCCF from November 9, 2015 through April 7, 2016. Dkt. 161-4 ¶ 3. At times relevant to Mr. Lynch's Complaint, defendants Gay Mullins and Angela Howard worked at NCCF as Licensed Practical Nurses ("LPNs"). Dkt. 161-1 ¶ 3; dkt. 161-6. Lisa Blount3

worked as a Registered Nurse at NCCF during the relevant times. Dkt. 161-5 ¶ 3. LPNs and Registered Nurses can evaluate, assess, and triage patients. Dkt. 161-1 ¶ 4; dkt. 161-5 ¶ 4; dkt 161-6 ¶ 4. They cannot prescribe medication or develop treatment plans. Id. Nurses handle inmate Healthcare Request Forms, evaluate patients in "Nursing Sick Call" to determine whether an inmate's medical complaint warrants referral to a doctor or nurse practitioner, and pass medications. Id. They also respond to medical emergencies. Id.

2 The Court notes that Mr. Lynch misspelled this defendant's name on the amended complaint as Dr. Rafik. 3 Mr. Lynch misspelled this defendants' name "Blunt" in the amended complaint. Loretta Dawson worked as a Nurse Practitioner ("NP") at NCCF from August 29, 2016, through March 31, 2017. Dkt. 161-7 ¶ 3. During the relevant times, Barbara Brubaker4 worked as an Advanced Practical Nurse at NCCF. Dkt. 161-2 ¶ 3. An Advance Practical Nurse is like a Nurse Practitioner. Id.

B. Mr. Lynch's Medical Conditions Mr. Lynch's medical care claims are based on care he received from October 12, 2015 to December 20, 2016. See dkt. 161-9 at 9-11. During that time, Mr. Lynch was enrolled in the Chronic Care Clinic at NCCF for pain in his joints. Dkt. 161-10 at 15. He had also been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and was seeing mental health staff to manage this condition. Id. As a Chronic Care patient, Mr. Lynch was seen every 90 days by a provider (a physician, physician's assistant, or nurse practitioner) for his chronic conditions. Dkt. 161-7 ¶ 5. If Mr. Lynch needed to see medical staff between chronic care appointments, he could submit a Healthcare Request Form. Id. Nursing staff would review and triage the form and either handle the request themselves or refer Mr. Lynch to a provider. Id. Mr.

Lynch also complained of several other conditions, which are discussed below. C. Mr. Lynch's Care in the Fall of 2015 In the Fall of 2015, Mr. Lynch was taking Pamelor5 for pain and Remeron for depression. Dkt. 161-6 ¶ 6. Nurse Mullins saw Mr. Lynch on October 12, 2015 after he submitted a Healthcare Request Form stating that the Pamelor was causing him to feel lightheaded and dizzy. Dkt.

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Bluebook (online)
LYNCH v. CORIZON, INC., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lynch-v-corizon-inc-insd-2021.