Lynch v. Clarkstown Central School District

155 Misc. 2d 846, 590 N.Y.S.2d 687, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 499
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 29, 1992
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 155 Misc. 2d 846 (Lynch v. Clarkstown Central School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lynch v. Clarkstown Central School District, 155 Misc. 2d 846, 590 N.Y.S.2d 687, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 499 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

William K. Nelson, J.

This is a CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus seeking an order of this court requiring respondents, Clarkstown Central School District and Superintendent Dr. John L. Krause (hereinafter collectively referred to as the District), to admit the infant plaintiff, Christie Lynch, to the Jesse Kaplan School without the immunizations mandated by Public Health Law § 2164. Supreme Court (Stolarik, J.) considered petitioners’ and respondents’ papers, originally submitted on an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction, as a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was denied, and the court ordered a hearing to be held.

Hearings were held at which both petitioners and respondents presented expert testimony and other evidence on the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to the relief requested. The entire history of the litigation on this, petitioners’ third request seeking to have Christie admitted without immunizations, is worth noting here.

I.

On September 7, 1990, petitioners sent a letter to the District requesting a religious exemption from the mandatory immunization requirements for Christie. On September 14, the District responded with a letter and questionnaire requesting additional information about petitioners’ religious beliefs. Petitioners completed the questionnaire, which was in the form of an affidavit, and in answer to question number 11 denied that they were seeking a medical exemption from immunizations. On September 19, the District denied petitioners’ request for a religious exemption in a letter from respondent Krause.

Petitioners next sought to obtain a medical exemption for Christie by presenting a note, exhibit B in evidence, from Dr. Pavel Yutsis. This request was denied by the District’s Chief Medical Officer on September 28, 1990, and on October 26, petitioners submitted their second claim for a religious exemption stating that they were now members of the Congregation of Universal Wisdom. The District again denied their request.

[848]*848In November 1990 petitioners sought a temporary restraining order against the District, in connection with a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on First Amendment grounds, seeking enforcement of their right to free exercise of religion and asking for a preliminary injunction. The District Court (Brieant, Ch. J.) denied the TRO and held a hearing on the preliminary injunction beginning in December 1990. Judge Brieant denied petitioners’ claim for injunctive relief and dismissed the petition on the merits, on factual grounds, while at the same time citing constitutional infirmities with the statute, Public Health Law § 2164. He also declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over petitioners’ State law claim of a medical exemption under Public Health Law §2164 (8). It is that claim that is now before the court.

Christie Lynch is a six-year-old child who has been diagnosed with Rett Syndrome. The syndrome in girls who are afflicted with it, including Christie, results in severe multiple disabilities. Christie cannot walk or speak and has no control over bladder or bowel functions. Her level of cognitive functioning as reported by a psychological evaluation in May of 1990 was at that of a SVz- to 5-month-old child, and her social development was reported at the four- to eight-month-old level. She received one dose of oral polio vaccine at approximately three months of age, and shortly thereafter was hospitalized and was diagnosed with viral syndrome. She has not received any other immunizations. Petitioners attribute the onset of her present condition to the administration of the oral polio vaccine. Christie presently receives home instruction provided by the District, although professional evaluations have shown she would benefit from a structured special educational environment such as that available through the Jesse Kaplan School. Christie has been refused admittance to the school because of petitioners’ refusal to comply with the mandatory immunization requirements of Public Health Law § 2164.

Following the District’s denial of petitioners’ first claim for a religious exemption, petitioners provided the District with a seven-line note, written on a prescription pad, signed by Dr. Pavel Yutsis, which stated, "To whom it may concern: This is to certify that Christie Lynch has been under my care for Rett Syndrome, a progressive neurological disorder with danger of dysphagia. It is my opinion that all vaccinations are contraindicated indefinitely.”

[849]*849Section 2164 (8) of the Public Health Law provides an exemption from the mandatory immunization requirements, stating, "If any physician licensed to practice medicine in this state certifies that such immunization may be detrimental to a child’s health, the requirements of this section shall be inapplicable until such immunization is found no longer to be detrimental to the child’s health.” In the present action, petitioners claim that in applying section 2164 the District may look no further than the face of Dr. Yutsis’ "certificate,” since he is a physician licensed to practice in New York. The District, on the other hand, argues that the statute itself does not define conditions that would be detrimental to a child’s health. It relies on the New York State Department of Health’s interpretation of section 2164 of the Public Health Law, and the corresponding regulation promulgated at 10 NYCRR 66-1.3, as requiring a school district to further scrutinize a "certificate” when the certificate fails to contain details contraindicating the administration of a vaccination "in accordance with accepted medical standards.” (See, exhibit K to Finkelstein Affirmation in Opposition, July 10,1991.)

II.

At the outset, it is clear that there are no procedural barriers to this court’s jurisdiction to decide this controversy on the merits, since, while petitioners could have sought review of the District’s decision by way of a formal appeal to the Commissioner of Education, that method of review is not mandatory or exclusive, nor does the failure of petitioners to seek such review preclude review of the District’s decision by the courts in an article 78 proceeding. (Matter of Coughlan v Cowan, 21 Misc 2d 667 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1959].) The court also notes that there are no reported cases in New York interpreting the medical exemption component of Public Health Law § 2164, nor has our research uncovered any reported cases in the United States dealing with a similar issue.

In deciding this case on the merits the court must examine the basis upon which the District made its decision, to determine whether that decision was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, or whether it was founded on a rational basis. Under this limited standard of review, if the District’s decision was founded on a rational basis, this court’s review of the matter must end. In undertaking this analysis the court [850]*850will assess the District’s decision on both a procedural and substantive level.

III.

It is clear from the testimony at the hearing and the voluminous exhibits submitted in evidence that procedurally the District did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. After receiving petitioners’ request for a medical exemption, the District referred the matter to its Chief Medical Officer.

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Bluebook (online)
155 Misc. 2d 846, 590 N.Y.S.2d 687, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 499, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lynch-v-clarkstown-central-school-district-nysupct-1992.