Lyde v. Green Haven Prison

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 5, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-09351
StatusUnknown

This text of Lyde v. Green Haven Prison (Lyde v. Green Haven Prison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lyde v. Green Haven Prison, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JONATHAN HENRY LYDE, Plaintiff, 20-CV-9351 (LLS) -against- ORDERTO AMEND GREEN HAVEN PRISON, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Sing SingCorrectional Facility , brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his rights.By order dated February 4, 2021,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even,when they have been granted permission to proceedIFP.See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of thesegrounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted,emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude”in pro se cases,id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim,pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept

as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are taken from the complaint: on September 30, 2019, Plaintiff arrived at Green Haven Correctional Facility (Green Haven), and was wrongfully placed in keeplock confinement for 19 days without a disciplinary ticket or note. He wrote grievances to correction officials to no avail. Plaintiff was let out of keeplock on October 17, 2019. Plaintiff brings this action against “Green Haven Prison,” and seeks monetary compensation for the allegedly unlawful confinement. DISCUSSION A. Claims against Green Haven Plaintiff’s claims against Green Havenare barred by the Eleventh Amendment and therefore must be dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal

court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id.New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) “as an arm of the state, stands in the same position as the State of New York.” White v. New York, No. 19-CV-0543, 2019 WL 2578270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2019). Green Haven is a facility operated by DOCCS, and is therefore in the same position.2 New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Trotman v.

Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s §1983 claims against Green Haven. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

2 Section 1983 also provides that an action may be maintained against a “person” who has deprived another of rights under the “Constitution and Laws.” 42 U.S.C. §1983.Green Haven is not a “person” within the meaning of §1983.See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that a state agency is not a “person” for the purpose of § 1983 liability); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (noting that a correctional facility or jail is not a “person” within the meaning of §1983). B. Claim of Wrongful Placement in Keeplock Plaintiff’s assertion that he was wrongfully placed in keeplock without a disciplinary ticket is liberally construed as a claim that prison officials violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. “In a § 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The threshold question for a due process claim “‘is always whether the plaintiff has a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution.’ Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trs. of the Conn. State Univ., 850 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.

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Related

Wolff v. McDonnell
418 U.S. 539 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Sandin v. Conner
515 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Nnebe v. Daus
644 F.3d 147 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Welch v. Bartlett
196 F.3d 389 (Second Circuit, 1999)
Perry v. McDonald
280 F.3d 159 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Washington v. Afify
681 F. App'x 43 (Second Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Lyde v. Green Haven Prison, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lyde-v-green-haven-prison-nysd-2021.