STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, SS Civil Action Docket No. e¥-06-145 /' ") (r({,.. '. ELIZABETH LYMAN,
Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER v. ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LUKE HUBER,
Defendant
I. BEFORE THE COURT
This matter comes before the court on defendant Luke Huber's ("Huber") motion
for partial summary judgment.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Huber was involved in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff, Elizabeth
Lyman ("Lyman"), for approximately fifteen years, beginning in 1991. At the time their
relationship began, Lyman was living in Portland and Huber was living in Saratoga
Springs, New York. In 1994, Lyman became interested in purchasing property that was
for sale in Cape Elizabeth so that she could start a business involving horses. At some
point, the partie~ discussed buying the property together, and did so in November 1994.
Huber paid the total purchase price at the time and Lyman made contributions later. 1
Lyman lived there full-time until she moved out in April of 2006. Huber did not live
there full-time until some time in late 2002 or 2003.
I The parties were initially listed as joint tenants, but later executed a quitclaim deed that changed their ownership status to tenants in common. Lyman has filed claims against Huber for equitable partition, waste and/ or trespass, and ouster, but they are not the subjects of Huber's motion. During their relationship, Huber paid for most of the household expenses, and also
contributed money for Lyman's horse business and her personal expenses. Lyman
contends that she was responsible for virtually all of the household chores, including
cooking, cleaning, food and household shopping, snow plowing, lawn mowing, and
landscaping. Huber asserts that he performed some of the household labor.
For reasons that are discussed within, the relationship deteriorated. In August
2006, Lyman filed an eight-count complaint against Huber asserting claims for, inter
alia, unjust enrichment (Count IV), quantum meruit (Count V), negligent infliction of
emotional distress (Count VI), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII),
and punitive damages (Count VIII).2 Huber answered the complaint and later filed the
present motion for partial summary judgment,3
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, err 4, 770 A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is
raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing
versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, err 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A
2 The eight counts of the complaint are: I. Equitable Partition II. Waste and/ or Trespass as Between Co-Tenants III. Ouster IV. Unjust Enrichment V. Quantum Meruit VI. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress VII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and VIII. Punitive Damages.
3 The defendant's motion is directed only at Counts IV through VIII, inclusive.
2 material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.
Sob us, 2000 ME 84, ']I 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575'. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute
must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ']I 7, 784 A.2d 18,
22. When a defendant seeks summary judgment, a "plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case for each element of her cause of action." Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr.,
1998 ME 87, ']I 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME
24, ']I 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.
B. Unjust Enrichment
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she
provided a benefit to the defendant, that the defendant knew of or appreciated the
benefit, and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to continue to retain the
benefit without payment of value. George C. Hall & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor, 628 A.2d 1037,
1039 (Me. 1993). "Where one party will be unjustly enriched by the receipt of goods or
services that are rendered by another with expectations of compensation, the law will
imply a promise to pay on the part of the recipient." Estate of White, 521 A.2d 1180, 1182
(Me. 1987). The issue of whether the services provided were gratuitous is one of fact.
Id. at 1183. The measure of recovery is "based on the extent to which the recipient has
been enriched." Id. at 1184.
For example, a construction company sued a town for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment when the town refused to pay the company for repairing a ballpark.
A.F.A.B, Inc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 610 A.2d 747, 749 (Me. 1992). The company
had been solicited to make the renovations by another company that planned to buy the
ballpark, but then did not purchase it. Id. at 748-749. When the construction company
agreed to repair the park, it did so because the other company had promised it
3 compensation regardless of whether the sale actually occurred. [d. at 749. The Law
Court held that summary judgment should not have been granted for the Town
because, although the trial court properly found that the first two elements had been
satisfied, it applied the incorrect legal standard regarding whether it was inequitable for
the town to retain the benefit. [d. at 7.
In this case, applicability of unjust enrichment depends upon whether Lyman
can show that she provided services to Huber with the expectation of compensation and
that it would be inequitable if she were not paid for them. Lyman contends that she did
virtually all of the cooking, cleaning, food and household shopping, snow plowing,
lawn mowing, and landscaping, and that such services were requested by Huber.
Huber disagrees with Lyman's assertions that she did all of the work on the property,
claiming that he also provided some labor. Furthermore, he asserts that he paid most of
the household expenses, and contributed money to Lyman's horse business and
personal expenses. Lyman admitted in her deposition that Huber paid most of the
household expenses, and stated in her affidavit that it was her understanding that
because she did not have as much money to contribute financially, she would perform
more of the household labor. She also admits that Huber paid some money toward the
horse business.
Given these facts, Lyman cannot show that she expected to be compensated for
the services that she provided, or that it would be inequitable for Huber to retain the
benefit of them. The parties had an arrangement whereby Huber would provide the
majority of the financial support to the household and Lyman would provide the
majority of household labor. Moreover, the division of household labor as part of the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, SS Civil Action Docket No. e¥-06-145 /' ") (r({,.. '. ELIZABETH LYMAN,
Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER v. ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LUKE HUBER,
Defendant
I. BEFORE THE COURT
This matter comes before the court on defendant Luke Huber's ("Huber") motion
for partial summary judgment.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Huber was involved in a romantic relationship with the plaintiff, Elizabeth
Lyman ("Lyman"), for approximately fifteen years, beginning in 1991. At the time their
relationship began, Lyman was living in Portland and Huber was living in Saratoga
Springs, New York. In 1994, Lyman became interested in purchasing property that was
for sale in Cape Elizabeth so that she could start a business involving horses. At some
point, the partie~ discussed buying the property together, and did so in November 1994.
Huber paid the total purchase price at the time and Lyman made contributions later. 1
Lyman lived there full-time until she moved out in April of 2006. Huber did not live
there full-time until some time in late 2002 or 2003.
I The parties were initially listed as joint tenants, but later executed a quitclaim deed that changed their ownership status to tenants in common. Lyman has filed claims against Huber for equitable partition, waste and/ or trespass, and ouster, but they are not the subjects of Huber's motion. During their relationship, Huber paid for most of the household expenses, and also
contributed money for Lyman's horse business and her personal expenses. Lyman
contends that she was responsible for virtually all of the household chores, including
cooking, cleaning, food and household shopping, snow plowing, lawn mowing, and
landscaping. Huber asserts that he performed some of the household labor.
For reasons that are discussed within, the relationship deteriorated. In August
2006, Lyman filed an eight-count complaint against Huber asserting claims for, inter
alia, unjust enrichment (Count IV), quantum meruit (Count V), negligent infliction of
emotional distress (Count VI), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII),
and punitive damages (Count VIII).2 Huber answered the complaint and later filed the
present motion for partial summary judgment,3
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, err 4, 770 A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is
raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing
versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, err 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A
2 The eight counts of the complaint are: I. Equitable Partition II. Waste and/ or Trespass as Between Co-Tenants III. Ouster IV. Unjust Enrichment V. Quantum Meruit VI. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress VII. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and VIII. Punitive Damages.
3 The defendant's motion is directed only at Counts IV through VIII, inclusive.
2 material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.
Sob us, 2000 ME 84, ']I 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575'. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute
must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ']I 7, 784 A.2d 18,
22. When a defendant seeks summary judgment, a "plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case for each element of her cause of action." Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr.,
1998 ME 87, ']I 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME
24, ']I 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.
B. Unjust Enrichment
To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she
provided a benefit to the defendant, that the defendant knew of or appreciated the
benefit, and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to continue to retain the
benefit without payment of value. George C. Hall & Sons, Inc. v. Taylor, 628 A.2d 1037,
1039 (Me. 1993). "Where one party will be unjustly enriched by the receipt of goods or
services that are rendered by another with expectations of compensation, the law will
imply a promise to pay on the part of the recipient." Estate of White, 521 A.2d 1180, 1182
(Me. 1987). The issue of whether the services provided were gratuitous is one of fact.
Id. at 1183. The measure of recovery is "based on the extent to which the recipient has
been enriched." Id. at 1184.
For example, a construction company sued a town for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment when the town refused to pay the company for repairing a ballpark.
A.F.A.B, Inc. v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 610 A.2d 747, 749 (Me. 1992). The company
had been solicited to make the renovations by another company that planned to buy the
ballpark, but then did not purchase it. Id. at 748-749. When the construction company
agreed to repair the park, it did so because the other company had promised it
3 compensation regardless of whether the sale actually occurred. [d. at 749. The Law
Court held that summary judgment should not have been granted for the Town
because, although the trial court properly found that the first two elements had been
satisfied, it applied the incorrect legal standard regarding whether it was inequitable for
the town to retain the benefit. [d. at 7.
In this case, applicability of unjust enrichment depends upon whether Lyman
can show that she provided services to Huber with the expectation of compensation and
that it would be inequitable if she were not paid for them. Lyman contends that she did
virtually all of the cooking, cleaning, food and household shopping, snow plowing,
lawn mowing, and landscaping, and that such services were requested by Huber.
Huber disagrees with Lyman's assertions that she did all of the work on the property,
claiming that he also provided some labor. Furthermore, he asserts that he paid most of
the household expenses, and contributed money to Lyman's horse business and
personal expenses. Lyman admitted in her deposition that Huber paid most of the
household expenses, and stated in her affidavit that it was her understanding that
because she did not have as much money to contribute financially, she would perform
more of the household labor. She also admits that Huber paid some money toward the
horse business.
Given these facts, Lyman cannot show that she expected to be compensated for
the services that she provided, or that it would be inequitable for Huber to retain the
benefit of them. The parties had an arrangement whereby Huber would provide the
majority of the financial support to the household and Lyman would provide the
majority of household labor. Moreover, the division of household labor as part of the
typical romantic relationship should not provide a basis for a claim of unjust
enrichment. Summary judgment is appropriate on this claim.
4 C. Quantum Meruit.
Quantum meruit is a vehicle for recovery when an implied contract exists.
Runnells v. Quinn, 2006 ME 7, lJI 10, 890 A.2d 713, 716-717 (citations omitted). To prevail
on a quantum meruit claim, a plaintiff must prove that he or she rendered services to
the defendant with the defendant's "knowledge and consent," and that, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff reasonably expects reimbursement. [d. lJI 10, 890 A.2d at 717.
The measure of recovery is the "reasonable value of the services used" by the
defendant. Estate of White, 521 A.2d at 1184, n. 3.
For the same reasons as stated above, Lyman also cannot prevail on a claim for
quantum meruit. She has not shown that it would be reasonable for her to expect
compensation for the household labor that she provided during the course of her
relationship with Huber while the defendant funded the household expenses and her
business. Summary judgment is warranted on this claim.
D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In order to prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must show "(1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant
breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the breach caused the
plaintiff's harm." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, lJI 18, 784 A.2d 18, 25. However,
plaintiffs "face a significant hurdle in establishing the requisite duty," because a
"general duty to avoid negligently causing emotional harm to others" does not exist. [d.
The "limited circumstances" in which an individual has such a duty are either in
"bystander liability actions" or when "a special relationship exists between the actor
and the person emotionally harmed." [d. at lJI 19, 784 A.2d at 25. Additionally, the
harm suffered must amount to "serious mental distress," which is "found where a
5 reasonable person normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the
mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the event." Id. at 437.
The Law Court has stated that it is "[o]nly where a particular duty based upon
the unique relationship of the parties has been established may a defendant be held
responsible, absent some other wrongdoing, for harming the emotional well-being of
another." Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 1999 ME 144,
839, 848 1999 (Me.1999). The special relationships that the Court has recognized as
providing a basis for recovery are those in which there is typically some unique level of
trust required. See e.g. Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986) (holding that a
psychotherapist had a duty to avoid emotional harm to a patient because of the nature
of the relationship); Bolton v. Caine, 584 A.2d 615, 618 (Me. 1990) (holding that a doctor
has a duty to avoid emotional harm caused by a failure to provide a patient "critical
information relevant to a potentially life-threatening illness"); Gammon v. Osteopathic
Hosp. of Me., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987) (holding that it was reasonably foreseeable to a
hospital and a mortician that families of the recently deceased would incur emotional
harm upon the negligent handling of remains).
Huber argues that a "boyfriend! girlfriend relationship" is not a special
relationship that would give rise to a duty to avoid causing emotional harm. In fact, he
asserts, a romantic relationship is one in which emotional harm is a common
occurrence. Lyman argues that it is not the romantic relationship between them, but
their relationship as co-owners of a house, which provides the basis for such a duty.
However, the Law Court has never held that co-owners of a house owe a duty to one
another to avoid causing emotional harm, and there is nothing unique about this type of
relationship that would warrant the existence of one. Because there is no special
6 relationship between the parties, summary judgment on claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress is appropriate.
E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant's behavior was "extreme and outrageous" to the point that it
"exceed[s] all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community." Latremore v. Latremore, 584 A.2d 626, 630 (quoting
Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 1979)(intemal quotation marks
omitted). For instance, in Latremore, the Law Court upheld a jury verdict awarding
damages for emotional distress to a couple whose son had threatened to evict them
from property that they originally had sold to him. [d. at 630. The Court was
persuaded that the jury reasonably could have found the son's behavior was "extreme
and outrageous" because he demanded excessively high rent from his parents and
threatened to evict them "even though he knew that his parents were aged and ... in
poor health." [d.
Lyman contends that shortly after the purchase of the home, Huber began to
create and enforce irrational rules and would respond with violent outbursts designed
to control and intimidate her when she did not comply, although she admits that he
was never physically violent toward her. She also asserts that she was forced to live in
an unreasonable condition, because Huber accumulated piles of papers, boxes,
newspapers, periodicals, crates, and trash that Lyman was forbidden to touch or move.
She submits that as a result of Huber's actions toward her, she felt inadequate and
withdrawn. She claims that visitors to the property witnessed Huber's behavior, and
provides affidavits from friends, family, and business associates to support her
allegations, including the effect of Huber's behavior on her. They describe Lyman as
7 "guarded, jumpy and withdrawn," "shaken," and "tense, afraid and on edge." Lyman
believed that Huber's angry outbursts would lead to violence if she did not comply
with his demands, and one friend witnessed her looking "exhausted and stressed with
dark circles under her eyes." Finally, she asserts that Huber exploited her financial
vulnerability.
Huber claims that the house was messy only toward the end of their relationship
as a normal consequence of the "dislocation" that they were experiencing. He denies
that any angry outbursts from Huber were directed at Lyman, and points to her
deposition testimony where she states that the anger was mostly directed at himself.
Furthermore, he argues that Lyman has failed to show that any distress she suffered
was sufficiently severe. He asserts that Lyman has not alleged any specific emotional
injury or symptom and has not sought treabnent for emotional distress. While it is
necessary to prove that the defendant's conduct caused severe emotional distress, such
distress may at times be inferred from the defendant's conduct and "objective
symptomatology is not an absolute prerequisite for recovery of damages for intentional,
as opposed to negligent, infliction of emotional distress." Latremore, 584 A.2d at 633.
Furthermore, the severity of emotional distress that a person suffers is a factual issue.
Id. at 631.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Lyman, she has satisfied her
burden to set forth a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Like the son's conduct in Latremore, Huber's behavior toward Lyman could be viewed
as manifesting a pattern of cruelty and intimidation such that a reasonable jury might
conclude that it is extreme and outrageous. Also, the affidavits of friends, family and
business associates of Lyman establish that the impact of that conduct upon the plaintiff
was severe. Because it is for the fact finder to determine whether Huber's behavior in
8 fact was extreme and outrageous, and whether Lyman in fact suffered severe emotional
distress, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate, as Lyman has made a prima
facie demonstration that there are facts supporting each element of an lIED claim.
F. Punitive Damages
A plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages only if there is underlying "tortious
conduct" and "the tortfeasor acted with malice." Waxler v. Waxler, 1997 ME 190,
699 A.2d 1161, 1165. Malice may be found where 1'the plaintiff can establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant's cond4ct was motivated by actual ill will
or was so outrageous that malice is implied." Id. (quoting Fine Line, Inc. v. Blake, 677
A.2d 1061, 1065 (Me. 1996)).
Huber first argues that the defendant's conduct must be tortious to support an
award of punitive damages and Lyman is unable to show such conduct. Additionally,
he contends that the claims presented by Lyman do not show either actual or implied
malice. Lyman asserts that Huber's conduct was intended to control and intimidate
her. If a jury concludes that Huber's actions amounted to intentional infliction of
emotional distress, it may also be possible for them to find that Huber acted with
malice, actual or implied, for the same reasons as outlined above. Lyman has generated
a genuine issue of material fact as to malice, and summary judgment is not appropriate.
IV. DECISION AND JUDGMENT The clerk will make the following entries as the Decision and Judgment of the
court:
A. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to Count IV, unjust enrichment;
B. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to Count V, quantum meruit;
9 C. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to Count VI, negligent infliction of emotional distress;
D. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied as to Count VII, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and,
E. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied as to Count VIII, punitive damages.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: , ~~~..., 2.~ .2-00 ~ I
Thomas E. ha ty II Justice, Superior ourt
10 IF COURTS and County Box 287 ine 04112-0287
PAU~A HOUSE MCFAUL ESQ -/ 26 SAWYER ST SCARBOROUGH ME 04074
IF COURTS and County Box 287 , ine 04112-0287
----0 TIMOTHY NORTON ESQ KELLY REMMEL & ZIMME&~ PO BOX 597 PORTLAND ME 04112-0597