MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 29 2016, 9:19 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Donald E.C. Leicht Gregory F. Zoeller Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eric P. Babbs Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Luther Riddell, February 29, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 34A04-1507-CR-897 v. Appeal from the Howard Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable George A. Appellee-Plaintiff. Hopkins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-1412-MR-171
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 1 of 9 [1] Luther Riddell was convicted of Murder,1 a felony, and was determined to be a
Habitual Offender. Riddell presents two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Riddell’s motion for a mistrial?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the habitual offender phase?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] During the early morning hours of December 16, 2014, Jay West went to
Riddell’s house. An argument and fight ensued, most of which was recorded
on Riddell’s surveillance camera system. As West walked away from Riddell’s
home and out of camera range, Riddell grabbed an object and followed him.
Riddell then returned to camera range and replaced the object. West was
discovered lying in a nearby yard and ultimately died of a stab wound. West’s
DNA was taken from the blade of a knife that was found in proximity to where
Riddell can be seen grabbing and later replacing an object.
[4] The following day, the State charged Riddell with murder and alleged him to be
a habitual offender. A three-day jury trial commenced on June 9, 2015. At the
end of the second day, just before the court recessed for the evening, there was
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 2 of 9 an outburst from the gallery by an unidentified woman who yelled, “You need
to fucking die, you fucking murderer, lying ass, bitch.” Transcript at 213. The
trial court summoned security and removed the jury to the jury room. The
record continued outside the presence of the jury with Riddell’s counsel moving
for a mistrial based on the spectator’s outburst. Riddell’s counsel argued that
“the jury has been affected and may have been tainted and contaminated.” Id.
at 214. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and Riddell’s counsel
made no further request.
[5] The jury reconvened the next day and the trial continued. After the close of
evidence, the jury returned its verdict finding Riddell guilty of murder. The trial
then continued with the habitual offender phase tried to the jury. To establish
Riddell was a habitual offender, the State offered State’s Exhibit 19, a series of
documents relating to his August 15, 2008 conviction for receiving stolen
property, a class D felony, under Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. Riddell
objected to admission of State’s Exhibit 19, asserting that not every document
therein was certified. The trial court looked at the exhibit and sua sponte
removed four pages of the exhibit, which were described as a “prosecutor’s
report” and an “update report.” Transcript at 275. The trial court allowed
admission of the remaining documents that comprised State’s Exhibit 19,
including the certified charging information, certified probable cause affidavit,
and certified sentencing order from Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. The trial
court overruled Riddell’s objection that the exhibit must be “taken either as a
whole or not.” Transcript at 276.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 3 of 9 [6] When the State offered State’s Exhibit 21, which included documents relating to
Riddell’s April 25, 2006 conviction for burglary, a class C felony, under Cause
No. 30D01-0512-FC-185, Riddell objected, citing again the fact that several of
the documents included therein were not certified. The trial court sua sponte
took out the probable cause affidavit, but allowed admission of the remaining
documents, which included the certified charging information, certified guilty
plea and sentencing entry, and certified judgment of conviction from Cause No.
30D01-0512-FC-185. The trial court overruled Riddell’s objection that the
exhibit “ha[d] to be accepted in whole or rejected.” Transcript at 278. The jury
found Riddell to be a habitual offender. On July 10, 2015, the trial court
sentenced Riddell to sixty years for murder with a ten-year enhancement for his
status as a habitual offender. Riddell now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
1. Mistrial
[7] Riddell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a mistrial following an outburst from someone in the gallery while the jury was
still present in the courtroom. Riddell asserts that the trial court’s failure to
admonish the jury immediately after the outburst occurred allowed the outburst
“to germinate in [the jurors’] minds.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Riddell also
seemingly faults the trial court for not admonishing the jury the following
morning before trial resumed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 4 of 9 [8] A mistrial is an extreme action and is warranted only when no other action can
be expected to remedy the situation. Vaughn v. State, 971 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Ind.
2012). “The decision to grant or deny a mistrial motion is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 67. We will reverse the trial court’s
determination on the issue only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court. Id. at 67-68. “We afford great deference to the
trial court because it is in the best position to gauge the circumstances and
impact on the jury.” Id.
[9] When faced with a circumstance that a defendant believes might warrant a
mistrial, generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment. Isom v.
State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 482 (Ind. 2015). If unsatisfied with the admonishment or
if it is obvious that an admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error,
then counsel may move for a mistrial. Id. In situations similar to the present, it
has been held that an admonishment to disregard an outburst by a spectator is a
reasonably curative measure. Thus, where an admonishment is given in such
cases, the trial court’s subsequent denial of a motion for mistrial is not an abuse
of discretion. See Adkins v. State, 524 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (Ind. 1988); Hill v.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 29 2016, 9:19 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Donald E.C. Leicht Gregory F. Zoeller Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eric P. Babbs Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Luther Riddell, February 29, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 34A04-1507-CR-897 v. Appeal from the Howard Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable George A. Appellee-Plaintiff. Hopkins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-1412-MR-171
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 1 of 9 [1] Luther Riddell was convicted of Murder,1 a felony, and was determined to be a
Habitual Offender. Riddell presents two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Riddell’s motion for a mistrial?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the habitual offender phase?
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] During the early morning hours of December 16, 2014, Jay West went to
Riddell’s house. An argument and fight ensued, most of which was recorded
on Riddell’s surveillance camera system. As West walked away from Riddell’s
home and out of camera range, Riddell grabbed an object and followed him.
Riddell then returned to camera range and replaced the object. West was
discovered lying in a nearby yard and ultimately died of a stab wound. West’s
DNA was taken from the blade of a knife that was found in proximity to where
Riddell can be seen grabbing and later replacing an object.
[4] The following day, the State charged Riddell with murder and alleged him to be
a habitual offender. A three-day jury trial commenced on June 9, 2015. At the
end of the second day, just before the court recessed for the evening, there was
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 2 of 9 an outburst from the gallery by an unidentified woman who yelled, “You need
to fucking die, you fucking murderer, lying ass, bitch.” Transcript at 213. The
trial court summoned security and removed the jury to the jury room. The
record continued outside the presence of the jury with Riddell’s counsel moving
for a mistrial based on the spectator’s outburst. Riddell’s counsel argued that
“the jury has been affected and may have been tainted and contaminated.” Id.
at 214. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and Riddell’s counsel
made no further request.
[5] The jury reconvened the next day and the trial continued. After the close of
evidence, the jury returned its verdict finding Riddell guilty of murder. The trial
then continued with the habitual offender phase tried to the jury. To establish
Riddell was a habitual offender, the State offered State’s Exhibit 19, a series of
documents relating to his August 15, 2008 conviction for receiving stolen
property, a class D felony, under Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. Riddell
objected to admission of State’s Exhibit 19, asserting that not every document
therein was certified. The trial court looked at the exhibit and sua sponte
removed four pages of the exhibit, which were described as a “prosecutor’s
report” and an “update report.” Transcript at 275. The trial court allowed
admission of the remaining documents that comprised State’s Exhibit 19,
including the certified charging information, certified probable cause affidavit,
and certified sentencing order from Cause No. 34D04-0710-FD-141. The trial
court overruled Riddell’s objection that the exhibit must be “taken either as a
whole or not.” Transcript at 276.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 3 of 9 [6] When the State offered State’s Exhibit 21, which included documents relating to
Riddell’s April 25, 2006 conviction for burglary, a class C felony, under Cause
No. 30D01-0512-FC-185, Riddell objected, citing again the fact that several of
the documents included therein were not certified. The trial court sua sponte
took out the probable cause affidavit, but allowed admission of the remaining
documents, which included the certified charging information, certified guilty
plea and sentencing entry, and certified judgment of conviction from Cause No.
30D01-0512-FC-185. The trial court overruled Riddell’s objection that the
exhibit “ha[d] to be accepted in whole or rejected.” Transcript at 278. The jury
found Riddell to be a habitual offender. On July 10, 2015, the trial court
sentenced Riddell to sixty years for murder with a ten-year enhancement for his
status as a habitual offender. Riddell now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
1. Mistrial
[7] Riddell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a mistrial following an outburst from someone in the gallery while the jury was
still present in the courtroom. Riddell asserts that the trial court’s failure to
admonish the jury immediately after the outburst occurred allowed the outburst
“to germinate in [the jurors’] minds.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Riddell also
seemingly faults the trial court for not admonishing the jury the following
morning before trial resumed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 4 of 9 [8] A mistrial is an extreme action and is warranted only when no other action can
be expected to remedy the situation. Vaughn v. State, 971 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Ind.
2012). “The decision to grant or deny a mistrial motion is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 67. We will reverse the trial court’s
determination on the issue only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court. Id. at 67-68. “We afford great deference to the
trial court because it is in the best position to gauge the circumstances and
impact on the jury.” Id.
[9] When faced with a circumstance that a defendant believes might warrant a
mistrial, generally the correct procedure is to request an admonishment. Isom v.
State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 482 (Ind. 2015). If unsatisfied with the admonishment or
if it is obvious that an admonishment will not be sufficient to cure the error,
then counsel may move for a mistrial. Id. In situations similar to the present, it
has been held that an admonishment to disregard an outburst by a spectator is a
reasonably curative measure. Thus, where an admonishment is given in such
cases, the trial court’s subsequent denial of a motion for mistrial is not an abuse
of discretion. See Adkins v. State, 524 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (Ind. 1988); Hill v.
State, 497 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind. 1986) (same).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 5 of 9 [10] Here, Riddell never requested an admonishment, but rather, moved
immediately for a mistrial.2 The decision whether to admonish a jury is a
function of trial strategy because an admonishment may draw undue attention
to the very remarks and or conduct to be addressed. See Brewer v. State, 455
N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ind. 1983). It is a function of defense counsel to determine if
such strategy is desirable. Id. The trial court’s function is to rule on such
request, if made, and not to, sua sponte, initiate the admonishment of the jury.
Id. We therefore reject Riddell’s argument to the extent he claims it was
incumbent upon the trial court to admonish the jury even where an
admonishment was not requested.
[11] We likewise reject Riddell’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for mistrial. To prevail on appeal from the denial of a
motion for mistrial, Riddell must establish that the questioned conduct “was so
prejudicial and inflammatory that he was placed in a position of grave peril to
which he should not have been subjected.” Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585,
589 (Ind. 2001). The gravity of peril is determined by considering the
misconduct’s probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision, not the
impropriety of the challenged action, evidence, or misconduct. Mack v. State,
736 N.E.2d 801, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
2 When the jury reconvened the following day, Riddell again did not request an admonishment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 6 of 9 [12] The circumstance giving rise to Riddell’s motion for a mistrial was an
emotional outburst from an unidentified female spectator. The spectator used
profane language and accused Riddell of being a liar and a murderer. The
outburst occurred as the court recessed the jury for the evening. The trial court
immediately summoned security and removed the jury from the courtroom.
After the jury was removed, Riddell immediately moved for a mistrial, asserting
the jury had been “tainted.” Transcript at 214. The trial court disagreed and
denied the motion.
[13] Here, the spectator’s outburst was short, transpiring in a matter of seconds.
Further, there was no disruption of trial proceedings as the jury was preparing
to exit the courtroom after the proceedings had been adjourned for the day.
The spectator’s outburst did not add to the State’s evidence. Indeed, the State’s
evidence of Riddell’s guilt was overwhelming, with much of it presented by way
of the recording taken from Riddell’s security cameras. The recordings showed
a heated exchange followed by Riddell initiating a physical confrontation. The
recording also showed Riddell following West after he left Riddell’s property.
Riddell is seen grabbing an object and then replacing it. A knife later found in
proximity to where Riddell is seen grabbing an object contained West’s DNA
on the blade. West was found in a nearby yard and died of a stab wound at the
scene. The spectator’s outburst, while an unfortunate breach of decorum, did
not place Riddell in a position of grave peril to which he otherwise would not
have been subjected. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Riddell’s motion for a mistrial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 7 of 9 2. Habitual Offender
[14] During the habitual offender phase, the State offered State’s Exhibits 19 and 21,
each composed of documents relating to Riddell’s prior convictions for the
jury’s consideration of Riddell’s status as a habitual offender. Riddell’s
argument with regard to admission of these exhibits is that the trial court
exceeded its authority when it admitted the exhibits as modified by the court
instead of admitting them as offered by the State or excluding them altogether.
Riddell cites no authority to support his argument that the trial court could not
admit the exhibits as modified. Riddell has therefore waived any error in this
regard. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“[e]ach contention must be
supported by citations to the authorities . . . relied on”); Jackson v. State, 758
N.E.2d 1030, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding waiver where appellant failed
to cite appropriate authority).
[15] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
State’s Exhibits 19 and 21 without certain documents that were initially
contained therein. Trial courts have “inherent discretionary power on the
admission of evidence.” Vasquez v. State, 868 N2d 473, 476 (Ind. 2007)
(quotation omitted). Indeed, trial courts frequently redact or excise
inadmissible matter from statements and other evidence. Townsend v. State, 533
N.E.2d 1215, 1225 (Ind. 1989). This is apparently what happened here.
[16] To the extent Riddell complains that the exhibits as tendered by the State are
not included in the record, we note that it was Riddell’s burden to provide us
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 8 of 9 with a complete record. See Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (noting that the appellant bears the burden of presenting a complete
record with respect to the issues raised), trans. denied. Finally, we note that
Riddell does not challenge the documents that were admitted as part of State’s
Exhibits 19 and 21 as inadmissible. Upon review of the documents in each
exhibit, it is clear that each one bears a proper certification. Riddell has failed
to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibits
19 and 21.
[17] Judgment affirmed.
[18] Robb, J. and Barnes, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1507-CR-897 | Februar 29, 2016 Page 9 of 9