Luten v. Marsh

254 F. 701, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 979
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedJanuary 7, 1919
DocketNo. 4009
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 254 F. 701 (Luten v. Marsh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Luten v. Marsh, 254 F. 701, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 979 (S.D. Iowa 1919).

Opinion

WADE, District Judge.

I am going to dispose of this case now, notwithstanding the fact that it must be self-evident that I have not had time to study the various items of evidence presented here upon both sides, and, if I had any doubt in my mind as to what the decision ought to be, I would take the time to go through this record more carefully. But I have not the time to study this record within the next few months, and I feel that this is a case that should be promptly disposed of — first, because of the public importance of it, the far-reaching effect it may have; and, second, because of some of the methods, disclosed here, which, have been employed by the plaintiff in the business of constructing bridges or getting the business of designing bridges. These methods no court can approve — some of them, at least. I am not sure but what they ought to be construed as sufficient to deny the party relief on the ground that he does not come into court with clean hands. I refer especially to the half-truths, which are worse than falsehoods, in some of these representations made to contractors; because, when a man recites a list of cases as having been tried, or in which decisions have been rendered, without disclosing that nearly all of them have been consent decrees, it is not the truth. It is only half the truth. Those consent decrees should never have been utilized for any such purpose. It ought to appear upon their face, stamped plainr ly “by consent of parties,” and not be held out as the solemn action, of the court, which has never inquired into the facts at all. In fact, I am not sure but that there ought to be a prohibition of consent decrees in patent cases, because of the fact that they are by some per[702]*702sons used as the basis of obtaining settlements, when the one party knows that tire decree is not the decree of the court, but the decree prepared by consent of parties and simply approved by the court without investigation, and the other party does not. So that I feel that this is a matter which ought to be disposed of promptly, and I also feel that, in view of the disclosures in this case, Congress ought to pass a law providing that the Attorney General, or some one else, may institute a proceeding testing the validity of patents, settling the rights of parties on both sides — at least, as to the validity and as to the construction of the patent. Of course, anybody can see, in a field of this kind, which extends so far, that until these patents are settled they will always be an obstacle, or always may be an obstacle, to the development of tire art, and to the utilization by communities of the best there is in bridge engineering. Plaintiff has certain rights, or he has not, and the plaintiff in this length of time certainly should have some of these rights determined finally. I do not know whose fault it is, but so far as the case which Judge Eewis decided so long ago, which has been lying there two years after his decision was rendered, with the rights of the public still in the balance, it is all wrong. The final decision of that matter should and would aid very materially the rights of the plaintiff here, and the rights of the public. There is something wrong.

[1] Well, now, in this first group of claims under patent No. 852,-970, nobody claims that this pavement under a bridge is new. No one claims that the method provided for putting in this pavement is new ; but what plaintiff claims is, as I understand it, that the tapering edge extending into the bed of the stream is a new invention. Well, if there is any invention about it, I do not think it is new. Without going into the evidence, the publication in the Engineering News in 1891 is such that I feel that any mechanic, called upon to do that work, would do it, if he was sufficiently well educated to understand the matter, in the manner pointed out by Mr. Luten in his patent. This Engineering News says:

“Wherever water is to be carried, it is very necessary to protect both ends by sheet pile aprons or curb walls, as shown in Figures 1 and 3. This is needed as much, if not more, at lower than at upper ends, because if water is at ah rapid, and material soft, failure most frequently takes place at lower ends, as shown by the line of scour in Figure 3.
“A filling of large and small' broken stones to carry this protection still farther is desirable, and, in case of a rapid fall in the water surface, several cross-walls to protect the scour are often useful. Sheet piles can be used instead of cross-walls, if always wet.”

And further:

“These remarks cover an important and much-neglected matter. Our observation is that the protection is needed very much more at the. lower end than the upper. Great carelessness is often shown in this respect, when great care should rather be used to carry the water safely away from the structure.”

In other words, anybody with powers of observation and experience, in handling beds of streams — trying to pave the bed of a stream— would know instinctively, when he saw the paving tapering off there, that if it stopped with the actual technical bottom of the stream the [703]*703effect of the current would be to do the very thing described in this Engineering News. The very danger that the Engineering News gives for the protection of the lower end must be provided against, or else you would have a washout, and of course any one could see, without the exercise of any inventive genius, that a floor on the bottom of the stream, just level with the bottom of the stream, not extending into it.to any degree, would simply invite a counter-current under the edge there, which would wash it out. In this patent, of course, it shows the curve of the whole paving downward, to and into the bottom of the stream; but that is not essential at all. It does not make any difference, nor is it any advantage, what form the bottom of the paving is. The only thing that is of importance is what is the form of the top of the paving. In other words, if you put paving in there a foot deep in the bottom of the stream, and have the lower edge taper off in the form described by Mr. Euten, I assu,me that you have the same thing exactly as if you had a three-inch paving, which curved down and extended into the bed of the stream to the same degree that the surface of the other pavement extended. I do not think, in the state of the art at the time that this patent was granted, that Mr. Euten’s patent is of any validity.

Now, group 2 is under patent No. 852,970. That relates to the extending of the spandrel and the wing walls. I have not yet been able to determine what Mr. Euten claims to have invented. I understand, of course, what he has described in his application, and what is described in the patent. I understand the purpose which he claims this construction will serve; but the particular thing invented I have nor yet been able to grasp. It is not disputed that the extension of the spandrel was old. There cannot be any question about that. It did extend, prior to that time, sometimes to a greater or less degree, beyond the pier. Of course, if it was old and varied in its extension, then it became simply a matter of experience and custom of those skilled in the art, working in the peculiar roadway involved in each particular case, as to how far the spandrel ought to extend out — how far it would have advantage in extending out, depending, of course, upon the length of the bridge and other things; and there is no claim here that the extension of the spandrel is a patentable novelty, or was at that time.

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Related

Luten v. Wilson Reinforced Concrete Co.
263 F. 983 (Eighth Circuit, 1920)
Luten v. Washburn
253 F. 950 (Eighth Circuit, 1918)
Luten v. Scott
263 F. 721 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1918)

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Bluebook (online)
254 F. 701, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/luten-v-marsh-iasd-1919.