Lvnv Funding LLC, Etc. v. Jonathan Carrasco

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: A-3901-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3901-23

LVNV FUNDING LLC, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST [SOFI LENDING CORP., ORIGINAL CREDITOR],

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JONATHAN CARRASCO,

Defendant-Respondent. _________________________

Argued April 15, 2026 – Decided May 20, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7552-23.

Jesse R. Barreiro argued the cause for appellant (Pressler, Felt & Warshaw, LLP, attorneys; Donald V. Valenzano, Jr. and Michael J. Peters, on the briefs).

Lawrence C. Hersh argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM Plaintiff LVNV Funding, LLC ("LVNV") appeals from a Law Division

order dismissing its complaint and ordering the complaint be filed in another

vicinage. We affirm.

I.

Defendant Jonathan Carrasco obtained a $60,000 personal loan from Sofi

Lending. Under the terms of the agreement, Carrasco was obligated to repay

the lender $1,649.86 over the following forty-eight months. At the time the loan

was negotiated, Carrasco lived in Kearny. The debt was ultimately assigned to

LVNV that sued to recover the unpaid balance after Carrasco defaulted on his

payment obligation. LVNV brought the action in Essex County.

After the complaint was filed, a court clerk issued a deficiency notice and

informed LVNV that the complaint may have been filed in the improper venue,

noting Carrasco's residence in Hudson County as reflected in the pleadings.

LVNV, through Essex County Sheriff's Officer Daniel Deamorim, attempted to

serve Carrasco with the summons and complaint at an address in Newark. Off.

Deamorim did not serve Carrasco personally. Rather, the officer left a copy of

the pleadings with a person named "Jess" at the Newark address whom Off.

Deamorim described in the paperwork as Carrasco's "friend/roommate."

A-3901-23 2 Instead of filing an answer, Carrasco moved to dismiss the complaint and

to quash the summons and the pleadings because the complaint was filed in

Essex County despite the fact that he resided in Kearny, in Hudson County .

Carrasco also sought to quash service of the summons and complaint, asserting

that he neither resided nor had he ever lived at the Newark address where "Jess"

was served. LVNV opposed the motion and noted service was proper because

Jess was Carrasco's sister-in-law and Carrasco's in-laws owned the Newark

residence. LVNV further contended that Carrasco's certification denying he

lived in Newark was insufficient to invalidate service, that he failed to provide

his current address, and that the court should have held a plenary hearing to

address the factual dispute. Carrasco certified, in reply, he continuously resided

in Kearny, had never lived in Newark, and was living in Kearny when the loan

was issued and when the summons and complaint were served in Newark.

The motion judge granted Carrasco's motion, dismissed the complaint for

lack of service and because it was filed in an improper venue, and quashed

service of the summons and complaint. The motion judge specifically directed

LVNV refile the matter in Hudson County.

Rather than following the court's instructions, LVNV moved for

reconsideration and argued the judge should have convened a plenary hearing to

A-3901-23 3 resolve what it asserted were disputed facts. Carrasco responded that service

upon a roommate or someone at the residence is only valid if a defendant

actually lived at that address at which substituted service occurred. He argued

there was no factual evidence that he ever lived in Newark. The judge denied

the motion for reconsideration.

LVNV appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied her discretion in

denying both motions. Before oral argument, LVNV, through counsel, informed

us that it no longer wished to pursue its request for a plenary hearing before the

motion court.

II.

"It is elementary that service must be accomplished in accordance with

the pertinent rules in such a way as to afford 'notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" Jameson v. Great

Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Davis

v. DND/Fidoreo, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 92, 97 (App. Div. 1998)).

"The primary method of obtaining [personal] jurisdiction over a defendant

in this State is by causing the summons and complaint to be personally served

within this State pursuant to [Rule] 4:4-3." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Curcio, 444

A-3901-23 4 N.J. Super. 94, 105 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting R. 4:4-4(a)). Rule 4:4-3(a)

requires that a summons and complaint be served "by the sheriff, or by a person

specially appointed by the court for that purpose, or by plaintiff's attorney or the

attorney's agent, or by any other competent adult not having a direct interest in

the litigation."

The person serving the complaint and summons must submit proof of

service in the form of an affidavit. R. 4:4-7. The return of service creates a

"presumption that the facts recited therein are true." Jameson, 363 N.J. Super.

at 426 (quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Associated Gulf Contractors, Inc., 263 N.J.

Super. 332, 343 (App. Div. 1993)); see also Intek Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Zetes

Microtech Corp., 268 N.J. Super. 426, 433 (App. Div. 1993) (finding that service

by a process server authorized by the court is entitled to a presumption of

validity). This presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence establishing the return is false. Jameson, 363 N.J. Super. at 426.

LVNV's argument is flawed because it relies on the incorrect factual

premise that Carrasco had some connection to the premises sufficient to

establish that he would ultimately receive the summons and complaint, thereby

ensuring due process. Nothing in the record, however, presented to the trial

court demonstrates that any attempt was made to serve defendant directly at the

A-3901-23 5 Kearny address or that service on Jess would have been a means sufficient for

him to receive the process.

Despite having information that Carrasco was living in Kearny, LVNV

instead took substantial efforts — including detailed forensic investigations —

to ascertain an address at which Carrasco might have resided in Newark. The

record does not indicate that service in Kearny failed or had even been

attempted. LVNV failed to make any prima facie showing Carrasco had even

minimal contacts with the residence at which Off. Deamorim served the

summons and complaint. Therefore, because the original service and

accompanying affidavit was flawed, the presumption of truthfulness does not

apply and the burden of disproving valid service cannot shift to Carrasco. We

discern no error in the trial court's conclusion that LVNV failed to obtain

personal jurisdiction over Carrasco.

Therefore, we discern no error in the trial judge's orders dismissing the

complaint, directing LVNV to file in the proper county that would have

jurisdiction over this dispute, and denying reconsideration.

To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

issues, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

A-3901-23 6 Affirmed.

A-3901-23 7