Luther X. Hall

2021 Ark. 160, 631 S.W.3d 552

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: September 16, 2021
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2021 Ark. 160 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-81-130

Opinion Delivered: September 16, 2021

LUTHER X. HALL PETITIONER PETITION TO REINVEST JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL V. COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR STATE OF ARKANSAS CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH DIVISION, NOS. 60CR-80-2160; 60CR-80-2159]

PETITION DENIED.

BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice

Petitioner Luther X. Hall brings this pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the

trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. 1 In the petition, Hall alleges

that he was denied counsel for four months prior to his trial and that such a fundamental

violation of his Sixth Amendment right entitles him to coram nobis relief. Because Hall fails

to state sufficient grounds for such relief, we deny the petition.

1 In the title of his petition, Hall alleges that he is seeking to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court for the purpose of considering a renewed Rule 37 petition. In 1981, a Rule 37 petitioner was required to obtain permission from this court to file the petition in the trial court. Hall previously filed such a petition, which was denied by this court. Hall v. State, CR 81-130 (Ark. June 20, 1983) (unpublished). Moreover, under the previous Rule, a petition for postconviction relief had to be filed within three years from the date of the commitment unless the judgment was absolutely void. Smothers v. State, 273 Ark. 518, 621 S.W.2d 475 (1981). Here, Hall has not demonstrated that the judgment in his case was absolutely void. I. Background

On June 15, 1981, Hall was convicted by a Pulaski County jury of two counts of

capital murder and one count of second-degree murder in a separate trial that took place on

August 25, 1981. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole on the capital

charges and to a term of thirty years’ imprisonment on the second-degree murder

conviction. The cases were consolidated on appeal. We affirmed. Hall v. State, 276 Ark.

245, 634 S.W.2d 115 (1982).

The convictions arose when Hall acted as a lookout while his two accomplices killed

Leonard Jones and Carl Jackson by shooting them repeatedly while they were tied up in the

trunk of a car. After that, Hall and his accomplices robbed Rosemary Bogard and killed her

in the course of that crime. Id. Hall’s argument on appeal that his confession to the crimes

was involuntary was rejected by this court. Id. In affirming his convictions and the voluntary

nature of Hall’s confession, this court set forth the facts surrounding his arrest, his initial

court appearance, and his decision to provide a statement to investigators. In so doing, this

court pointed out that within a few days of his arrest, Hall was taken before the court where

his rights were explained to him, including his right to appointment of counsel. Id. Hall

informed the court that he intended to retain his own counsel, and upon being returned to

the jail, Hall told investigators that he wanted to make a statement. After being informed of

his rights, Hall gave a detailed confession to the crimes that was recorded and introduced at

the trial for the murder of Jones and Jackson. Id.

2 Hall subsequently filed a petition for Rule 37 relief raising multiple allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel, all of which were rejected. Hall v. State, CR 81-130 (Ark.

June 20, 1983) (unpublished per curiam).

II. Writ of Error Coram Nobis

The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial court

can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on

appeal only after we grant permission. Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. A

writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397,

17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that

the judgment of conviction is valid. Green v. State, 2016 Ark. 386, 502 S.W.3d 524. The

function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some

fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and

which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before

rendition of the judgment. Newman, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. The petitioner has the

burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Roberts v. State,

2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771.

A writ of error coram nobis is available to address certain errors found in one of four

categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial; (2) a coerced guilty plea; (3) material evidence

withheld by the prosecutor; and (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time

between conviction and appeal.2 Linell v. State, 2020 Ark. 253, 602 S.W. 3d 117. The

2 This court has extended the writ in compelling circumstances to ensure due process and prevent a miscarriage of justice. See Strawhacker v. State, 2016 Ark. 348, 500 S.W. 3d 716.

3 function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some

fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and

which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before

rendition of judgment. E.g., White v. State, 2014 Ark. 348, at 2, 438 S.W.3d 916, 917–18

(per curiam). The burden is on the petitioner in the application for coram nobis relief to

make a full disclosure of specific facts relied upon and not to merely state conclusions as to

the nature of such facts. McCullough v. State, 2017 Ark. 292, 528 S.W.3d 833.

III. Claims for Relief

Hall argues that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because he was arrested in

December 1980, was not appointed an attorney until April 13, 1981, and went to trial on

June 15, 1981, for the murders of Jones and Jackson. Hall asserts that the delay in the

appointment of counsel affected the ability of counsel to investigate his case and to call

witnesses that would have provided an alibi and other favorable testimony. Hall further

alleges that his appointed attorney was ineffective for failing to thoroughly investigate his

case or to subpoena witnesses that Hall had suggested would aid in the defense. Hall appears

to attribute his allegedly invalid convictions to both the delay in appointment of counsel

and to the ineffective assistance of his appointed counsel.

The allegations raised by Hall do not set out facts that were extrinsic to the record

and otherwise do not fall within the five categories recognized as grounds for issuance of

the writ. Howard, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. Hall argues that the failure to appoint

counsel for four months while he awaited trial constitutes a violation of his fundamental

rights and should therefore be recognized as an exception under our holding in Strawhacker

4 v. State, 2016 Ark. 348, 500 S.W.3d 716. Hall is mistaken. In Strawhacker, the facts alleged

in the coram nobis petition questioned the reliability of testimony from a government expert

at trial, were unknown at the time of the trial, and potentially affected the trial’s outcome.

Hall’s allegation regarding the delayed appointment of counsel was not unknown at the time

of his trial and could have been remedied at that time by requesting a continuance. Indeed,

in Hall’s original Rule 37 petition, Hall alleged that counsel was ineffective by failing to

request a continuance. See Hall, CR 81-130 (Ark. June 20, 1983).

In essence, Hall’s claims for coram nobis relief represent claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not support issuance

of the writ of error coram nobis. Henington v. State, 2020 Ark. 11, 590 S.W.3d 736. Coram

nobis proceedings are not to be used as a substitute for timely raising claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel under Rule 37.1. Id.

Luther X. Hall, pro se petitioner.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael L. Yarbrough, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for respondent.